

INEQUALITY IN THE LIVES OF ADOLESCENTS IN SERBIA

A photograph of four young adults (two men and two women) sitting outdoors on a rocky surface. They are dressed in casual, contemporary clothing like denim jackets and jeans. The scene is lit with a strong blue light, creating a monochromatic aesthetic. The background shows some trees and a bright sky.

 MICS

unicef 
for every child

INEQUALITY IN THE LIVES OF ADOLESCENTS IN SERBIA

INEQUALITY IN THE LIVES OF ADOLESCENTS IN SERBIA

Publisher	UNICEF Serbia
For the Publisher	Deyana Kostadinova, Representative
Acknowledgement	UNICEF Serbia is grateful to Dr Dragan Stanojević for the preparation of this report and to Fahrudin Memić for the expert support in data processing.
Design	Rastko Toholj
ISBN	978-86-80902-73-9
Published	2022

CONTENTS

Abbreviations	4		
INTRODUCTION	5		
WEALTH OF ADOLESCENTS	8		
The internet and digital technologies	13		
INCLUSION IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES	16		
DISCIPLINE: PARENTAL ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES (10–13)	20		
HEALTH RISKS AND FUNCTIONAL DIFFICULTIES	24		
Contraception and sexual behaviour	27		
Early marriage: adolescent girls	28		
Early childbearing	29		
EDUCATION	32		
Primary school: upper grades / lower secondary (ISCED)	32		
Secondary school/upper secondary (ISCED)	35		
Transitions in the education process	37		
Equality in education indices	38		
Home learning environment (10–13)	39		
		PARTICIPATION IN SCHOOL-RELATED ACTIVITIES (10–13)	41
		Support for schoolchildren (10–13)	42
		LIFE SATISFACTION	45
		CONCLUSION	47
		References	53
		APPENDIX	55

ABBREVIATIONS

DPA	densely populated areas
IPA	intermediate populated areas
TPA	thinly populated areas
GNI	gross national income
GPI	gender parity index
HDI	human development index
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
NAR	net attendance ratio

INTRODUCTION

Adolescence includes biological growth, psychological development and transitions to different social roles. It is a period that connects childhood and adulthood. Various risks could intervene in children's development and transitions, leading to lowering their potential. Transitions that take place, or may occur during this period, are educational, work, partnership and parental transitions. Although contemporary trends, and national research (Tomanović et al., 2012, Tomanović and Stanojević, 2015), indicate the postponement of all transitions to later years (primarily due to the longer process of education), a number of children enter the social adult role relatively early. Early school leaving, entry into the labour market, early marriage or parenthood all limit potential future life events and carry health, labour market and family risks. From a life-course perspective, this period is full of potential disruptions that can have effects on life chances. Inequalities in development outcomes among marginalized and disadvantaged adolescents are the result of insufficient resources, support in the family, neighbourhood and the wider community in which they live, as well as the discrimination they suffer (Bonnie et al., 2019).

One approach that can provide adequate answers to inequalities among adolescents and different chances in life is the ecological theory (Guo et al., 2018; Ostrom, 2009; Kef et al., 2000). Developed within psychology (Bronfenbrenner, 1974), this approach recognizes the circles of influence on a person, and “specify that factors at multiple levels, often including intrapersonal, interpersonal, organizational, community, and public policy” can influence different outcomes for children and youth (Sallis, Owen and Fisher, 2008: 470). The factors of interest are “the individual system (age, gender, etc.), family system (family income, family support, etc.), school system (school engagement, school support, etc.) and community system (organizations, neighbours' support, etc.)” (Guo et al., 2018:2).

Endeavouring to analyse the factors that produce different outcomes among adolescents, this analysis operationalizes the ecological approach that recognizes different spheres of influence. The first of these is the family environment, which is divided into household resources and family (including parental) practices. The second is the broader social context in which adolescents develop and which can be either stimulating or limiting to various degrees. The social context was operationalized through region (level NUTS2), area type (population density: densely populated areas — DPA; intermediate populated areas — IPA; and thinly populated areas — TPA) and four quality of life indices: human development index (HDI); gross national income (GNI) per capita; education expectancy; and index of life expectancy.

First circle — family resources

Wealth has proved to be a significant predictor of many outcomes for adolescents, as it has for the outcomes of adults. Wealth and poverty can directly and indirectly impact a large number of outcomes, such as quality of life, health, learning environment and learning outcomes, child labour and violence, as well as psychological security (Skopek et al., 2014; Gibson-Davis and Hill, 2021; Pfeffer and Waitkus, 2021).

Parental education. Research continues to confirm links between the educational level of parents and the educational (Stanojević, 2013; Davis Kean, 2005) and occupational (Dubow et al., 2009) outcomes of their children. Whether it is down to better learning conditions, parenting practices or beliefs and attitudes that correlate with parental education, the children of better-educated parents will be more likely to achieve better grades in school, attain a higher level of education and find better paid and less risky work.

Possession of **digital technologies** and access to the internet are preconditions for access to information, knowledge, social networks and, during the COVID-19 pandemic, significant tools in terms of learning and work. At the same time, possession alone does not say enough about use, and studies show a broad range of internet use that depends on a child's socio-economic status (Peter and Valkenburg, 2006; Notten et al., 2009). Various analyses clearly document that internet access is linked to wealth, poverty and education, and related to digital skills and knowledge (Scheerder et al., 2017).

Second circle — family practices

Child labour. Even though not all work during childhood is harmful, and can result in a range of benefits to an extent, work that is engaged in beyond certain limits or that takes place in hazardous conditions has a negative impact on a child's physical, emotional and intellectual development, as well as contributing to the reproduction of poverty and social inequality. The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines child labour as work that is “mentally, physically, socially or morally dangerous and harmful to children; and/or interferes with their schooling by: depriving them of the opportunity to attend school; obliging them to leave school prematurely; or requiring them to attempt to combine school attendance with excessively long and heavy work.”¹ Engagement in this kind of harmful work results in a lowering of educational opportunities and a reduction of time spent in formal or non-formal education, decreased chances in the labour market and similar (Parker and Bachman, 2002; Basu and Tzannatos, 2003).

Discipline methods. How children are disciplined can have far-reaching consequences for the child and the parent–child relationship. If parents employ violent methods, children are more likely to develop a lower degree of moral internalization and higher degrees of aggressive behaviour, delinquency and criminal or antisocial behaviour. Their ability to forge relationships with their peers will be hindered, and barriers to the parent-child relationship will result in lower levels of mental and physical health, including depression and anxiety (Gershoff, 2002; Smith, 2006). Several groups of factors are associated with such practices. Above all, these practices depend on the level of tolerance for aggression in society, including aggression in family relationships and towards children. Closely linked to this are the parent's own experiences, in the sense that parents who were severely punished as children are more likely to develop attitudes supportive of such forms of discipline and to subsequently employ these models of child-rearing, thereby continuing the vicious cycle. Stress that can be caused by familial relationships, unemployment, a lack of resources or other social upheavals can also result in aggressive behaviour towards children (Straus, 2010).

Learning environment at home. Children with whom parents regularly work on homework, and who have an adequate learning environment at home, are more likely to develop work habits, learning skills and high educational aspirations. Although new practices of parental involvement also indicate the burden that parents bear (these practices are named ‘third shift’ — along with paid work, household chores, parental tasks are the third important ways of involvement), these to some extent have positive outcomes for children.

Third circle — social context

Regions. Like most societies, Serbia has regional differences based on the development of infrastructure, labour market opportunities, culture and lifestyle. The differences between the north and the south, and between the capital and the rest of Serbia, are most often mentioned.

Areas. Research has already documented the existence of rural–urban disparities and inequalities, which may have an impact on the outcomes of children and youth. Differences in the development of infrastructure, primary economic activities, demographic structure, values and lifestyles can affect the opportunities and decisions that young people make in a key period of life.

Development of districts. As measures of district development, we used HDI and its components: 1. GNI per capita, 2. index of life expectancy, 3. education expectancy. Data on HDI measures for each of the 24 districts in Serbia were obtained from official statistics. Analyses of HDI measures are based on a comparison of HDI means in different segments of the population. HDI indexes were used as individual characteristics of the respondents. For example, when examining the association between HDI and preschool attendance, the average HDI for children who attend and for children who do not attend kindergarten was compared.

1 <https://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/lang--en/index.htm>, accessed 12/6/2022.

Research questions:

1. What are the effects of socio-economic factors and family background on adolescent (male and female) well-being?
2. What are the effects of family practices on adolescent (male and female) well-being?
3. What are the effects of place of residence — settlement type, region and district — on adolescent well-being?

In the analysis, we divided the phases of life course of adolescence in accordance with the developmental stages and the educational cycle so that this population is divided into two phases:

1. Lower secondary school age (10–13 years old) is the phase where formal compulsory education continues. In this phase, children acquire basic knowledge and social skills and prepare for the next level of education: upper secondary.
2. Upper secondary school age (14–19 years old) is a period of more intensive transitions in different domains, a period in which children enter into social roles and acquire competencies. For most children, this phase means continuing their formal education, but for some, entry in the labour market. More and more adolescents are in a relationship, becoming sexually active, which can lead to early marital and parental transitions. During this phase, individuals plan their future and can see their chances within a structural and cultural context.

To conduct our analysis, we used the matrix, adapting it as needed to the nature of the outcomes.

The tables are shown as a heatmaps with values in the cells. Colour shading in a cell indicates statistically significant differences between populations in some value. Green indicates less and red indicates higher risks that the (sub)population faces, while white (no fill) indicates no associations between two measures. In the HDI indexes, ‘+’ and ‘-’ signs were used to indicate the direction of the relationship between the value of the index and the subpopulation.

WEALTH OF ADOLESCENTS

The wealth index, which is assumed to track long-term wealth, is designed in the MICS6 methodology using a series of indicators that include “the ownership of consumer goods, dwelling characteristics, water and sanitation, and other characteristics that are related to the household’s wealth” (UNICEF, 2020:49). Although the index is divided into quintiles, we chose to divide the population into the poorest 60 per cent and richest 40 per cent due to the low number of adolescents in some of the quintile divisions.

The material deprivation index is the standard measure used in the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) methodology (and used for the first time in MICS6 national survey), which expresses the degree to which a family cannot afford any one of nine basic necessities.² This index is divided into three sections: 1. none — those who cannot afford any of the listed necessities; 2. one or two — those who cannot afford one or two of the necessities; and 3. three or more — those who cannot afford three or more of the necessities.

The data show that household wealth is clearly linked to the mother’s education level, as well as all other social context indicators. As many as nine out of ten adolescents whose mother has completed only primary education are in the poorest 60 per cent, while this is true of a quarter of those whose mother has a university degree. Regional differences and those across population density are also clearly indicated, with Belgrade and Vojvodina scoring higher on the wealth index, and poverty increasing as population density decreases. For adolescents, the wealth index is also clearly linked with well-being indicators — HDI, GNI per capita, educational expectation index and life expectancy index — indicating that poverty is not only deeply rooted in underdeveloped social contexts but also that it results in poorer prospects for future generations. Household material deprivation displays similar linkages, in that it is linked to the mother’s education level, region and place of residence. Those who are not deprived are more likely to live in Belgrade and Vojvodina and less likely to live in Southern and Eastern Serbia, with a significantly higher likelihood that they inhabit DPA. There are also more of them in those areas that have above-average HDI, GNI and education index. Therefore, in addition to the personal characteristics of the household members, the social context plays an important role in determining the degree of wealth or deprivation.

Among adolescents living in Roma settlements, as many as two thirds live in households that are in the poorest 60 per cent of the population, while one in six young people live in a household considered to be severely materially deprived. Poverty is more pronounced if the mother has completed no formal education, in the regions of Sumadija and Western Serbia, as well as in TPA. Material deprivation is more pronounced in Vojvodina and Southern and Eastern Serbia and least prevalent in the Belgrade region. As is the case with the general population of adolescents, deprivation is least prevalent in districts with higher HDI, GNI and educational expectation index.

Analyses of the status of the households in which adolescents develop show that while poverty and deprivation in the general population correlate with how developed the area is, this is not the case for those living in Roma settlements. This indicates that the former are able to directly benefit from an area’s development, while the latter do not see many of the benefits.

² 1. to pay their rent, mortgage, utility bills, 2. to keep their home adequately warm, 3. to face unexpected expenses, 4. to eat a meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day, 5. to go on a one-week annual holiday away from home, 6. a television set, 7. a washing machine, 8. a car, or 9. a telephone.

Table 1. Wealth and material deprivation of adolescents (10–19 years old), Serbia

Associations		Wealth		Deprivation		
		Poorest 60%	Three or more	Two	None	
Total		55	27	37	36	
Sex	Male	55	28	36	37	
	Female	56	25	39	36	
Family background	Education of mother	Primary or none	90	59	30	12
		Secondary	61	25	42	33
		Tertiary	27	11	32	56
Spatial context	Region	Belgrade	38	26	32	43
		Vojvodina	47	24	32	44
		Sumadija and Western Serbia	67	24	43	34
		Southern and Eastern Serbia	69	34	42	23
		DPA	34	24	33	43
Social context	Area	IPA	52	22	46	32
		TPA	74	30	37	33
		HDI	-	-	-	+
Level of well-being	GNI	-	-	-	+	
	Education	-	-	-	+	
	Life expectancy	-	-	-	-	

Per cent distribution of the adolescent population 10–19 years old, by wealth index and material deprivation


Table 2. Wealth and material deprivation of adolescents (10–19 years old), Serbia Roma settlements

Associations		Wealth		Deprivation		
		Poorest 60%	Three or more	Two	None	
Total		66	84	10	6	
Sex	Male	68	85	9	6	
	Female	64	83	10	6	
Family background	Education of mother	None	78	85	9	6
		Primary	67	86	10	4
		Secondary or higher	40	75	11	14
Spatial context	Region	Belgrade	57	73	14	13
		Vojvodina	80	91	6	3
		Sumadija and Western Serbia	53	83	8	9
		Southern and Eastern Serbia	65	86	10	4
		DPA	55	80	10	10
Social context	Area	IPA	59	83	13	4
		TPA	80	88	8	4
		HDI	-	-	-	+
Level of well-being	GNI	-	-	-	+	
	Education	-	-	-	+	
	Life expectancy	-	-	-	-	

Per cent distribution of the adolescent population 10–19 years old, by wealth index and material deprivation


The wealth status of adolescents, as observed across both samples, has not altered significantly over the 10-year period. Among the general population there is a notable regional equalization, with the status of adolescents from Belgrade approaching the national average and some reduction in poverty among adolescents living in Vojvodina. An increase in the rate of poor adolescents living in Roma settlements in the Belgrade region has been recorded.

Chart 1. Poorest 60 per cent of adolescents aged 10–19, Serbia



Per cent distribution of the adolescent population 10–19 years old in 2010, 2014 and 2019

Chart 2. Poorest 60 per cent of adolescents aged 10–19, Serbia Roma settlements



Per cent distribution of the adolescent population 10–19 years old in 2010, 2014 and 2019

The characteristics of the dwellings in which adolescents live reveal some more details about their living conditions and show that they are not equal depending on household wealth, the degree of material deprivation, the mother's education, but also the region and

area type. Young people who are in the poorest 60 per cent of the population are significantly more likely to live in a house or apartment in which the roof is leaking or there is damp on the walls, floors or foundations, or in which there is rot present in the window frames or floor. A similar link is apparent with material deprivation, as a rise in deprivation corresponds to a rise in the likelihood that a young person will live in unfavourable conditions. Maternal education — which is an indicator of the household's social stratification — is systemically linked with the household's living conditions, where lower levels of education are accompanied by a dwelling in worse condition. There are no great differences between the regions (except that leaking roofs are more common in Vojvodina and less so in Sumadija and Western Serbia), but dwellings are significantly worse in TPA than in DPA. Dwelling characteristics are not systemically linked to HDI (neither as a whole nor in terms of individual components).

Adolescents living in the Roma settlements experience significantly poorer living conditions compared to their counterparts in the general population according to all of the observed parameters of housing conditions. As is the case with the general population of adolescents, the conditions for adolescents living in Roma settlements are associated with wealth — where the poorest 60 per cent are more likely to live in substandard conditions — and material deprivation — where the severely deprived are far more likely to experience poor living conditions than those who are merely deprived. There are some indications that those living in the Belgrade region experience slightly better living conditions and also that those living in DPA experience slightly better conditions than those in TPA. There are no links between living conditions and HDI indicators for this population either, indicating that living conditions do not differ according to the level of a district's development, but rather according to the material and financial means of families.

Table 3. Housing characteristics, percentage of adolescents (10–19 years old), Serbia

Associations			Housing characteristics		
			Leaking roof	Damp walls, floors or foundation	Rot in window frames or floor
Total			14	23	15
Sex	Male		15	25	15
	Female		13	21	15
Family background	Wealth	Poorest 60%	18	34	22
		Richest 40%	8	10	6
	Deprivation	Three or more	29	45	36
		Two	12	22	11
		One or none	4	8	3
	Education of mother	Primary or none	26	37	30
		Secondary	15	25	15
		Tertiary	7	11	8
Spatial context	Region	Belgrade	12	22	13
		Vojvodina	19	20	17
		Sumadija and Western Serbia	9	22	11
	Southern and Eastern Serbia		15	28	19
	Area	DPA	10	16	8
IPA		12	21	12	
TPA		17	29	21	
Level of well-being	HDI				
	GNI				
	Education				
	Life expectancy				



Per cent distribution of adolescents (10–19 years old) by selected housing characteristics

Table 4. Housing characteristics, percentage of adolescents (10–19 years old), Serbia Roma settlements

Associations		Housing characteristics				
		Leaking roof	Damp walls, floors or foundation	Rot in window frames or floor		
Total		55	73	44		
Sex	Male	54	73	42		
	Female	57	73	45		
Family background	Wealth	Poorest 60%	64	82	58	
		Richest 40%	38	56	16	
	Deprivation	Three or more	62	80	49	
		Two	26	47	23	
		One or none	15	22	6	
	Education of mother	Primary or none	60	76	45	
		Secondary	57	73	46	
		Tertiary	44	67	28	
	Social context	Region	Belgrade	50	60	38
			Vojvodina	58	80	51
Sumadija and Western Serbia			51	71	43	
Spatial context		Southern and Eastern Serbia	57	76	43	
		Area	DPA	55	68	41
IPA	54		69	41		
TPA	57		80	48		
Level of well-being	HDI					
	GNI					
	Education					
	Life expectancy					

Per cent distribution of adolescents (10–19 years old) by selected housing characteristics

Parental education. In Serbia, the mothers of adolescents tend to have a slightly higher level of education than fathers, which is why we will rely on their education level when approximating cultural capital.

Chart 3. Trends in the education of the mother: higher education, Serbia (2014–2019)**Chart 4. Trends in the education of the mother: secondary or higher, Serbia Roma settlements (2014–2019)**

Per cent distribution of adolescents (10–19 years old) whose mothers have higher education: comparative 2014 and 2019

Parental education is at a somewhat higher level in the Belgrade region and in DPA. Since 2014, there has been a significant improvement in the educational level of the mothers of adolescents: in 2014, 20 per cent of mothers had completed higher education, while in 2019 this number had risen to 28 per cent and there was a fall in the number of mothers with only primary education. Most of this increase took place in the Belgrade region and other DPA, while there was practically no change in TPA, which tells us that there is a trend towards an unequal distribution of cultural capital and a growing regional rural–urban gap. In Roma settlements, adolescents live in families with significantly lower levels of education than their counterparts in the general population, while differences across regions and area types are relatively small. In these settlements, the educational level of mothers has not undergone significant change since 2014, indicating relative stagnation and an increasing cultural capital gap between this population and the general population (in favour of the latter).

The internet and digital technologies

In this study, we tracked adolescent possession or access to the following: the internet, a laptop or desktop computer or a tablet. **Access to the internet** is something most adolescents in the general population possess. A household's access to the internet is linked to wealth status, in that one in ten adolescents in the poorest 60 per cent lack access to the internet, while all adolescents from the richest 40 per cent have access to the internet. Deprivation yields similar links, whereby there are significantly fewer of those with internet access at home among the most deprived categories. Maternal education is also positively linked to internet access. The regional aspect also indicates certain differences. While internet coverage in Belgrade and Vojvodina is almost complete, it is significantly less so in Southern and Eastern Serbia. There are no differences between urban and rural areas, making it possible to conclude that this digital divide has been closed. Interestingly, internet access is linked to HDI, GNI per capita and the educational expectation index.

Table 5. Access to digital technologies — percentage of adolescents 10–19 years old, Serbia

Associations			Digital equipment and internet access			
			Laptop	Desktop	Tablet	Internet access at home
Total			55	66	37	94
Family background	Wealth	Poorest 60%	37	57	24	90
		Richest 40%	77	77	54	100
	Deprivation	Three or more	27	46	18	84
		Two	55	69	35	97
		One or none	75	78	53	99
	Education of mother	Primary or none	21	49	24	80
		Secondary	53	67	37	96
		Tertiary	74	69	49	98
	Spatial context	Region	Belgrade	62	63	44
Vojvodina			60	71	41	98
Sumadija and Western Serbia		48	68	39	94	
		Southern and Eastern Serbia	49	61	22	88
Social context		Area	DPA	66	68	45
	IPA		51	65	33	97
	TPA		48	65	33	92
Level of well-being		HDI	+		+	+
		GNI	+		+	+
		Education	+		+	+
		Life expectancy				

Per cent distribution of adolescents 10–19 years old by selected housing characteristics

Table 6. Access to digital technologies — percentage of adolescents 10–19 years old, Serbia Roma settlements

Associations			Digital equipment and internet access				
			Laptop	Desktop	Tablet	Internet access at home	
Total			13	18	9	75	
Family background	Wealth	Poorest 60%	7	10	6	64	
		Richest 40%	26	32	16	95	
	Deprivation	Three or more	11	15	6	72	
		Two	19	32	24	91	
		One or none	41	38	22	92	
	Education of mother	None	7	14	7	67	
		Primary	14	17	8	75	
		Secondary or higher	20	37	23	81	
	Social context	Region	Belgrade	19	13	10	72
			Vojvodina	14	17	4	83
Sumadija and Western Serbia			16	15	14	78	
Spatial context		Southern and Eastern Serbia	11	20	10	72	
		Area	DPA	19	18	11	76
IPA			9	18	9	77	
TPA			12	17	8	73	
Level of well-being	HDI						
	GNI						
	Education						
	Life expectancy						


Per cent distribution of adolescents 10–19 years old by selected housing characteristics

Possession of a desktop or laptop computer or tablet — in other words, modern digital technology — also depends on the material status of the household. Greater wealth increases the likelihood of possessing each of these items and a lower degree or absence of deprivation. Maternal education is also positively linked to the possession of these devices. In terms of contextual variables, differences in the degree of possession of laptops and tablets are evident between DPA and TPA, but it is also clear that a higher degree of HDI, GNI and educational expectation index at the district level contributes better to adolescents having improved access to digital technologies.

Among the population living in Roma settlements, there is a significantly lower number of adolescents who have access to the internet — as many as one in four live in a household that is not connected. Among this population too there are strong links between a family's wealth status, degree of material deprivation and access to the internet. Interestingly, the contextual variables (spatial context and well-being) are not linked to inequalities in internet access, indicating that these inequalities are an expression of individual/familial material inequalities. Ownership of digital devices is very low among this population, indicating that the most likely source of internet access and use in the household is the mobile phone, which is not suitable for many aspects of learning. Possessing a digital device is clearly linked to a household's material status — the wealth index and degree of deprivation — as well as maternal education. Interestingly, there are no links between device ownership and the contextual variables, indicating that even pronounced differences generated by the social context in the general population have no effect on young people living in Roma settlements. Indeed, this means that they cannot access the advantages generated in better-developed and wealthier environments.


Even in the short five-year period observed here, there was a significant spread of internet access across all regions and area types. In both the general population and among adolescents living in Roma settlements, the highest increase took place among those groups who previously had poorer access, accelerating the closing of the digital divide.

Chart 7. Internet access in home — percentage of adolescents 10–19 years old, Serbia



Per cent distribution of adolescents 10–19 years old with internet connection within the household: comparative 2014–2019

Chart 8. Internet access in home — percentage of adolescents 10–19 years old, Serbia Roma settlements




Per cent distribution of adolescents 10–19 years old with internet connection within the household: comparative 2014–2019

INCLUSION IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

A global analysis conducted by ILO and UNICEF shows that child labour is more common among boys, in rural rather than urban areas, and is most often conducted as part of a family business, particularly in agriculture (ILO/UNICEF, 2020). The crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic placed additional pressure on families, particularly those in the poorer strata, and there are indications that child labour increased while the institutional response weakened (Kechagia and Metaxas, 2021). Target 8.7 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals aims to completely eradicate child labour. This study's definition of child labour follows the MICS methodology, which implies an age-specific threshold above which economic activities and household chores become harmful to a child's development.³

One in ten adolescents aged 10–13 are involved in economic activities at or above the age-specific threshold, one in seven are engaged below the age-specific threshold, only a small number of children are engaged in household chores that exceed the threshold, but nine out of ten children are engaged at below-threshold rates. One child in eight is engaged in work that qualifies as child labour. Looked at as a whole, one in eight adolescents are engaged in economic activities or household chores above the set thresholds or otherwise work in hazardous conditions. Boys are more commonly engaged in economic activities beyond age-specific thresholds, while girls are more commonly engaged in household chores beyond age-specific thresholds. Overall, males are more commonly engaged in economic and household activities beyond age-specific thresholds and work in hazardous conditions. Child labour is not linked with household characteristics, nor with maternal education, but there are links with parental practices. A higher degree of economic activities and total child labour take place in families where the parents practise physical punishment, hence special attention should be paid not only to protecting children from these activities but also to potentially violent aspects of child discipline that could be linked to child labour. Interestingly, the less coercive parental practices concerning learning correlate with a higher degree of participation in household chores at or above the age-specific threshold, indicating that a number of parents see household chores as part of a child's developmental needs. Economic activities below and above the thresholds and total child labour have a clear spatial dimension.

Chart 9. Child labour



Percentage of children aged 10–17 years by involvement in economic activities or household chores during the last week and percentage engaged in child labour during the previous week

Looked at regionally, the Belgrade region stands out with the lowest risk of child labour, with Sumadija and Western Serbia, where one in five adolescents are involved in work, with the highest risk. Economic activities are more prevalent in TPA, where one in five adolescents are engaged in child labour, compared with DPA and IPA where participation is significantly lower. This shows us that agricultural

³ All economic activities longer than 1 hour per week for children aged 5–11, 14 hours per week for children aged 12–14 and 43 hours per week for children aged 15–17 are classed as child labour. All household chores beyond 21 hours of engagement per week for children aged 5–11 and 12–14 are considered child labour (there is no limit for adolescents aged 15–17). The data will be presented according to the age cohorts used in this study.

production and farm work engage a significant portion of an adolescent's resources. In TPA, it is more common for economic activities to be carried out by boys than girls, indicating that boys are exposed to a greater workload and the risks that accompany it.

Table 7. Child labour, Serbia

		Associations								
		Involved in economic activities at or above the age-specific threshold	Involved in economic activities below the age-specific threshold	Involved in household chores at or above the age-specific threshold	Involved in household chores below the age-specific threshold	Total child labour	Hazardous conditions	Engaged in economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions		
Total		11	14	2	89	12	2	13		
Sex	Male	15	14	1	87	16	2	15		
	Female	5	14	3	90	8	1	8		
Family background	Wealth	Poorest 60%	12	17	2	89	14	2	15	
		Richest 40%	10	11	1	88	10	1	10	
		Three or more	9	21	3	90	12	1	13	
	Households	Deprivation	One or two	11	12	2	89	12	3	13
		None	12	12	1	87	12	1	12	
		Education of mother	Primary or none	21	15	0	90	21	2	21
Secondary	10		16	3	87	12	2	14		
Tertiary	7		11	0	91	8	0	8		
Parental family practices	Discipline	Any physical — no	9	15	2	90	10	1	11	
		Any physical — yes	23	12	0	(82)	(23)	(2)	(23)	
	Help with homework	No	11	15	4	84	14	2	15	
		Yes	11	13	0	92	11	2	11	
Social context	Region	Belgrade	4	5	4	89	7	3	9	
		Vojvodina	11	18	0	93	11	0	11	
		Sumadija and Western Serbia	18	22	3	86	19	3	20	
		Southern and Eastern Serbia	7	8	0	87	7	0	7	
	Area	DPA	7	11	2	90	9	1	9	
		IPA	6	8	4	85	8	0	8	
		TPA	17	22	0	90	17	3	19	
Level of* well-being	HDI	+								
	GNI	+								
	Education	+								
	Health									

* Analyses were conducted with adolescents aged 10–17.

Percentage of children aged 14–17 years by involvement in economic activities or household chores during the last week and percentage engaged in child labour during the previous week

Although a quarter of them are involved in some kind of work, adolescents aged 14–17 are broadly not involved in economic activities that are at or above the age-specific threshold, making child labour relatively rare for this age cohort. The share of work in hazardous conditions increases for older adolescents, and this kind of work is performed by one in twenty of them. More young men work in hazardous conditions, indicating a gender component to this risk. In contrast to younger age cohorts, the work of older adolescents is more closely linked to family resources. All of the analysed indicators show that children from the poorest 60 per cent of the population are more likely to engage in harmful economic activities and that child labour and work under hazardous conditions are present only in this part of the population. Child labour is similarly linked to deprivation and increases with the degree of household deprivation. Engagement in economic activities below the thresholds and work in hazardous conditions are linked with maternal education, with lower levels of maternal education resulting in greater participation in work. With this cohort, the spatial aspect is significantly linked with work, as child labour is least prevalent in the Belgrade region and most prevalent in the regions of Sumadija and Western Serbia and Southern and Eastern Serbia. Economic activities below the age-specific threshold are most commonly carried out by children in TPA and IPA, while this kind of work is relatively uncommon in DPA. As is the case with younger adolescents, economic activities are more frequently engaged in by males.

Table 8. Child labour, Serbia

			Associations				
			Involved in economic activities at or above the age-specific threshold	Involved in economic activities below the age-specific threshold	Total child labour	Hazardous conditions	Engaged in economic activities or household chores above thresholds, or working under hazardous conditions
Total			1	29	1	5	6
Sex	Male		1	34	1	8	8
	Female		2	22	2	3	3
Family background	Wealth	Poorest 60%	2	38	2	9	10
		Richest 40%	0	16	0	0	0
	Deprivation	Three or more	4	36	4	9	10
		One or two	0	29	0	7	7
		None	1	23	1	1	2
	Education of mother	Primary or none	4	43	4	12	14
		Secondary	1	27	1	5	5
		Tertiary	0	23	0	4	4
Social context	Spatial context	Belgrade	0	7	0	4	4
		Vojvodina	0	21	0	2	2
		Sumadija and Western Serbia	1	60	1	8	9
		Southern and Eastern Serbia	5	19	5	8	10
	Area	DPA	0	16	0	1	1
		IPA	2	21	2	7	7
		TPA	2	39	2	7	8

Percentage of children aged 14–17 years by involvement in economic activities or household chores during the last week and percentage engaged in child labour during the previous week


Given the small number of cases for conducting statistical analysis, we merged two groups of adolescents (10–13 and 14–17 into one group aged 10–17 years old) in order to check associations between HDI indicators. The only link to emerge is between the development of a district and involvement in economic activities above the threshold, but interestingly this is a positive correlation. In other words, children are more likely to be burdened with work in districts with a higher average HDI, GNI and educational expectation index. With the aforementioned analyses in mind, this gives us a picture in which, regardless of a family's existing resources, children living in the better-off districts are participating in work earlier, most likely to help their family out.

When it comes to those living in Roma settlements, there is less involvement in economic activities and household chores when compared to the general population; however, adolescents of both age groups are more likely to work in hazardous conditions. Vojvodina also stands out as a region with higher rates of work in hazardous conditions. A significantly greater number of boys than girls participate in this kind of work in the 14–17 age group. Other characteristics, such as those of the family, household, social and spatial context, do not display any links with child labour.

DISCIPLINE: PARENTAL ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES (10–13)


Under the MICS methodology, child discipline is operationalized through a series of questions about child-rearing practices, which can include various forms of physical and psychological aggression in the preceding month, as well as questions covering the parents' attitudes to physical forms of punishment. SDG 16.2.1 aims to reduce and eradicate violent discipline against children.

Chart 10. Child discipline, Serbia



Percentage of children aged 10–13 years by child disciplining methods experienced during the last one month

Chart 11. Child discipline, Serbia Roma settlements



Percentage of children aged 10–13 years by child disciplining methods experienced during the last one month

One in ten mothers of adolescents hold the belief that children should be punished physically when necessary. This view is shared by a greater proportion of mothers in the richest 40 per cent of the population than in the poorest 60 per cent. Parents who are more supportive of their children's learning are more likely to believe that physically punishing children is acceptable, indicating a pattern of parenting that is at the same time supportive of education but also restrictive. This combination may be an expression of paternalistic parent-child relationships, which restrain children's autonomy and focus principally on their education. Looked at in regional terms, Sumadija and Western Serbia is the region where the idea of physically punishing children is accepted the least. There are no differences stemming from the gender of the child, place of residence or the educational level of the parents. A slight increase in the acceptance of physical punishment was noted between 2014 and 2019. Such parenting methods are more likely to be seen as acceptable in Belgrade and Vojvodina, though they were more acceptable in Sumadija in 2014. In contrast to data from 2010 and 2014, when these attitudes did not show any relationship to wealth status, they were more prevalent among the richest 40 per cent in 2019.

When it comes to disciplinary practices, a little less than half of parents employ only non-violent discipline, while around the same number employ some methods of violent discipline. Non-violent practices are most prevalent in Southern and Eastern Serbia and least prevalent in the Belgrade region. These practices are also more prevalent in districts with a higher GNI per capita, potentially indicating a competitive context that comprises greater familial tensions and stresses but also exposes children to greater risk. The most common form of violent discipline is psychological aggression, though one in ten parents also employ some form of physical punishment. Psychological aggression is significantly more common among children who live in the richest 40 per cent of households, while the only variable linked to physical punishment is maternal education, where mothers who have completed only primary education or are uneducated are more likely to employ this method than mothers with tertiary education. Between 2010 and 2014, there was a significant fall in physical punishment and, more broadly, all forms of violent methods have declined significantly over the past 10 years, but when we compare 2014 and 2019 we notice stagnation.

Table 9. Child discipline, Serbia

		Associations					
		Percentage of mothers/ caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	Only non-violent discipline	Psycho-logical aggression	Physical punishment		Any violent discipline method
					Any	Severe	
Total		10	46	43	11	2	44
Sex	Male	12	46	43	16	3	45
	Female	7	47	43	7	1	44
Wealth	Poorest 60%	7	50	37	10	2	38
	Richest 40%	12	43	50	13	2	51
	Three or more	6	43	45	10	0	46
Households	Deprivation						
	One or two	8	54	37	8	2	38
	None	13	42	47	15	3	49
Education of mother	Primary or none	12	31	55	25	5	56
	Secondary	10	49	38	10	2	40
	Tertiary	8	47	46	8	1	47
Children who receive help with homework	No	6	42	40	8	2	40
	Yes	12	50	45	14	2	46

		Associations						
		Percentage of mothers/ caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	Only non-violent discipline	Psycho-logical aggression	Physical punishment		Any violent discipline method	
					Any	Severe		
Spatial context	Region	Belgrade	15	38	50	11	5	50
		Vojvodina	14	38	54	14	2	55
		Sumadija and Western Serbia	2	51	32	13	1	35
		Southern and Eastern Serbia	9	59	37	7	0	38
	Area	DPA	10	44	44	11	2	46
		IPA	8	50	43	11	0	43
		TPA	10	47	42	12	2	44
Level of well-being	HDI	(+)						
	GNI	(+)	(-)					
	Education	(+)						
	Health							

Percentage of children aged 10–13 years by child disciplining methods experienced during the last one month

The mothers of adolescents living in Roma settlements are equally likely to believe corporal punishment is acceptable as their counterparts in the general population, with no differences according to the analysed characteristics. When it comes to parental practices, however, non-violent methods are significantly less well represented, while violent methods are more prevalent than in the general population. Just over a quarter of all parents practice exclusively non-violent methods, while two thirds employ some form of violent disciplining. Among this population, differences emerge when it comes to physical punishment, which is more prevalent in Southern and Eastern Serbia and DPA while being less prevalent in Vojvodina and TPA. As with the general population of adolescents, here too we recorded a decline in all forms of violent parenting between 2010 and 2014, and stagnation between 2014 and 2019.

Table 10. Child discipline, Serbia Roma settlements

Associations		Percent- age of mothers/ caretak- ers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	Only non-vi- olent discipline	Psycho- logical aggression	Physical punishment				
					Any	Severe [A]	Any violent discipline method [1]		
Total		7	29	66	26	2	67		
Sex	Male	8	2	70	28	3	73		
	Female	6	4	60	23	1	60		
Family background	Wealth	Poorest 60%	5	26	68	28	3	70	
		Richest 40%	12	34	61	20	1	61	
	Households	Deprivation	Three or more	6	26	68	28	2	70
			One or two	11	39	58	18	0	58
			None	18	54	46	8	4	46
	Education of mother	Primary or none	1	24	62	16	0	64	
		Secondary	8	31	65	25	1	66	
		Tertiary	15	23	77	43	9	77	
	Help with homework	No	8	31	67	19	1	68	
		Yes	7	30	63	28	3	65	
Social context	Spatial context	Belgrade	21	21	77	31	8	77	
		Vojvodina	4	41	55	13	3	55	
		Sumadija and Western Serbia	6	26	70	16	0	72	
		Southern and Eastern Serbia	4	28	65	31	0	67	
	Area	DPA	10	24	70	35	6	73	
		IPA	4	30	60	25	0	60	
		TPA	7	32	65	18	0	66	
	Level of well-being	HDI							
GNI									
Education									
Life expectancy									

Percentage of children aged 10–13 years by child disciplining methods experienced during the last one month

HEALTH RISKS AND FUNCTIONAL DIFFICULTIES

Studies show that the physical (Plenty and Mood, 2016), reproductive (Malesse et al., 2020) and mental (Reiss, 2013) health of adolescents is impacted by the material status of their family — i.e., the resources available to them. Additionally, research also indicates that there exist regional (international) differences based on differences in national wealth or wealth inequality within a country (Viner et al., 2012). Hence the context in which adolescents develop is also a risk factor, to a greater or lesser extent. In this study, we have operationalized risks as functional difficulties⁴ faced by adolescents and as risks associated with reproductive health.⁵


In the general population, one in twenty adolescents have some form of functional difficulty. Among younger adolescents, there is a greater prevalence of those who struggle to form friendships, while anxiety is more prevalent among older adolescents. When it comes to factors linked with functional difficulties, our findings indicate that these difficulties are not linked to family background. In the older cohort, parents whose children are experiencing any of these difficulties are more likely to assist their children with learning. Surprisingly, our analysis reveals that there are significant regional differences in terms of the prevalence of functional difficulties. They are less prevalent in Sumadija and Western Serbia and more prevalent in Vojvodina, among older adolescents. Among younger adolescents, those reporting difficulties are significantly more common in IPA than in DPA, which tells us that mid-sized settlements can be a greater source of risk.

Three times as many functional difficulties are reported among adolescents living in Roma settlements. There are significantly more of those experiencing problems with seeing, learning, remembering and controlling behaviour, while problems with anxiety and depression are particularly pronounced. There are no significant differences between the age cohorts, but differences emerge between other variables. Among younger adolescents, difficulties are more likely to be linked to poverty (i.e., to appear among the poorest 60 per cent), while among older adolescents the links are with maternal education: they are significantly more prevalent among adolescents whose mothers are uneducated. The likelihood of experiencing difficulties increases for those not living in two-parent households. Among the older age cohort living in DPA, more than a fifth experience some form of functional difficulty, indicating that urban areas carry with them significantly more risk than TPA.

⁴ In the MICS methodology, functional difficulties are operationalized as the presence or absence of the following difficulties: 1. seeing, 2. hearing, 3. walking, 4. self-care, 5. communication, 6. learning, 7. remembering, 8. concentrating, 9. accepting change, 10. controlling behaviour, 11. making friend, 12. Anxiety, and 13. depression.


⁵ We observed reproductive health through risks associated with sexual activity and use or failure to use contraception.

Chart 12. Child functioning, Serbia



Percentage of children aged 10–17 years who have functional difficulty, by domain

Chart 13. Child functioning, Serbia Roma settlements



Percentage of children aged 10–17 years who have functional difficulty, by domain

Table 11. Child functioning, Serbia

Associations			At least in one domain		
			10–13	14–17	10–17
Total			5.3	5.1	5.2
Sex		Male	6.3	6.4	6.8
		Female	3.2	3.6	3.3
Households	Wealth	Poorest 60%	3.6	4.2	3.9
		Richest 40%	7.1	6.5	6.8
	Deprivation	Three or more	9.3	5.2	7.2
		One or two	4.8	7.0	6.0
		None	3.3	2.8	3.1
	Education of mother	Primary or none	4.4	7.2	6.0
Secondary		4.9	5.0	4.9	
Tertiary		6.4	4.4	5.5	
Parental family practices	Discipline	Any violence — no	5.2	5.0	5.1
		Any violence — yes	5.5	6.4	5.7
	Children who receive help with homework	No	5.1	0.5	3.8
		Yes	5.4	9.3	6.1
	Living with both parents	No	6.9	9.4	8.3
		Yes	5.0	3.7	4.4
Social context	Region	Belgrade	2.3	4.7	3.4
		Vojvodina	11.3	9.1	10.1
		Sumadija and Western Serbia	1.8	0.4	1.1
		Southern and Eastern Serbia	5.6	5.1	5.3
	Area	DPA	2.6	3.8	3.1
IPA		10.0	4.9	7.5	
TPA		5.3	6.0	5.7	
Level of well-being	HDI				
	GNI				
	Education				
	Life expectancy				

Percentage of children aged 10–17 years who have functional difficulty, in at least one domain

Table 12. Child functioning, Serbia Roma settlements

Associations		At least in one domain		
		10–13	14–17	10–17
Total		13.0	15.2	14.1
Sex	Male	13.3	14.6	14.0
	Female	12.7	15.8	14.3
Wealth	Poorest 60%	15.6	16.2	15.9
	Richest 40%	7.3	13.2	10.4
Households	Deprivation	14.9	14.9	14.9
	Three or more	6.4	11.1	8.1
	One or two	0.0	22.4	12.6
	None	18.6	27.8	23.8
Education of mother	None	13.1	11.6	12.4
	Primary	3.5	13.1	7.4
	Secondary or tertiary	9.5	14.3	13.0
Discipline	Any violence — no	14.7	21.5	15.8
	Any violence — yes	11.7	4.9	9.8
Parental family practices	Children who receive help with homework	9.7	36.7	12.7
	No	16.0	23.3	20.1
	Yes	12.2	11.9	12.1
Region	Belgrade	4.6	11.8	8.3
	Vojvodina	18.4	13.7	15.9
	Sumadija and Western Serbia	15.0	21.4	18.0
	Southern and Eastern Serbia	13.6	16.1	14.8
	DPA	10.0	22.2	16.1
Social context	Area	18.7	14.5	16.7
	IPA	11.8	9.4	10.6
	TPA			
Level of well-being	HDI			
	GNI			
	Education			
	Life expectancy			

Percentage of children aged 10–17 years who have functional difficulty, in at least one domain

Contraception and sexual behaviour

Wealth and family resources are linked with risky sexual behaviour, so girls from poorer backgrounds are more likely to become sexually active at an earlier age, have more partners and are less likely to use condoms and other contraception (Madise et al., 2007). The consequences of these behaviours are a greater incidence of unwanted pregnancies, sexually transmitted diseases, and also less control over one's own decisions regarding sexual behaviour in the case of younger adolescents.

Most adolescent girls have some basic knowledge about contraception. Some 98 per cent are well informed about modern contraception methods, while 91 per cent are informed about traditional methods. Somewhat better knowledge of contraception (particularly modern methods) is present among adolescents from the richest 40 per cent of the population. Among adolescents who live in Roma settlements, things are somewhat less favourable. Of them, 94 per cent know about modern methods and 77 per cent about traditional methods; however, on average they are aware of only 4.8 forms of contraception.⁶ Slightly less awareness is displayed by those living in IPA, those who suffer material deprivation and those in the poorest 60 per cent of the population (Table A1 in Appendix).

⁶ Respondents were offered 13 different methods of contraception (11 modern and 2 traditional) which they recognized.

Around one quarter of adolescent girls have had sexual intercourse, one in five in the past year, while 2 per cent have been sexually active with more than one partner. Analyses show that there are no familial or contextual factors linked to sexual behaviour. Two thirds (67 per cent) report using a condom last time they had sexual intercourse, although very few (9) of those who have been sexually active with more than one partner report using condoms. Adolescent girls living in Roma settlements are exposed to greater risks. Nearly half of them (46 per cent) have had sexual intercourse (42 per cent in the past year) but, as with the general population, neither familial nor contextual factors are linked to sexual behaviour. A significantly smaller number of adolescent girls than in the general population (24 per cent) reported using a condom during the last time they had sexual intercourse, exposing themselves and their partner to a greater degree of risk (Table A2 in Appendix). Moreover, it is concerning that as many as 13 per cent of adolescent girls from this population were sexually active before turning 15 (compared to 1 per cent in the general population).

Although they are only just embarking upon adulthood, one in eight (12 per cent) adolescent girls living in Roma settlements have unmet needs for birth spacing, while 2 per cent have unmet needs for birth limitation (14 per cent in total). Most adolescent girls, both in the general population and in Roma settlements, are able to meet their menstrual hygiene needs in an adequate manner, and most have a private place for their hygiene needs.

Early marriage: adolescent girls

Even though this practice is not legal, it is practised to a greater or lesser extent around the world ([UNICEF](#)). The data show that it is linked, on the one hand, to people's values and, on the other, to poverty and insufficient resources that would enable girls to choose different life paths. Values impact the perceived importance of educating girls and the timing of marriage, while familial resources might affect the decision to marry girls off early if this is seen as a way to ease pressure on the household budget. The latter is confirmed by the fact that early marriages are more common in poorer countries, particularly among the poorest segments of society (Parsons et al., 2015; Klugman et al., 2014). Under [SDG 5, gender equality](#), early marriages are to be eradicated by 2030. Under the MICS methodology, child marriage is defined as the prevalence of women aged 15–19 who are currently married/in union and the prevalence of women aged 20–49 who married before the age of 15 or 18.

There are still girls who enter into marriage before the age of 15. The data indicate that this practice has remained relatively constant over the last 15 years (women aged 20–49 who married before the age of 15). The practice of marrying before the age of 15 is more common in TPA and is typical exclusively of the poorer 60 per cent of the population. Marriage before the age of 18 is widespread but least prevalent in the Belgrade region, being more common in DPA and typical almost exclusively of the poorer (60 per cent) social strata. The number of adolescent girls who are currently married or in union has also remained relatively uniform, indicating that this practice is a constant in the aforementioned segments of society (Table A3 in Appendix). Trend analysis reveals a slight decline in this practice in the Belgrade region but also that it is more common in the poorer strata.

Chart 14. Child marriage and early marriage, Serbia





Chart 15. Child marriage and early marriage, Serbia Roma settlements




Percentage of women aged 20–49 who first married or entered a marital union before their 15th and 18th birthdays and percentage of women aged 15–19 years currently married or in union in 2010, 2014 and 2019


Among adolescent girls who live in Roma settlements, early marriage is a significant challenge given that one in six girls marry before the age of 15, that more than half marry before the age of 18, and that around a third of adolescent girls are currently married or in union. The prevalence of these unions is significantly higher than in the general population of adolescent girls. In this population too, marriage before the ages of 15 and 18 is more common in the poorest (60 per cent) strata. During the past 10 years, there has been some reduction in the number of married female adolescents aged 15–19 between 2014 and 2019, indicating that this practice is in decline. Furthermore, there has been some regional levelling of early marriage, which had previously been less prevalent in the Belgrade region than in the other regions of Serbia.

Early childbearing

Like early marriage, early childbearing is a consequence of cultural norms and poverty acting together (Wado, 2019), and it too carries with it a series of negative effects for adolescent girls. Health risks (Patton et al., 2012) can result from insufficient physical development (Ganchimeg et al., 2014), while the social risks include early termination of education (Ou and Reynolds, 2013), the perpetuation of poverty and significant reliance on informal support networks (Yordanova and Stoilova, 2019). In addition to the negative health impacts for mothers, multiple health risks for the infants are also possible. As part of SDG 3, the need to reduce childbirth in adolescence is emphasized precisely for these reasons.

Chart 16. Early childbearing, Serbia

Percentage of women aged 15–19 years who have had a live birth, are pregnant with the first child, have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child, and who have had a live birth before age 15, and percentage of women aged 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18, in 2010, 2014 and 2019

Chart 17. Early childbearing, Serbia Roma settlements

Percentage of women aged 15–19 years who have had a live birth, are pregnant with the first child, have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child, and who have had a live birth before age 15, and percentage of women aged 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18, in 2010, 2014 and 2019

In the general population of adolescent girls there are currently no recorded cases of childbirth under the age of 15, which could mean that this phenomenon is becoming marginal or has been eradicated in the general population. One in 40 adolescent girls has a child or is currently pregnant. The occurrence of this is higher in TPA and among the poorest 60 per cent of the population, indicating that the causes are the typical reasons that accompany early marriage and childbirth in adolescence: poverty and limited prospects. Trends reveal a decline in the number of adolescent girls who have children or are currently pregnant, so it is possible that we are witnessing the gradual disappearance of this phenomenon. Among women aged 20–24, childbirth before the age of 18 is more or less constant, though it is more common in Southern and Eastern Serbia than in other regions, in TPA more so than in urban areas, as well as among the poorest 60 per cent of the population.

Among women who live in Roma settlements, early childbearing is prevalent, given that one in three adolescent girls either have children or are currently pregnant and that one in 40 girls under the age of 15 has already given birth to a child. Childbirth under the age of 18 is somewhat more common in the poorest 60 per cent of the population. The number of women aged 20–24 who gave birth before they turned 18 is more or less constant, while there has been some decline in childbirth among adolescent girls aged 15–19, which could indicate a gradual abandonment of this practice among the younger generations.

EDUCATION

Education is a key channel for social mobility and a key transition in the lives of children and adolescents. During this period, young people generate various forms of capital that they are then able to use in later life. Remaining in the education system for longer, success in school and at university, and acquiring knowledge and skills through non-formal education will all influence a person's work and civic (participatory) transitions, as well as the health risks to which they are exposed. Yet, education itself is not unaffected by social inequality. In spite of efforts to level out social differences, education is indeed a sphere of activity where these differences are reproduced. Children from poorer backgrounds have fewer opportunities to remain in the system (particularly when it comes to tertiary education), are more likely to drop out (Stanojević, 2013; Tomanović and Stanojević, 2015) and to be less successful in terms of educational attainment (OECD, 2010). Given that non-formal and informal education have grown in importance in the past few decades and that they largely depend on supply by the private sector (in local areas or regions) and the purchasing power of the family, social inequalities are reproduced through access to them (Tomanović et al., 2012; Tomanović and Stanojević, 2015). When it comes to health, research shows links between socio-economic status, contextual factors and children's physical activity, resulting in children with better material status having better opportunities to train in sport, be active and, hence, healthier (Stalsberg and Pedersen, 2010). SDG 4 is completely devoted to equal access to education and opportunities for lifelong learning. In this study we analysed the following indicators: 1. the net attendance rate; 2. overage-for-grade and underage-for-grade; 3. completion rate; 4. out-of-school rate; 5. transition rates; 6. gender parity index (GPI); 7. parental support at home (book ownership and assistance with homework); 8. parental participation in educational institutions (Parents' Council and school-related activities, events and celebrations); and 9. children's participation in paid and unpaid extracurricular activities. The age classification is made according to ISCED levels and includes children belonging to lower secondary and upper secondary education.

Primary school: upper grades / lower secondary (ISCED)

The net attendance rate for primary schools indicates a high degree of educational attendance. Overall, there are no differences across area type, region, maternal education or material status and attendance rates. When the same measure is looked at by gender, however, it emerges that boys whose mothers have completed only primary education attend school at a somewhat lower rate than boys whose mothers have completed secondary education. This points to decisions regarding the education of boys that are more likely to be made in more disadvantaged households. Moreover, the net attendance rate for lower secondary education indicates a slightly higher rate among boys than girls, even though no sociodemographic characteristics were identified as impacting the attendance rate of girls. The trend analysis is a U-curve, indicating that the net attendance rate for primary education was high in 2010 and 2019 but somewhat lower in 2014. No boys were recorded as being outside of the education process, while a small number of girls were outside the education process and they were exclusively from the poorest 60 per cent of the population, materially deprived (unable to afford three or more necessities) and whose mothers had completed only primary education.

Chart 18. Lower secondary school attendance, Serbia






Chart 19. Lower secondary school attendance, Serbia Roma settlements



Percentage of children of lower secondary school age attending lower secondary school or higher (adjusted net attendance ratio) in 2010, 2014 and 2019

Chart 20. Out-of-school children



Percentage of out of lower secondary school children in 2014 and 2019


Among the population living in Roma settlements, net primary school attendance rates indicate a relatively low level of educational attendance. As is the case in the general population, net primary school attendance is slightly better among boys than among girls. Boys whose mothers have completed only primary education (or are uneducated) have a lower attendance rate, as do boys who do not live with both parents, indicating that risks often multiply. The spatial context also emerges as significant, since boys who live in the Belgrade region have lower attendance rates than those living in other regions, as do boys who live in DPA when compared to other area

types. This indicates that the contexts of the capital city and other urban centres expose boys to educational risks. As is the case with boys, adolescent girls living in TPA are also slightly more likely to attend the higher grades of primary school than those living in other area types. The risks for this age group are primarily tied to urban areas. As with the general population, trends indicate a U-curve, with the net primary education attendance rate being higher in 2010 and 2019 and lower in 2014. However, in contrast with the general population, the 2010 level has not yet been reached, indicating that this population may have been affected to a greater extent and that it needs more time to recover.

The number of adolescents who are out of school is significant among both girls and boys. These numbers are somewhat higher in urban areas (DPA and IPA) than in rural areas (TPA). Looked at in terms of region, Vojvodina experiences the smallest number of out-of-school children.

In the higher grades of primary school among the general population, 94 per cent of pupils are in the age-appropriate grade. This rate is somewhat lower for those from poorer backgrounds. Those who start school early are relatively evenly distributed throughout the population. Those who embark upon their education late are more prevalent among the poorest 60 per cent, among children who live in materially deprived households, and among those whose mother is educated only to primary level. This tells us that lagging behind in education is a challenge among the disadvantaged, who are failing to keep pace in education, thus creating the conditions for other risks during their life course.

Chart 21. Age for grade by wealth index



Per cent distribution of children attending lower secondary school who are underage, at official age and overage by 1 and by 2 or more years for grade by wealth index


Among adolescents who live in Roma settlements, only a little over half of children are in age-appropriate grades at school. Relatively few children start school early (on average as many as in the general population) and they are relatively well distributed among the population. Starting school late is more common among boys, among the poorest 60 per cent, among children whose mother has no education or only primary education, and among children living with only one parent. This tells us that marginalized groups are at greater risk of lagging behind in education.

Secondary school/upper secondary (ISCED)

Chart 22. Upper secondary school attendance, Serbia




Chart 23. Upper secondary school attendance, Serbia Roma settlements



Percentage of children of upper secondary school age attending lower secondary school or higher (adjusted net attendance ratio) in 2010, 2014 and 2019

The net attendance rate for secondary schools among the general population is 94 per cent: 95 per cent for boys and 93 per cent for girls. Of the familial factors, maternal education, poverty and deprivation are linked to lower rates of secondary school attendance. Adolescents whose mothers have only completed primary education (or are uneducated), those in the poorest 60 per cent of the population, and those who are materially deprived are less likely to attend school. Of the contextual factors, area type stands out as attendance rates are lower in rural areas (TPA) than in urban areas (IPA and DPA). Almost the same factors affecting general differences are present in both male and female adolescents: maternal education, material deprivation and poverty. Only among girls does area type show a negative correlation with educational attendance rates. This final finding indicates that girls in rural areas are potentially at risk, given that they are not participating in secondary education at the same rates as their peers in urban areas. Trend analysis reveals that the net attendance rate for secondary education is, with some oscillation, improving.

In total, 4 per cent of adolescents are outside the education process. The Belgrade region stands out as the one with the lowest rate of out-of-school adolescents. The familial factors that contribute to lower attendance rates are poverty, material deprivation and maternal education. Children who are out of school are more prevalent among families where the mother has no education or only primary education, families that are materially deprived, and those in the poorest 60 per cent of the population. The out-of-school rate rises as population density falls and is highest in TPA and lowest in DPA (in our DPA sample there are no girls who are out of school). The out-of-school rate is also higher in districts that are underdeveloped according to HDI indicators. The same factors affect out-of-school rates for boys and girls. Trend analysis shows that there has been a decline in out-of-school rates among male children, while the rate for female children has remained the same.

Chart 24. Out-of-school children


Percentage of out of upper secondary school children in 2014 and 2019

Among the population living in Roma settlements, the net secondary education attendance rate (of only 28 per cent) indicates a very low level of educational attendance. The net rate indicates a slightly better situation among boys than among girls. A significant number of children (13 per cent) who are of the right age to attend secondary school are still attending primary school, and half (53 per cent) are out of education entirely. Overall, the net rate is higher for children whose mothers have completed secondary education or higher education and those whose families are in the richest 40 per cent. We did not detect any contextual differences. Among adolescent girls, the net rate of secondary school attendance is somewhat higher in IPA than in other area types. Trend analysis in this population shows a certain, though very small, improvement in this domain. A significant number of children are outside the school system and these children are more likely to live in poorer households or have mothers who have been educated only to primary level, which indicates that exclusion is reproduced across generations. Over the past five years, there has been some decline in the number of out-of-school children, but this trend is not pronounced.

Transitions in the education process


In the general population, the primary school completion rate is almost complete and the transition to lower secondary is 100 per cent. The completion of lower secondary education (compulsory education) is also almost complete and is in gender balance. The upper secondary completion rate is only a little lower.

Chart 25. Completion and effective transition rates, Serbia



Completion rate for primary school, effective transition rate to lower secondary school, gross intake rate and completion rate for lower secondary school and completion rate for upper secondary school

Chart 26. Completion and effective transition rates, Serbia Roma settlements




Completion rate for primary school, effective transition rate to lower secondary school, gross intake rate and completion rate for lower secondary school and completion rate for upper secondary school

Among the population living in Roma settlements, the state of affairs is less favourable. One in ten children fail to complete the lower grades of primary school. Around 3 per cent of children fail to make the transition to the upper grades of primary school, and as many as 36.3 per cent fail to finish primary school. The upper secondary completion rate is also low, indicating that around a third of children do not attend or complete secondary education. Though certain differences according to familial material status (or wealth index) are evident, the low number of cases does not allow for unequivocal conclusions.

Equality in education indices

The gender parity index (GPI) is a measure that expresses the relationship between education and gender: i.e., the ratio of boys to girls at all stages of schooling. This indicator is part of SDG 4.5.1 and expresses the gender balance in education. According to MICS standards, gender parity is level if the GPI is between 0.97 and 1.03. Values below 0.97 indicate that boys are over-represented in education processes; that is, that girls are disadvantaged compared to boys. Values above 1.03 indicate that significantly more girls are included in education processes; that is, that boys are disadvantaged.

Chart 27. Parity indices



Ratio of adjusted net attendance ratios of girls to boys, in lower and upper secondary school

In the general population, there is gender parity between boys and girls in the upper grades of primary school, with no significant differences according to place of residence or the material condition of the family. Among the familial factors, lower maternal education (primary or lower) is linked to higher participation by boys. Some difference is notable in Vojvodina, where boys are slightly over-represented in the upper grades of primary school. When it comes to gender parity in secondary school, the GPI is in balance on average but there are certain differences. Poorly educated mothers (with primary or no education) are again a relevant link to higher participation by boys. In Vojvodina, participation by boys is higher; in Sumadija participation by girls is higher. Boys participate in education processes more in DPA, girls in IPA. There are more male children in education whose mothers have finished primary school, and more girls whose mothers have finished secondary school. Trend analysis reveals that there has, on average, been some levelling of GPI in upper secondary education, as in 2014 boys participated at a higher rate (Table A4 in Appendix).


Among the population living in Roma settlements, GPI favours boys. There are fewer girls than boys in the upper grades of primary school, with this trend being even more pronounced in secondary school. At the level of lower secondary education, we identified the

significance of familial and contextual factors linked to gender imbalances. Material deprivation results in fewer girls in education processes, while the absence of this kind of deprivation results in lower participation by boys. Boys are more likely to participate in education processes if their mother had completed no education or if she had completed secondary or higher education (the GPI of children whose mothers had completed primary education was in balance). There are significant differences across regions and area types, with girls being over-represented in the Belgrade region and boys in the others. Girls are also over-represented in other DPA, while boys are in IPA and TPA. In the observed five-year period, the GPI has shown a tendency to move away from gender parity to slightly lower participation by girls in the upper grades of primary school. Similar differences have been identified at the level of upper secondary education. Of the familiar factors, maternal education has once again proved to be a relevant framework for explaining imbalances, as more boys participate in education when mothers are uneducated, more girls when mothers have finished primary school, and more boys again when mothers have finished secondary or higher education. Among children in the richest 40 per cent of the population, there are significantly more boys in secondary education. There are also sizeable differences across regions and area types. In the Belgrade and Sumadija regions, girls outnumber boys, with the reverse being true in Vojvodina and Eastern Serbia. In DPA and IPA there are more boys than girls. Trend analysis reveals that there has been a certain amount of improvement over the five-year period — i.e., a reduction in GPI asymmetry in secondary schools — though we have still recorded significantly higher numbers of boys than girls (Table A4 in Appendix).

Home learning environment (10–13)

In addition to providing material that children can absorb, possessing books and other learning aids at home also creates an atmosphere conducive to learning. In the general population of adolescents, 85.8 per cent have more than three books at home. The familial context displays multiple links with book ownership. The poorest 60 per cent of households and those suffering material deprivation have fewer books at their disposal. This is also the case with families where the mother has completed only primary education or none at all. Of the social contextual factors, the area type is linked to book ownership, with more families in DPA than TPA having three or more books.

Chart 28. Learning environment at home



Percentage of children under age 10–13 by the number of children's books present in the household and children who receive help with homework


A little more than half of children receive some help when doing their homework. This is most commonly the mother, less often the father, and then other family members. Fathers are more likely to be involved when mothers have completed higher education, confirming the importance of women as a resource for the greater inclusion of fathers in child-rearing responsibilities (Stanojević, 2018). Interestingly, fathers are more likely to be involved in this kind of support in Southern and Eastern Serbia than in Sumadija or Vojvodina. Other factors do not turn up any significant links.

Among children who live in Roma settlements, things are far less favourable. Only 12 per cent of children have three or more books at home, a fact that is compounded by regional differences: book ownership is somewhat higher in Sumadija and somewhat lower in Southern Serbia. Interestingly, fathers are just as likely to participate in their child's learning as in the general population and there are no differences among fathers in this activity. On the other hand, even though mothers are more involved, there are differences between them depending on their education level, where those with secondary education are more likely to help their children.

PARTICIPATION IN SCHOOL-RELATED ACTIVITIES (10–13)


One in five children (19 per cent) in the general population receive paid private tuition, almost half (46 per cent) attend sports activities, 20 per cent attend language classes, and 4 per cent are learning to play an instrument. Private classes that parents pay for are linked exclusively to familial factors in that they are more prevalent for children in the richest 40 per cent and significantly less common among those suffering from severe material deprivation (unable to afford three or more necessities) or where mothers are educated only to primary level or not at all. It is probable that the distribution of private classes is relatively uniform and whether parents will send their children to attend them depends exclusively on the parents' purchasing power.

Chart 29. Participation in school-related activities, Serbia



Percentage of children aged 10–13 years attending school who are participating in school-related activities paid for by the household, and the percentage who are participating in school-related activities that are free of charge

Chart 30. Participation in school-related activities, Serbia Roma settlements



Percentage of children aged 10–13 years attending school who are participating in school-related activities paid for by the household, and the percentage who are participating in school-related activities that are free of charge

Paid sporting activities and foreign language classes are, in addition to familial factors (such as wealth, deprivation, maternal education level), also linked to contextual factors: region, size of settlement and district development as measured by HDI indices. Children in Southern and Eastern Serbia and Vojvodina, as well as those in TPA, are less likely to participate in sports activities. Children in districts with lower HDI, GNI per capita and educational expectation index scores, where life expectancy is also lower, are significantly less likely to engage in sports activities. This indicates that the social context structures the framework of possibilities. Foreign language lessons are somewhat less common in the regions of Sumadija and Western Serbia and Southern and Eastern Serbia, being more common in the Belgrade region and in districts with higher HDI, GNI per capita and educational expectation index scores. Musical instrument lessons are the least common paid extracurricular activity, which are least popular for those whose mothers have completed only primary school and less common among those who suffer material deprivation.


Children are slightly more likely to participate in free activities, hence one in four children attend remedial classes, 41 per cent attend extra classes, and 55 per cent are members of school clubs. Remedial classes are somewhat more commonly attended by children whose mothers have finished only primary school or are uneducated. These children are also more likely to receive parental support with their homework, but it is of concern that there are links with the violent discipline methods more likely to be employed by the parents of these children and that these children are more likely to engage in child labour. Extra classes are more likely to be attended by children that are not materially deprived, who live with both parents, and children living in DPA. Participation in after-school clubs is the most common form of activity and is slightly more common among children whose families are in the richest 40 per cent of the population, as well as among girls.

Unlike children from the general population, the participation of those living in Roma settlements in paid activities is minimal. Sports are the most common form of activity, but only the parents of children from the richest 40 per cent of the population can afford them. As many as 38 per cent of children attend remedial classes, only 10 per cent attend extra classes, while participation in after-school clubs is half that of the general population.⁷


Support for schoolchildren (10–13)

Most parents of children in the upper grades of primary school have insight into their child's grades. In the general population, almost all parents are aware of Parents' Councils at school, while this is the case for only four in five parents of children from Roma settlements. The number of those who are aware of Parents' Council decisions is somewhat lower, as is the number of those who are aware that the Council deliberates on key issues pertaining to education and socialization. The level of parental familiarity with these decisions is linked with the wealth index, where the less well-informed parents are more likely to be from the poorest 60 per cent of the population.

⁷ Even though relative participation is induced by certain differences in family resources and contextual factors, the small number of cases does not allow for unequivocal conclusions.

Chart 31. Support for child learning at school, Serbia

Percentage of children aged 10–13 years attending school and, among those, percentage of children for whom an adult member of the household received a report card for the child, and adults' awareness of school management and involvement in school activities in the last year

Chart 32. Support for child learning at school, Serbia Roma settlements

Percentage of children aged 10–13 years attending school and, among those, percentage of children for whom an adult member of the household received a report card for the child, and adults' awareness of school management and involvement in school activities in the last year

Awareness of the fact that Parents' Councils discuss key educational issues and school performance reports is significantly lower among parents who are from the poorest 60 per cent of the population, lower among those who suffer severe material deprivation

(unable to afford three or more necessities) and where mothers have completed only primary education. Interestingly, parents who employ violent methods in disciplining their children are less aware of these discussions. In terms of contextual factors, awareness is lower in the Belgrade region and somewhat higher in Sumadija and Western Serbia. Parents from poorer backgrounds (the poorest 60 per cent) attend school celebrations or sporting events less often, as do those parents who employ violent methods to discipline their child and those who do not help their children with their homework. Here too the Belgrade region stands out with somewhat lower parental participation, which is somewhat higher in Sumadija and Western Serbia.

The parents of children who live in Roma settlements are less familiar with the decisions of Parents' Councils and the topics they discuss and are less likely to participate in events organized by the school.

LIFE SATISFACTION


Discrimination and harassment

In the general population, 4 per cent of adolescent girls have experienced discrimination or harassment, mostly due to their age, a disability, gender or religious affiliation. In the population of adolescent girls living in Roma settlements, one in ten (11 per cent) have experienced discrimination or harassment, mostly due to their ethnic origin, religious beliefs and gender.

Life satisfaction is an indicator of the subjective experience of the current state of affairs and often consists of several sociologically relevant components — satisfaction with family relationships, the professional domain, intimate/partner relationships — and it is linked to personal and family resources (Stanojević et al., 2016; 2020).

On average, adolescent girls are satisfied with their lives (see Table SE.32 in Appendix). They are less likely to be satisfied with their lives if they live in households characterized by severe material deprivation (unable to afford three or more necessities) but also if they are studying for a university degree, compared with those who concluded their education upon completing secondary school. Somewhat lower levels of satisfaction were recorded in the Belgrade region than in the rest of Serbia. Somewhat lower levels of satisfaction were evident in IPA than in TPA or DPA. Among adolescent girls living in Roma settlements, satisfaction was not significantly lower than in the general population, and no differences were recorded according to familial or contextual factors.

Chart 33. Perception of a better life — percentage of women aged 15–19



Percentage of women aged 15–19 who think that their lives improved during the last one year and those who expect that their lives will get better after one year

Half of all adolescent girls report that their lives have improved in the previous year. Almost nine out of ten believe that their lives will be better next year. Those who are more materially deprived or are not in higher education report that their lives have improved at a slightly lower rate. Those who are not materially deprived are somewhat less optimistic, while those who are in higher education or live

in DPA are more optimistic. Adolescent girls living in Sumadija are more optimistic than those living in the Belgrade region. Among adolescent girls living in Roma settlements the situation is broadly similar, with around half believing that their lives have improved over the past year and nearly nine in ten thinking that their lives will be better still next year. We did not detect any significant differences according to sociodemographic characteristics. Among the general population, there has been a significant change over the last 10 years, which has taken on the appearance of a U-curve. The years 2010 and 2019 are on a similar level in terms of the perception that life has improved over the past year, and that it will be better next year, while in 2014 this perception was significantly less common. Among adolescent girls living in Roma settlements, we noted improving perceptions and increased optimism.

CONCLUSION

Adolescence is a period marked by various developmental processes: physical, mental and social. Given the intensity and speed of these processes, this period is also marked by risks that can affect developmental outcomes and future life chances. It is for this reason that identifying all potential sources of risk and inequality during this period and working on reducing them or eradicating them is a prerequisite for creating an environment of equal opportunities for children and young people.

The analysis of adolescents in this study has tried to address two aims: the descriptive and the analytical. Under the descriptive aim, we sought to identify the incidence of various living conditions and all of the factors we considered to be impactful for positive and negative outcomes, bearing in mind at all times the longitudinal character of the phenomenon. We also endeavoured to identify the degree to which a phenomenon changes and in which direction, over time. The analytical goal led us to identify the significance that a) the familial environment and b) the social context has for various outcomes among adolescents. We began with an ecological approach that identified spheres of influence and, on the basis of available indicators, conducted comparisons between adolescents. At all times, we engaged in comparative analysis of the general population and the population living in Roma settlements, which enabled us to directly examine the differences.

Family/household resources

In the general population, household wealth correlates with both familial indicators and all contextual factors. Wealth is lower in families where the mother has a lower educational level, it is regionally uneven — as it is higher in the north (Belgrade and Vojvodina) and lower in the south (Sumadija and Western Serbia and Southern and Eastern Serbia) — it declines with declines in population density, and it positively correlates with how developed a district is according to HDI. Deprivation is linked with familial and contextual factors in essentially the same way. Tracking parental education (of the mother), as well as being an indicator of the family's cultural capital, also indicates the growing gap between TPA and DPA, as well as between the Belgrade region and other regions. Consequently, this educational gap favours populations in urban centres and the capital city — in other words, the families who live there and their children. Access to the internet and digital technologies, though rapidly spreading, remains indicative of a digital divide that is linked to population density and the degree of development of a given district. Trend analysis indicates a significant spread of internet use across all categories of the population, particularly the marginalized, which is accelerating the closing of the digital divide.

Among the population living in Roma settlements, we have also identified correlation between maternal education and wealth, certain regional differences and a greater prevalence of poverty in TPA than in DPA. Unlike the general population, however, we have not identified pronounced regional differences or differences according to the development level of a district (according to HDI). This indicates that the general population are able to reap the benefits of the level of development in which they live, while these benefits are significantly restricted for this population, which lives in relatively uniform poverty regardless of the context. The educational level attained by the parents of adolescents who live in Roma settlements has not changed significantly in recent decades and remains at a rather low level. This population has significantly less access to digital technologies, a fact that does not correlate to regional differences, district development or population density, indicating that development of the socio-economic context does not contribute significantly to the ownership or use of digital technologies. Instead, use depends exclusively on household characteristics. As with wealth indicators, this population does not reap many benefits from the development context in which it lives, which is in contrast to the general population. Trend analysis reveals a significant increase in the use of digital technologies.

Child labour

A significant degree of child labour remains present in Serbia, persisting primarily according to traditional patterns of engaging children and adolescents in the family business. Among adolescents aged 9–13, child labour is not linked with household characteristics but exclusively with the socio-economic context and the gender of the child. This kind of work is more common among boys than girls. It is also more prevalent in TPA than in urban areas (DPA and IPA), while in regional terms it is more prevalent in Sumadija and Western Serbia and less so in the Belgrade region. Bearing in mind that child labour is carried out by children irrespective of their household's resources, we can assume that some children from the better-off families engage in work as a form of *help* (to get things done), while others from less well-off backgrounds do this work out of *necessity*. It is rather worrying that child labour is more prevalent in households in which physical punishment is more common, indicating a coercive element to the work and the multiple avenues of risk to which working children are exposed. In the older cohort of adolescents (14–17), child labour is less prevalent (as the threshold is also higher). However, here engagement of adolescents over the age-specific threshold, and particularly in hazardous conditions, is linked clearly with familial resources. Adolescents from poorer and more deprived backgrounds, whose mothers are less well-educated, are more likely to engage in these kinds of work. Adolescents living in Serbia's central regions (Sumadija and Western Serbia and Southern and Eastern Serbia) are at greater risk, as are male adolescents when compared to their female peers.

The relationship between child labour and the development of districts according to HDI for adolescents of all ages (10–17) indicates that more child labour takes place in the better-developed districts and that this does not depend on familial resources. This gives us a picture in which potentially poorer children in better-developed districts work to support themselves and their families.

Discipline

Disciplining practices in Serbia retain a significant violent dimension. A little less than half of all parents employ some form of violent discipline, one in eight use some form of corporal punishment, and one in ten mothers believe physical punishment of children to be necessary. Interestingly, violent practices are more prevalent in wealthier families, and attitudes that are supportive of corporal punishment are more prevalent both among the richest and those who live in more developed districts. If we add in the fact that these attitudes are more prevalent among those who help their children with homework, we get an image of a paternalistic attitude towards children that is more common, judging from these data, among the middle class. The risk such attitudes expose children to is restricted autonomy and slower development of the skills needed for inclusion in the world of adults.

When it comes to children living in Roma settlements, a paradox emerges. Three times more mothers physically punish their children than support the view that children should be physically punished, indicating the absence of a systematic approach to parenting and inconsistencies in childrearing — the result being significantly higher rates of violent discipline methods than in the general population. There appear to be no links between discipline methods and the majority of analysed characteristics, other than that physical punishment is more common in DPA and the central regions of Serbia (Sumadija and Western Serbia and Southern and Eastern Serbia).

Health

Functional difficulties experienced by adolescents are linked to life-course aspects of development. Younger adolescents are more likely to have problems making friends, and older adolescents are more likely to face depression and anxiety. Physical difficulties are more or less evenly distributed among the population. It is surprising that there are regional differences and differences according to the size of the settlement, with younger adolescents experiencing somewhat more difficulties in Vojvodina and older adolescents more likely to experience difficulties in IPA. Special attention should be paid, therefore, to whether certain social contexts generate certain types of difficulties, so as to design location-specific policies. The parents of children who have functional difficulties are significantly more likely to assist with homework, which indicates the burden on parents.

The population of children living in Roma settlements is three times more likely to experience functional difficulties. Among younger adolescents these difficulties are more prevalent among the poorest 60 per cent, and among older adolescents they are more common when mothers have completed only primary education — clearly linking such difficulties to familial resources. For older adolescents, DPA are riskier areas, given that one in four adolescents experience some form of difficulty. Also, children who do not live with both parents are at greater risk than those living in two-parent households.

Even though adolescent girls from the general population are aware of contraception, risky sexual behaviour is prevalent, irrespective of the girls' sociodemographic characteristics. This tells us that merely being aware of various kinds of contraception is not enough to ensure use. It would be interesting to know the extent to which adolescents are aware of the consequences of not using contraception. Adolescent girls living in Roma settlements are less aware of contraception and exhibit even riskier sexual behaviour. Almost half have had sexual intercourse, one in eight before the age of 15, and only one in four have used a condom.

Early marriage and early childbearing: adolescent girls

The rate of early marriage (before the age of 15 or before the age of 18) in the general population of adolescent girls is relatively constant over the past decade. The practice has become less prevalent in the Belgrade region and is even more strongly linked to the poorer strata. Early childbearing, before the age of 15, has (almost) been eradicated, although a number of adolescent girls still give birth before their 18th birthday. Even though trends indicate the practice is in decline, it remains characteristic of parts of the poorer population and adolescents living in rural areas, indicating that poverty and the traditional context are sources of risk. Among adolescent girls living in Roma settlements, early marriage or union is an enormous challenge, given that one in six girls marry before the age of 15 and more than half marry before the age of 18. Even though the data show this practice to be in decline, it remains widespread, particularly among those from poorer backgrounds. Early marriage and unions are accompanied by high rates of early childbearing. One in three adolescent girls have either given birth or are currently pregnant, while almost two in five will give birth before turning 18. This phenomenon is more common among the poorer parts of the population. The data indicate that early marriage and early childbearing are linked to other risks, above all poverty, life in traditional environments characteristic of TPA, and risks characteristic of those living in Roma settlements.

Life satisfaction among adolescent girls

Adolescent girls are on average satisfied with their lives, although material deprivation, studying at university and living in the Belgrade region and IPA reduces this score. Half of adolescent girls think their lives have improved in the past year, although this rate is lower among those suffering material deprivation and those who have completed their secondary education (and are now at university). These data indicate that living in the capital city and studying at university offer greater opportunities for a better life but also carry with them certain risks, stress and a lower sense of satisfaction. On the other hand, deprivation also carries with it a lower sense of satisfaction but also fewer positive changes in life. Special attention should be paid, therefore, to those who suffer greater or lesser deprivation, but also to those adolescents who are at risk due to the discrepancy between expectations and possibilities. Adolescents living in Roma settlements express satisfaction with their lives at the same rate, with no sociodemographic differences between them.

Education

Lower secondary education

Attendance rates for lower secondary education are high. Trends point to potential turbulence caused by the Global Financial Crisis (started in 2008), through lower attendance rates and subsequent recovery in the latest wave of research. Out-of-school children are exclusively girls from lower social strata and poorer households. Most children are in age-appropriate grades, and those who are not were late to start school and come from poorer, more deprived families with lower levels of cultural capital. The transition from primary to lower secondary is total, and very few children fail to complete lower secondary. The GPI indicates that there is some gender

imbalance, but, when sociodemographic variables are included, we see that in families with mothers who have only primary education boys are more likely than girls to attend education at this level. This indicates that there is a risk of early exclusion of girls from families with a low level of maternal education.

Children from poorer or more deprived backgrounds whose mothers have completed only primary education or who live in rural areas have fewer books at home. More than half of children receive assistance with their learning, with the only difference being regional. Fathers in Southern and Eastern Serbia are more likely to become involved in this activity. These data reveal a significant dimension of parental attitudes to education. It is clear that those from poorer and more marginalized segments of society lack the resources even for basic educational resources, such as books. At the same time, we see parents from poorer backgrounds helping their children at the same rates as those from wealthier backgrounds. This tells us that, on the one hand, there is a desire for children to do well at school irrespective of the family's material status, but, on the other, that parents from poorer backgrounds must invest greater efforts given the more meagre resources at their disposal (including both material and educational).

Participation in additional activities shows even more pronounced differences among adolescents. Private lessons, music classes and paid sporting activities are often within reach only of children from wealthier families, who are not deprived and whose parents have completed higher education. In addition to familial resources, participating in paid sports training or music classes also depends on the region, population density of the area, and how developed the district is according to HDI. This tells us that certain content is not universally available. Attending free activities is somewhat more common. These are usually part of the school's extracurricular programme, and participation in them is linked to familial resources. Children from wealthier families are more likely to attend extra lessons and after-school programmes, while children with parents who are less well-educated are more likely to attend remedial classes.

Even though most parents are aware of the role of Parents' Councils, lower participation and awareness of these councils' decisions are more common among parents who are poorer, deprived or less well-educated. Those parents who are less familiar with these councils are more likely to employ violent discipline methods and offer their children less learning support. Hence, this lack of awareness should be viewed as a symptom of potential neglect, as well as having an association with risk of violence.

Among those living in Roma settlements, school attendance is significantly lower than in the general population. Slightly more boys than girls attend school but adolescents from families with fewer resources are less likely to attend, as are children living in DPA and the Belgrade region. This tells us that urban areas, particularly the capital city, are high-risk areas. Out-of-school rates are also significantly higher than in the general population and, again, significantly higher in urban areas. Only a little over half of these children are in grades appropriate to their age, while most of those who are not are behind. Children who fall back a grade are more likely to be boys from poorer backgrounds and single-parent families with less cultural capital. One in ten children fail to finish primary school and do not go on to lower secondary. Fewer than two thirds of children finish lower secondary. The GPI indicates the favouring of male children over girls in the educational process, particularly by families who are poorer and more deprived. Surprisingly, there are significant regional differences and differences according to population density, whereby DPA and the Belgrade region are where girls outnumber boys, while boys outnumber girls in smaller towns and the other regions.

These children have significantly fewer books at their disposal, particularly in Southern and Eastern Serbia. The fathers of these children participate in their education at the same rate as the general population, while mothers participate less (particularly if they themselves have not finished primary school or are uneducated). In patriarchal societies, such as in Serbia, women are tasked with putting in an 'extra shift' at home, in the sense of providing formal and informal education for the children. Hence in populations where maternal education is low, such transmission is all the rarer. Even though other members of the household may take over this role, educating women has been shown to be crucial.

The rate at which adolescents from this population attend paid activities is minimal and far below that of the general population. The most common activity of this sort is paid sports training, though this is mostly reserved for the richest 40 per cent of the population. When it comes to free activities, most children attend remedial classes, while a very small number attend extra classes and after-school clubs. Their low level of resources prevents their participation in the non-formal aspects of education, while the school

system is focused almost exclusively on compensating for falling behind (through remedial classes), which perpetuates the vicious cycle of low cultural capital and the continuation of discrimination and stereotypes.

Parents' encounters with teachers and their awareness of decisions made at Parents' Councils is lower than in the general population, which in itself increases the potential risks of poor performance in school and of dropping out.

Upper secondary education

The net attendance rate for upper secondary education is relatively high and only one in twenty adolescents do not attend education at this level. In most cases, those not attending are from poorer or more deprived backgrounds, whose mothers have lower levels of education and, if they are girls, are more likely to live in TPA. This tells us that deficient resources are a source of risk for all and that girls are particularly at risk if they live in rural areas. Out-of-school rates are relatively low and, again, low familial resources are a source of dropping out of education. Higher rates are linked to the population density of the settlement and the level of development of the district, indicating that underdeveloped contexts result in high dropout risks. Only one in forty adolescents who enrol in upper secondary education fail to finish.

The GPI indicates parity between girls and boys, although it does point to boys being more likely to attend this level of education when their mother's educational level is low. Meanwhile, in DPA more boys attend, and more girls attend in IPA.

Among adolescents living in Roma settlements, the state of affairs is alarming. Just over a quarter of them attend upper secondary school, with boys slightly outnumbering girls in this regard. One in eight adolescents are still at a lower level of education due to re-taking grades or starting school late, while more than half are out of school. As is the case with the general population, familial factors such as wealth, deprivation and maternal education are linked to children's education. Trends show some positive but very gradual progress.

Two in five adolescents who enrol in upper secondary school fail to finish and, of them, more are girls than boys. This tells us that the dropout rate for girls in secondary education is high.

Here too the GPI indicates the favouring of boys over girls in education, particularly when it comes to poorer, more deprived families where maternal education is low. Urban areas (DPA and IPA) have more boys than TPA. Even though trends indicate positive changes and gradual levelling, the imbalances remain in place.

The eco-sociological model

If we return now to our theoretical model, we will see that family resources and the household characteristics in which adolescents live, along with the familial practices and social context, significantly impact the developmental outcomes of adolescents. Poverty, deprivation and low cultural capital are the most common factors that contribute to structural barriers or prevent children from evading risk and reaching their potential. In addition to these factors, differences across regions, areas of different population density and districts at different levels of development also emerge as present and highly significant factors. Southern and Eastern Serbia is the most underprivileged region in many respects. Risks are higher in TPA and lower in DPA, which are also places with greater opportunities for these age groups. Familial practices also emerge as potential risks, hence child labour correlates with violent discipline. The correlation indicates the risk of children being forced to work or the violence they endure in this process. Also, there are indices of risks, for some children, of growing up in a family atmosphere coloured by paternalism and restricted autonomy.

REFERENCES

- Basu, K., and Tzannatos, Z., 'The Global Child Labor Problem: What Do We Know and What Can We Do?', *World Bank Economic Review*, vol. 17, no. 2, December 2003, pp. 147–173, <https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhg021>
- Bonnie, R.J., et al., 'Fulfilling the Promise of Adolescence: Realizing Opportunity for All Youth', *Journal of Adolescent Health*, October 2019, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 440–442, DOI: 10.1016/j.jadohealth.2019.07.018.
- Bronfenbrenner, U., 'Developmental research, public policy, and the ecology of childhood', *Child Development*, 1974, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 1–5.
- Davis-Kean, P.E., 'The influence of parent education and family income on child achievement: the indirect role of parental expectations and the home environment', *Journal of Family Psychology*, 2005, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 294–304, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0893-3200.19.2.294>
- Dubow, E.F., Boxer, P., and Huesmann, L.R., 'Long-term Effects of Parents' Education on Children's Educational and Occupational Success: Mediation by Family Interactions, Child Aggression, and Teenage Aspirations', *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly*, 2009, vol. 55, no. 3, pp. 224–249, <https://doi.org/10.1353/mpq.0.0030>
- Ganchimeg, T., et al., on behalf of the WHO Multicountry Survey on Maternal Newborn Health Research Network, 'Pregnancy and childbirth outcomes among adolescent mothers: a World Health Organization multicountry study', *BJOG*, 2014, vol. 121, suppl. 1, pp. 40–48.
- Gershoff, E.T., 'Corporal punishment by parents and associated child behaviors and experiences: A meta-analytic and theoretical review', *Psychological Bulletin*, 2002, vol. 128, no. 4, pp. 539–579, <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.128.4.539>
- Gibson-Davis, C., and Hill, H.D., 'Childhood Wealth Inequality in the United States: Implications for Social Stratification and Well-Being', *RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences*, 2021, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 1–26. <https://doi.org/10.7758/rsf.2021.7.3.01>
- Guo, Y., Hopson, L.M. and Yang, F., 'Socio-ecological Factors Associated with Adolescents' Psychological Wellbeing: A multilevel analysis', *International Journal of School Social Work*, 2018, vol. 3, no. 1, <https://doi.org/10.4148/2161-4148.1032>
- International Labour Office and United Nations Children's Fund, *Child Labour: Global estimates 2020, trends and the road forward*, ILO and UNICEF, New York, 2021, License: CC BY 4.0.
- Kechagia, P., and Metaxas, T., 'Are Working Children in Developing Countries Hidden Victims of Pandemics?', *Social Sciences*, 2021, vol. 10, p. 321, <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci10090321>
- Kef, S., Hox, J., and Habekothé, H., 'Social networks of visually impaired and blind adolescents. Structure and effect on well-being', *Social Networks*, 2000, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 73–91.
- Klugman, J., et al., *Voice and Agency: Empowering Women and Girls for Shared Prosperity*. World Bank Group, Washington, DC, 2014, License: CC BY 3.0 IGO, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/19036>
- Madise, N., Zulu, E., and Ciera, J., 'Is poverty a driver for risky sexual behaviour? Evidence from national surveys of adolescents in four African countries', *African Journal of Reproductive Health*, 2007, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 83–98.
- Melesse, D.Y., et al., 'Adolescent sexual and reproductive health in sub-Saharan Africa: who is left behind?', *BMJ Global Health*, 2020, vol. 5, e002231.
- Notten, N., et al., 'Research Note: Digital Divide across Borders-A Cross-National Study of Adolescents' Use of Digital Technologies', *European Sociological Review*, 2009, vol. 25, no. 5, pp. 551–560, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27745235>
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *PISA 2009 Results: Overcoming Social Background — Equity in Learning Opportunities and Outcomes (Volume II)*, OECD, Paris, 2010, <https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264091504-en>
- Ostrom, E., 'A General Framework for Analysing Sustainability of Social-Ecological Systems', *Science*, 2009, vol. 325, no. 5939, pp. 419–422.
- Ou, S.R., and Reynolds, A.J., 'Timing of First Childbirth and Young Women's Postsecondary Education in an inner-city minority cohort', *Urban Education*, 2013, vol. 48, no. 2, 10.1177/0042085912451586.
- Paker, D.L., and Bachman, S., 'Economic exploitation and the health of children: Toward a rights-oriented public health approach', *Health and Human Rights*, 2002, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 2–29.
- Parsons, J., et al., 'Economic Impacts of Child Marriage: A Review of the Literature', *Review of Faith & International Affairs*, 2015, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 12–22, DOI: 10.1080/15570274.2015.1075757.

- Patton, G.C., et al., 'Health of the world's adolescents: a synthesis of internationally comparable data', *Lancet*, 2012, vol. 379, no. 9826, pp. 1665–1675, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(12\)60203-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)60203-7)
- Peter, J. and Valkenburg, P.M., 'Adolescents' internet use: testing the "disappearing digital divide" versus the "emerging digital differentiation" approach', *Poetics*, 2006, vol. 34, pp. 293–305.
- Pfeffer, T., and Waitkus, N., 'Comparing Child Wealth Inequality Across Countries', *RSF: The Russell Sage Foundation Journal of the Social Sciences*, 2021, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 28–49, DOI: 10.7758/RSF.2021.7.3.02.
- Plenty, S., and Mood, C., 'Money, Peers and Parents: Social and Economic Aspects of Inequality in Youth Wellbeing', *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 2016, vol. 45, pp. 1294–1308, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-016-0430-5>
- Reiss, F., 'Socioeconomic inequalities and mental health problems in children and adolescents: a systematic review', *Social Science & Medicine*, 2013, vol. 90, pp. 24–31.
- Sallis, J.F., Owen, N., and Fisher, E.B., 'Ecological Models of Health Behavior', In: K. Glanz, B.K. Rimer and K. Viswanath, eds., *Health Behavior and Health Education: Theory, Research, and Practice*, (4th ed., pp. 465–486), Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA, 2008.
- Scheerder, A., van Deursen, A., and van Dijk, J., 'Determinants of Internet skills, uses and outcomes. A systematic review of the second- and third-level digital divide', *Telematics and Informatics*, 2017, vol. 34, no. 8, pp. 1607–1624.
- Skopek, N., Buchholz, S., and Blossfeld, H.P., 'National patterns of income and wealth inequality', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 2014, vol. 55, no. 6, pp. 463–488, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020715214565674>
- Smith, A.B., 'The state of research on the effects of physical punishment', *Social Policy Journal of New Zealand*, 2006, no. 27, pp. 114–127.
- Stalsberg, R., and Pedersen, A.V., 'Effects of socioeconomic status on the physical activity in adolescents: a systematic review of the evidence', *Scandinavian Journal of Medicine and Science in Sports*, 2010, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 368–383.
- Stanojević, D., 'Medugeneracijska obrazovna pokretljivost u Srbiji u XX veku', u: *Promene osnovnih struktura društva Srbije u periodu ubrzane transformacije*, ur. Mladen Lazić i Slobodan Cvejić, ISI FF, Beograd, 2013, ISBN 978–86–531-0020–9, str 119–139.
- Stanojević, D., Tomanović, S., and Ljubičić M., 'Resources and Strategies Used by Young Parents in Serbia', *Revija za sociologiju*, 2020, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 353–380.
- Stanojević, D., Tomanović, S., and Ljubičić, M., 'Elements of life satisfaction among young adults in Serbia', *Journal of Youth Studies*, 2016, vol. 19, no. 7, pp. 973–989, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2015.1136057>
- Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia and UNICEF, *Serbia Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey and Serbia Roma Settlements Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, 2019, Survey Findings Report*. Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia and UNICEF, Belgrade, 2020.
- Straus, M.A., 'Prevalence, Societal Causes, and Trends in Corporal Punishment by Parents in World Perspective', *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 2010, vol. 73, no. 2, pp. 1–30, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25766385>
- Tomanović, S. and Stanojević, D., *Young People in Serbia 2015. Situation, perceptions, beliefs and aspirations*, FES and SeCons, Belgrade, 2015.
- Tomanović, S., et al., *Mladi — naša sadašnjost. Istraživanje socijalnih biografijamladih u Srbiji [Young People are Present. Study of Social Biographies of Young People in Serbia]*, Institute for Sociological Research at Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade, 2012.
- Viner, R.M., et al., 'Adolescence and the social determinants of health', *Lancet*, 2012, vol. 379, no. 9826, pp. 1641–1652, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(12\)60149-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(12)60149-4)
- Wado, Y.D., Sully, E.A., and Mumah, J.N., 'Pregnancy and early motherhood among adolescents in five East African countries: a multi-level analysis of risk and protective factors', *BMC Pregnancy and Childbirth*, 2019, vol. 19, no. 59, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12884-019-2204-z>
- Yordanova, G., and Stoilova, R., 'Mechanisms of gendered labour market outcomes, as a result of early job insecurity and consequences within the transition to adulthood', *Revista Inclusiones*, 2019, vol. 6, special issue, pp. 136–151, ISSN 0719-4706.

APPENDIX

Table A1: Knowledge of specific contraceptive methods: Percentage of all women aged 15–19 years, percentage of women aged 15–19 years currently married or in union and percentage of sexually active women aged 15–19 years not married or in union who have heard of any contraceptive method

		Serbia		Serbia Roma settlements	
		Any modern method	Any traditional method	Any modern method	Any traditional method
Total		98	91	94	77
Region	Belgrade	(100)	(98)	Belgrade	97
	Vojvodina	99	90	Vojvodina	90
	Sumadija	93	89	Sumadija	(98)
	South/East	99	89	South/East	(88)
Degree of urbanization	DPA	97	93	DPA	96
	IPA	(100)	(90)	IPA	92
	TPA	97	89	TPA	93
Education	Primary or none	(*)	(*)	None	(*)
	Secondary	98	91	Primary	92
	Higher	98	97	Secondary or higher	74
Material deprivation	Three or more	96	89	Three or more	99
	One or two	99	93	Two	94
	None	97	89	None or one	(*)
Wealth index 60/40	Poorest 60%	97	90	Poorest 60%	(*)
	Richest 40%	99	91	Richest 40%	73

Table A2: Sex with multiple partners — Percentage of women aged 15–19 years who ever had sex, percentage who had sex in the last 12 months, percentage who had sex with more than one partner in the last 12 months

		Serbia			Serbia Roma settlements			
		Ever had sex	Had sex in the last 12 months	Had sex with more than one partner in last 12 months				
					Ever had sex	Had sex in the last 12 months	Had sex with more than one partner in last 12 months	
Total		23	19	2	46	41	0	
Degree of urbanization	DPA	23	19	1	DPA	42	39	0
	IPA	(23)	(17)	(8)	IPA	38	35	0
	TPA	23	20	1	TPA	54	48	0
Education	Primary or none	(*)	(*)	(*)	Primary or none	55	50	0
	Secondary	16	13	0	Secondary or higher	23	21	0
	Higher	44	39	10				
Material deprivation	Three or more	24	22	2	Three or more	45	40	0
	One or two	26	23	2	Two	(*)	(*)	(*)
	None	19	14	3	None or one	(*)	(*)	(*)
Wealth index 60/40	Poorest 60%	23	21	2	Poorest 60%	49	43	0
	Richest 40%	22	17	2	Richest 40%	39	39	0

Table A3: Child marriage — Percentage of women aged 15–49 years who first married or entered a marital union before their 15th birthday, percentages of women aged 20–49 and 20–24 years who first married or entered a marital union before their 15th and 18th birthdays and percentage of women aged 15–19 years currently married or in union

		Serbia					Women age 15–19 years Percentage currently married/in union
		Women age 15–49 years	Women age 20–49 years		Women age 20–24 years		
		Percentage married before age 15	Percentage married before age 15	Percentage married before age 18	Percentage married before age 15	Percentage married before age 18	
Total		1.3	1.4	7.9	1.2	5.5	3.8
Region	Belgrade	0.4	0.4	3.6	0.0	1.4	(0.0)
	Vojvodina	2.0	1.9	8.6	2.3	4.9	4.9
	Sumadija	1.0	1.1	8.9	0.5	8.5	1.7
	South/East	2.0	2.2	11.1	2.0	8.1	8.2
Degree of urbanization	DPA	0.4	0.5	3.4	0.0	1.6	1.4
	IPA	0.8	0.9	6.5	0.0	4.8	(0.0)
	TPA	2.5	2.6	13.2	3.3	9.9	6.3
Material deprivation	Three or more	3.8	3.7	15.6	3.6	12.9	6.7
	One or two	1.1	1.2	8.2	1.2	5.3	4.1
	None	0.3	0.3	3.9	0.0	2.0	1.4
Wealth index 60/40	Poorest 60%	2.5	2.6	12.6	2.2	9.1	6.3
	Richest 40%	0.0	0.0	2.9	0.0	1.1	0.0
		Serbia Roma settlements					
Total		15.8	16.4	55.7	15.9	55.8	34.1
Region	Belgrade	14.8	15.4	49.5	15.9	46.2	33.4
	Vojvodina	15.6	16.5	62.3	13.9	68.9	37.3
	Sumadija	15.2	16.7	52.2	(20.0)	(58.6)	(*)
	South/East	16.4	16.7	56.4	15.6	55.2	32.9
Degree of urbanization	DPA	17.8	19.5	56.2	17.4	59.6	35.1
	IPA	15.0	14.7	51.0	15.2	47.2	28.8
	TPA	14.5	14.9	58.8	14.5	57.1	36.6
Material deprivation	Three or more	16.2	17.0	57.2	16.2	57.9	33.0
	Two	18.5	19.2	53.9	(*)	(*)	(*)
	None or one	8.8	8.3	44.8	(*)	(*)	(*)
Wealth index 60/40	Poorest 60%	19.5	20.7	63.4	19.7	65.5	36.2
	Richest 40%	10.7	10.9	45.9	10.5	41.8	30.2

Table A4: Parity indices — Ratios of girls to boys, in lower and upper secondary school

		Serbia		Serbia Roma settlements	
		Lower secondary school	Upper secondary school	Lower secondary school	Upper secondary school
		Gender parity index (GPI) for lower secondary school adjusted NAR	Gender parity index (GPI) for upper secondary school adjusted NAR	Gender parity index (GPI) for lower secondary school adjusted NAR	Gender parity index (GPI) for upper secondary school adjusted NAR
Total		0.99	0.99	0.95	0.89
Region	Belgrade	1.02	0.98	Belgrade	1.16
	Vojvodina	0.96	0.96	Vojvodina	0.89
	Sumadija	1	0.99	Sumadija	0.87
	South/East	1	1.04	South/East	0.94
Degree of urbanization	DPA	1.01	1.04	DPA	1.08
	IPA	1	0.91	IPA	0.90
	TPA	0.97	0.98	TPA	0.93
Mother's education [A]	Primary or none	0.9	1.08	None	0.91
	Secondary	1	0.96	Primary	0.98
	Higher	1	1.01	Secondary or higher	0.87
Material deprivation	Three or more	1	1	Three or more	0.96
	One or two	1	0.96	One or two	0.85
	None	0.98	1	None	1.07
Wealth index 60/40	Poorest 60%	0.98	0.98	Poorest 60%	0.94
	Richest 40%	1.01	0.99	Richest 40%	0.95

Table SE.1: Sampling errors: Wealth and material deprivation of adolescents (10–19 years old)Standard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia, 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
	Material deprivation — three or more	0.265	0.017	0.063	2.578	1.606	1780	0.231	0.298
Male	Material deprivation — three or more	0.275	0.021	0.077	2.178	1.476	933	0.232	0.317
Female	Material deprivation — three or more	0.252	0.020	0.080	1.777	1.333	847	0.212	0.293
DPA	Material deprivation — three or more	0.242	0.027	0.111	2.499	1.581	603	0.188	0.296
IPA	Material deprivation — three or more	0.220	0.039	0.175	3.135	1.771	361	0.143	0.298
TPA	Material deprivation — three or more	0.303	0.026	0.086	2.552	1.597	816	0.250	0.355
Belgrade	Material deprivation — three or more	0.256	0.034	0.134	2.327	1.525	364	0.188	0.325
Vojvodina	Material deprivation — three or more	0.241	0.029	0.118	2.329	1.526	455	0.184	0.298
Sumadija	Material deprivation — three or more	0.236	0.033	0.140	3.028	1.740	493	0.169	0.302
South/East	Material deprivation — three or more	0.343	0.037	0.109	2.356	1.535	468	0.268	0.418
Primary or none	Material deprivation — three or more	0.585	0.052	0.088	2.339	1.530	231	0.482	0.688
Secondary	Material deprivation — three or more	0.249	0.022	0.088	2.120	1.456	831	0.205	0.293
Higher	Material deprivation — three or more	0.114	0.021	0.185	1.794	1.339	394	0.072	0.156
Male	Material deprivation — one or two	0.355	0.022	0.061	1.986	1.409	933	0.311	0.398
Female	Material deprivation — one or two	0.391	0.022	0.055	1.591	1.261	847	0.348	0.434
DPA	Material deprivation — one or two	0.326	0.028	0.085	2.179	1.476	603	0.271	0.382
IPA	Material deprivation — one or two	0.461	0.043	0.093	2.683	1.638	361	0.376	0.547
TPA	Material deprivation — one or two	0.365	0.025	0.069	2.192	1.481	816	0.315	0.416
Belgrade	Material deprivation — one or two	0.317	0.039	0.124	2.702	1.644	364	0.238	0.395
Vojvodina	Material deprivation — one or two	0.317	0.031	0.097	2.291	1.514	455	0.256	0.379
Sumadija	Material deprivation — one or two	0.429	0.036	0.084	2.625	1.620	493	0.357	0.500
South/East	Material deprivation — one or two	0.424	0.033	0.078	1.680	1.296	468	0.359	0.490
Primary or none	Material deprivation — one or two	0.297	0.045	0.151	2.060	1.435	231	0.207	0.386
Secondary	Material deprivation — one or two	0.419	0.026	0.062	2.340	1.530	831	0.367	0.472
Higher	Material deprivation — one or two	0.324	0.035	0.109	2.313	1.521	394	0.253	0.394
Male	Material deprivation — none	0.371	0.023	0.063	2.230	1.493	933	0.324	0.417
Female	Material deprivation — none	0.357	0.021	0.059	1.571	1.253	847	0.315	0.399
DPA	Material deprivation — none	0.431	0.028	0.064	1.983	1.408	603	0.376	0.487
IPA	Material deprivation — none	0.318	0.042	0.132	2.918	1.708	361	0.234	0.402
TPA	Material deprivation — none	0.332	0.026	0.078	2.379	1.542	816	0.280	0.384
Belgrade	Material deprivation — none	0.427	0.038	0.089	2.225	1.492	364	0.351	0.503
Vojvodina	Material deprivation — none	0.442	0.037	0.084	2.914	1.707	455	0.368	0.516
Sumadija	Material deprivation — none	0.336	0.037	0.109	2.990	1.729	493	0.263	0.409
South/East	Material deprivation — none	0.233	0.025	0.108	1.342	1.158	468	0.182	0.283
Primary or none	Material deprivation — none	0.118	0.034	0.286	2.339	1.529	231	0.051	0.186
Secondary	Material deprivation — none	0.331	0.024	0.073	2.182	1.477	831	0.283	0.380
Higher	Material deprivation — none	0.562	0.037	0.066	2.274	1.508	394	0.488	0.636
Male	Poorest 60%	0.546	0.024	0.044	2.253	1.501	933	0.498	0.595
Female	Poorest 60%	0.561	0.023	0.042	1.789	1.337	847	0.514	0.607

DPA	Poorest 60%	0.336	0.031	0.092	2.684	1.638	603	0.274	0.397
IPA	Poorest 60%	0.521	0.047	0.091	3.218	1.794	361	0.426	0.615
TPA	Poorest 60%	0.741	0.025	0.034	2.550	1.597	816	0.691	0.791
Belgrade	Poorest 60%	0.383	0.037	0.098	2.244	1.498	364	0.308	0.458
Vojvodina	Poorest 60%	0.472	0.037	0.079	2.909	1.705	455	0.397	0.546
Sumadija	Poorest 60%	0.665	0.038	0.057	3.263	1.806	493	0.588	0.741
South/East	Poorest 60%	0.688	0.028	0.040	1.366	1.169	468	0.633	0.744
Primary or none	Poorest 60%	0.904	0.035	0.039	3.069	1.752	231	0.834	0.975
Secondary	Poorest 60%	0.608	0.024	0.039	2.001	1.415	831	0.560	0.656
Higher	Poorest 60%	0.265	0.031	0.116	1.996	1.413	394	0.203	0.327
Material deprivation — three or more — No	HDI	0.798	0.002	0.002	1.648	1.284	1280	0.795	0.802
Material deprivation — three or more — Yes	HDI	0.793	0.004	0.005	2.645	1.626	500	0.785	0.800
Material deprivation — one or two — No	HDI	0.800	0.002	0.003	2.074	1.440	1124	0.795	0.804
Material deprivation — one or two — Yes	HDI	0.792	0.003	0.003	2.170	1.473	656	0.787	0.798
Material deprivation — none — No	HDI	0.793	0.002	0.003	2.362	1.537	1156	0.788	0.797
Material deprivation — none — Yes	HDI	0.805	0.003	0.003	1.795	1.340	624	0.800	0.810
Poorest 60% — No	HDI	0.810	0.002	0.003	1.792	1.339	744	0.806	0.815
Poorest 60% — Yes	HDI	0.786	0.002	0.003	2.477	1.574	1036	0.781	0.791
Material deprivation — three or more — No	GNI	0.762	0.002	0.003	1.766	1.329	1280	0.757	0.766
Material deprivation — three or more — Yes	GNI	0.752	0.005	0.007	2.697	1.642	500	0.742	0.762
Material deprivation — one or two — No	GNI	0.763	0.003	0.004	2.099	1.449	1124	0.757	0.769
Material deprivation — one or two — Yes	GNI	0.752	0.004	0.005	2.167	1.472	656	0.745	0.760
Material deprivation — none — No	GNI	0.752	0.003	0.004	2.453	1.566	1156	0.746	0.758
Material deprivation — none — Yes	GNI	0.771	0.003	0.004	1.835	1.355	624	0.765	0.778
Poorest 60% — No	GNI	0.778	0.003	0.004	1.833	1.354	744	0.772	0.784
Poorest 60% — Yes	GNI	0.744	0.003	0.004	2.515	1.586	1036	0.737	0.750
Material deprivation — three or more — No	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	1.841	1.357	1280	0.854	0.856
Material deprivation — three or more — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.001	0.001	2.205	1.485	500	0.852	0.856
Material deprivation — one or two — No	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	2.247	1.499	1124	0.853	0.856

Material deprivation — one or two — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.856	0.001	0.001	2.168	1.472	656	0.854	0.857
Material deprivation — none — No	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	1.945	1.394	1156	0.854	0.856
Material deprivation — none — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	2.121	1.456	624	0.853	0.857
Poorest 60% — No	Life expectancy index	0.856	0.001	0.001	1.733	1.317	744	0.855	0.858
Poorest 60% — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.001	0.001	2.242	1.497	1036	0.852	0.855
Material deprivation — three or more — No	Education expectancy index	0.783	0.003	0.003	1.694	1.302	1280	0.778	0.788
Material deprivation — three or more — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.778	0.005	0.007	2.516	1.586	500	0.767	0.788
Material deprivation — one or two — No	Education expectancy index	0.786	0.003	0.004	2.025	1.423	1124	0.780	0.792
Material deprivation — one or two — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.775	0.004	0.005	2.220	1.490	656	0.767	0.783
Material deprivation — none — No	Education expectancy index	0.776	0.003	0.004	2.257	1.502	1156	0.770	0.783
Material deprivation — none — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.792	0.004	0.005	1.820	1.349	624	0.784	0.799
Poorest 60% — No	Education expectancy index	0.800	0.004	0.005	1.858	1.363	744	0.793	0.807
Poorest 60% — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.767	0.003	0.004	2.463	1.569	1036	0.760	0.774

Table SE.2: Sampling errors: Wealth and material deprivation of adolescents (10–19 years old)Standard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Male	Material deprivation — three or more	0.850	0.016	0.019	1.451	1.205	733	0.818	0.882
Female	Material deprivation — three or more	0.832	0.019	0.023	1.959	1.400	755	0.794	0.870
DPA	Material deprivation — three or more	0.803	0.025	0.032	2.058	1.435	559	0.753	0.854
IPA	Material deprivation — three or more	0.826	0.027	0.033	2.036	1.427	394	0.771	0.881
TPA	Material deprivation — three or more	0.882	0.026	0.029	3.804	1.950	535	0.830	0.934
Belgrade	Material deprivation — three or more	0.726	0.042	0.057	2.436	1.561	315	0.643	0.809
Vojvodina	Material deprivation — three or more	0.910	0.024	0.027	2.277	1.509	262	0.862	0.959
Sumadija	Material deprivation — three or more	0.828	0.032	0.038	1.038	1.019	151	0.765	0.891
South/East	Material deprivation — three or more	0.857	0.024	0.027	3.343	1.828	760	0.810	0.904
Primary or none	Material deprivation — three or more	0.852	0.036	0.042	2.524	1.589	275	0.781	0.923

Secondary	Material deprivation — three or more	0.855	0.017	0.020	2.017	1.420	840	0.821	0.889
Higher	Material deprivation — three or more	0.752	0.067	0.089	2.448	1.565	92	0.618	0.886
Male	Material deprivation — one or two	0.094	0.013	0.135	1.387	1.178	733	0.069	0.120
Female	Material deprivation — one or two	0.104	0.014	0.136	1.641	1.281	755	0.076	0.132
DPA	Material deprivation — one or two	0.101	0.022	0.217	2.681	1.637	559	0.057	0.145
IPA	Material deprivation — one or two	0.130	0.021	0.164	1.569	1.253	394	0.087	0.173
TPA	Material deprivation — one or two	0.077	0.018	0.238	2.822	1.680	535	0.041	0.114
Belgrade	Material deprivation — one or two	0.141	0.038	0.272	3.400	1.844	315	0.064	0.217
Vojvodina	Material deprivation — one or two	0.062	0.019	0.307	1.983	1.408	262	0.024	0.101
Sumadija	Material deprivation — one or two	0.082	0.030	0.365	1.759	1.326	151	0.022	0.141
South/East	Material deprivation — one or two	0.103	0.017	0.161	2.204	1.485	760	0.070	0.136
Primary or none	Material deprivation — one or two	0.085	0.027	0.322	2.394	1.547	275	0.030	0.139
Secondary	Material deprivation — one or two	0.103	0.013	0.129	1.641	1.281	840	0.076	0.130
Higher	Material deprivation — one or two	0.108	0.040	0.373	1.699	1.303	92	0.027	0.188
Male	Material deprivation — none	0.056	0.011	0.193	1.605	1.267	733	0.034	0.077
Female	Material deprivation — none	0.064	0.010	0.152	1.200	1.095	755	0.045	0.084
DPA	Material deprivation — none	0.095	0.017	0.178	1.676	1.294	559	0.062	0.129
IPA	Material deprivation — none	0.044	0.013	0.295	1.567	1.252	394	0.018	0.070
TPA	Material deprivation — none	0.041	0.014	0.335	2.821	1.680	535	0.013	0.068
Belgrade	Material deprivation — none	0.133	0.026	0.197	1.670	1.292	315	0.081	0.185
Vojvodina	Material deprivation — none	0.027	0.015	0.563	2.800	1.673	262	0.000	0.058
Sumadija	Material deprivation — none	0.091	0.029	0.318	1.497	1.223	151	0.033	0.148
South/East	Material deprivation — none	0.040	0.010	0.254	2.008	1.417	760	0.020	0.061
Primary or none	Material deprivation — none	0.063	0.021	0.326	1.797	1.340	275	0.022	0.105
Secondary	Material deprivation — none	0.042	0.008	0.195	1.411	1.188	840	0.025	0.058
Higher	Material deprivation — none	0.140	0.058	0.416	2.861	1.691	92	0.024	0.257
Male	Poorest 60%	0.680	0.026	0.039	2.310	1.520	733	0.627	0.732
Female	Poorest 60%	0.635	0.031	0.049	3.150	1.775	755	0.573	0.697
DPA	Poorest 60%	0.545	0.043	0.079	3.721	1.929	559	0.459	0.631
IPA	Poorest 60%	0.590	0.055	0.093	4.873	2.208	394	0.480	0.700
TPA	Poorest 60%	0.796	0.036	0.045	4.640	2.154	535	0.725	0.867
Belgrade	Poorest 60%	0.571	0.068	0.119	5.268	2.295	315	0.436	0.707
Vojvodina	Poorest 60%	0.804	0.055	0.068	6.008	2.451	262	0.695	0.914
Sumadija	Poorest 60%	0.525	0.056	0.107	1.869	1.367	151	0.413	0.637
South/East	Poorest 60%	0.653	0.028	0.043	2.598	1.612	760	0.597	0.709
Primary or none	Poorest 60%	0.776	0.036	0.047	1.901	1.379	275	0.703	0.849
Secondary	Poorest 60%	0.670	0.027	0.041	2.916	1.708	840	0.615	0.725
Higher	Poorest 60%	0.404	0.057	0.140	1.350	1.162	92	0.291	0.517
Material deprivation — three or more — No	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.008	2.355	1.535	234	0.008	0.008
Material deprivation — three or more — Yes	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.004	5.454	2.335	1254	0.008	0.008
Material deprivation — one or two — No	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.004	5.838	2.416	1341	0.008	0.008
Material deprivation — one or two — Yes	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.010	2.322	1.524	147	0.008	0.008
Material deprivation — none — No	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.004	4.839	2.200	1401	0.008	0.008
Material deprivation — none — Yes	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.012	2.038	1.428	87	0.008	0.008

Poorest 60% — No	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.006	3.486	1.867	519	0.008	0.008
Poorest 60% — Yes	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.005	5.787	2.406	969	0.008	0.008
Material deprivation — three or more — No	GNI	0.008	0.000	0.010	2.470	1.572	234	0.007	0.008
Material deprivation — three or more — Yes	GNI	0.007	0.000	0.007	6.608	2.571	1254	0.007	0.007
Material deprivation — one or two — No	GNI	0.007	0.000	0.007	6.770	2.602	1341	0.007	0.007
Material deprivation — one or two — Yes	GNI	0.008	0.000	0.013	2.625	1.620	147	0.007	0.008
Material deprivation — none — No	GNI	0.007	0.000	0.006	5.976	2.445	1401	0.007	0.007
Material deprivation — none — Yes	GNI	0.008	0.000	0.015	1.934	1.391	87	0.008	0.008
Poorest 60% — No	GNI	0.007	0.000	0.008	3.245	1.801	519	0.007	0.008
Poorest 60% — Yes	GNI	0.007	0.000	0.008	6.663	2.581	969	0.007	0.007
Material deprivation — three or more — No	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.002	2.395	1.548	234	0.009	0.009
Material deprivation — three or more — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.002	12.304	3.508	1254	0.008	0.009
Material deprivation — one or two — No	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.002	12.458	3.530	1341	0.008	0.009
Material deprivation — one or two — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.002	2.134	1.461	147	0.008	0.009
Material deprivation — none — No	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.001	12.082	3.476	1401	0.008	0.009
Material deprivation — none — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.003	2.273	1.508	87	0.009	0.009
Poorest 60% — No	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.001	3.622	1.903	519	0.009	0.009
Poorest 60% — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.002	13.379	3.658	969	0.008	0.009
Material deprivation — three or more — No	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.013	2.345	1.531	234	0.008	0.008
Material deprivation — three or more — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.007	6.029	2.455	1254	0.007	0.008
Material deprivation — one or two — No	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.007	6.406	2.531	1341	0.008	0.008
Material deprivation — one or two — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.015	2.074	1.440	147	0.007	0.008
Material deprivation — none — No	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.006	5.232	2.287	1401	0.008	0.008

Material deprivation — none — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.018	2.106	1.451	87	0.008	0.008
Poorest 60% — No	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.010	3.791	1.947	519	0.008	0.008
Poorest 60% — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.008	6.254	2.501	969	0.007	0.008

Table SE.3: Sampling errors: Wealth and material deprivation of adolescents (10–19 years old)Standard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia, 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Male	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.145	0.017	0.114	2.137	1.462	933	0.111	0.178
Female	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.126	0.013	0.100	1.174	1.084	847	0.101	0.151
Poorest 60%	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.184	0.017	0.093	1.929	1.389	1036	0.149	0.218
Richest 40%	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.077	0.014	0.181	2.176	1.475	744	0.049	0.105
Three or more	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.287	0.028	0.099	1.865	1.366	500	0.230	0.344
One or two	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.123	0.020	0.163	2.458	1.568	656	0.083	0.163
None	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.040	0.013	0.315	2.668	1.634	624	0.015	0.065
Primary or none	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.262	0.044	0.167	2.121	1.456	231	0.174	0.350
Secondary	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.146	0.016	0.109	1.677	1.295	831	0.114	0.177
Higher	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.068	0.016	0.234	1.628	1.276	394	0.036	0.100
Belgrade	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.120	0.027	0.227	2.649	1.628	364	0.066	0.174
Vojvodina	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.188	0.022	0.119	1.703	1.305	455	0.143	0.232
Sumadija	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.087	0.021	0.236	2.647	1.627	493	0.046	0.128
South/East	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.145	0.022	0.152	1.483	1.218	468	0.101	0.189
DPA	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.101	0.019	0.190	2.524	1.589	603	0.062	0.139
IPA	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.116	0.023	0.198	1.857	1.363	361	0.070	0.162
TPA	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.174	0.019	0.112	2.079	1.442	816	0.135	0.213
Leaking roof — No	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.002	1.950	1.396	1528	0.008	0.008
Leaking roof — Yes	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.005	2.120	1.456	252	0.008	0.008
Leaking roof — No	GNI	0.008	0.000	0.003	2.058	1.434	1528	0.008	0.008
Leaking roof — Yes	GNI	0.008	0.000	0.008	2.181	1.477	252	0.008	0.008
Leaking roof — No	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.001	1.968	1.403	1528	0.009	0.009
Leaking roof — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.001	1.608	1.268	252	0.009	0.009
Leaking roof — No	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.003	1.907	1.381	1528	0.008	0.008

Leaking roof — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.008	2.006	1.416	252	0.008	0.008
Male	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.246	0.019	0.076	1.845	1.358	933	0.209	0.284
Female	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.207	0.019	0.092	1.787	1.337	847	0.169	0.245
Poorest 60%	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.336	0.024	0.072	2.570	1.603	1036	0.288	0.385
Richest 40%	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.095	0.014	0.153	1.936	1.391	744	0.066	0.124
Three or more	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.447	0.034	0.076	2.176	1.475	500	0.379	0.515
One or two	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.216	0.026	0.121	2.653	1.629	656	0.164	0.268
None	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.082	0.015	0.187	2.027	1.424	624	0.051	0.113
Primary or none	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.365	0.050	0.138	2.332	1.527	231	0.264	0.466
Secondary	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.254	0.022	0.088	2.202	1.484	831	0.209	0.299
Higher	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.107	0.024	0.226	2.495	1.580	394	0.059	0.156
Belgrade	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.222	0.039	0.176	3.344	1.829	364	0.144	0.300
Vojvodina	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.202	0.028	0.138	2.517	1.586	455	0.146	0.257
Sumadija	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.224	0.025	0.114	1.860	1.364	493	0.173	0.275
South/East	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.277	0.035	0.125	2.256	1.502	468	0.208	0.346
DPA	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.164	0.024	0.148	2.705	1.645	603	0.116	0.213
IPA	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.212	0.039	0.181	3.208	1.791	361	0.135	0.290
TPA	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.286	0.023	0.079	1.986	1.409	816	0.241	0.332
Damp walls, floors or foundation — NO	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.002	1.975	1.405	1349	0.008	0.008
Damp walls, floors or foundation — YES	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.005	2.828	1.682	431	0.008	0.008
Damp walls, floors or foundation — NO	GNI	0.008	0.000	0.003	2.068	1.438	1349	0.008	0.008
Damp walls, floors or foundation — YES	GNI	0.008	0.000	0.007	2.915	1.707	431	0.007	0.008
Damp walls, floors or foundation — NO	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.001	2.039	1.428	1349	0.009	0.009
Damp walls, floors or foundation — YES	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.001	2.039	1.428	431	0.009	0.009
Damp walls, floors or foundation — NO	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.003	1.953	1.397	1349	0.008	0.008
Damp walls, floors or foundation — YES	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.008	2.651	1.628	431	0.008	0.008
Male	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.148	0.014	0.094	1.470	1.212	933	0.121	0.176

Female	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.147	0.016	0.108	1.614	1.270	847	0.115	0.178
Poorest 60%	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.222	0.019	0.087	2.140	1.463	1036	0.184	0.261
Richest 40%	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.055	0.012	0.222	2.275	1.508	744	0.030	0.079
Three or more	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.363	0.032	0.089	2.119	1.456	500	0.299	0.428
One or two	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.114	0.019	0.165	2.329	1.526	656	0.077	0.152
None	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.025	0.007	0.267	1.166	1.080	624	0.012	0.038
Primary or none	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.298	0.040	0.135	1.661	1.289	231	0.218	0.379
Secondary	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.151	0.016	0.106	1.659	1.288	831	0.119	0.183
Higher	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.076	0.018	0.236	1.881	1.372	394	0.040	0.112
Belgrade	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.131	0.024	0.180	1.841	1.357	364	0.084	0.178
Vojvodina	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.172	0.025	0.143	2.226	1.492	455	0.122	0.221
Sumadija	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.105	0.020	0.193	2.174	1.474	493	0.064	0.145
South/East	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.187	0.026	0.136	1.622	1.273	468	0.136	0.238
DPA	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.079	0.014	0.171	1.578	1.256	603	0.052	0.106
IPA	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.124	0.027	0.217	2.402	1.550	361	0.070	0.177
TPA	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.213	0.021	0.101	2.157	1.469	816	0.170	0.256
Rot in window frames or floor — NO	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.002	2.123	1.457	1495	0.008	0.008
Rot in window frames or floor — YES	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.005	1.565	1.251	285	0.008	0.008
Rot in window frames or floor — NO	GNI	0.008	0.000	0.003	2.280	1.510	1495	0.008	0.008
Rot in window frames or floor — YES	GNI	0.008	0.000	0.006	1.586	1.259	285	0.007	0.008
Rot in window frames or floor — NO	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.001	1.870	1.367	1495	0.009	0.009
Rot in window frames or floor — YES	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.001	1.817	1.348	285	0.009	0.009
Rot in window frames or floor — NO	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.003	2.046	1.430	1495	0.008	0.008
Rot in window frames or floor — YES	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.007	1.538	1.240	285	0.008	0.008

Table SE.4: Sampling errors: Wealth and material deprivation of adolescents (10–19 years old)Standard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Male	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.537	0.022	0.042	1.462	1.209	733	0.492	0.582
Female	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.571	0.025	0.044	2.003	1.415	755	0.521	0.622
Poorest 60%	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.644	0.024	0.038	2.520	1.588	969	0.595	0.692
Richest 40%	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.384	0.032	0.082	2.162	1.470	519	0.321	0.447
Three or more	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.618	0.024	0.038	2.974	1.725	1254	0.570	0.665
One or two	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.263	0.073	0.277	4.032	2.008	147	0.117	0.408
None	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.154	0.055	0.360	2.105	1.451	87	0.043	0.264
Primary or none	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.598	0.054	0.091	3.054	1.748	275	0.490	0.707
Secondary	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.567	0.022	0.038	1.653	1.286	840	0.523	0.610
Higher	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.443	0.076	0.172	2.376	1.541	92	0.291	0.596
Belgrade	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.495	0.064	0.128	4.534	2.129	315	0.368	0.622
Vojvodina	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.584	0.036	0.062	1.686	1.299	262	0.512	0.656
Sumadija	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.506	0.052	0.103	1.614	1.270	151	0.402	0.611
South/East	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.574	0.031	0.054	2.931	1.712	760	0.512	0.636
DPA	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.547	0.044	0.081	3.968	1.992	559	0.459	0.635
IPA	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.537	0.050	0.093	3.936	1.984	394	0.437	0.637
TPA	Problems with dwelling: Leaking roof	0.572	0.026	0.045	1.645	1.282	535	0.520	0.624
Leaking roof — No	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.006	4.958	2.227	634	0.008	0.008
Leaking roof — Yes	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.005	4.216	2.053	854	0.008	0.008
Leaking roof — No	GNI	0.007	0.000	0.009	4.966	2.228	634	0.007	0.008
Leaking roof — Yes	GNI	0.007	0.000	0.007	4.547	2.132	854	0.007	0.007
Leaking roof — No	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.002	7.255	2.694	634	0.008	0.009
Leaking roof — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.002	8.152	2.855	854	0.008	0.009
Leaking roof — No	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.010	5.774	2.403	634	0.007	0.008
Leaking roof — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.007	4.383	2.093	854	0.008	0.008
Male	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.732	0.025	0.035	2.378	1.542	733	0.681	0.782
Female	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.732	0.026	0.036	2.722	1.650	755	0.679	0.785
Poorest 60%	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.820	0.022	0.027	3.228	1.797	969	0.776	0.864

Richest 40%	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.563	0.036	0.063	2.639	1.625	519	0.492	0.635
Three or more	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.800	0.020	0.025	3.238	1.799	1254	0.759	0.841
One or two	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.465	0.066	0.143	2.603	1.613	147	0.332	0.597
None	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.222	0.068	0.306	2.397	1.548	87	0.086	0.359
Primary or none	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.756	0.046	0.060	2.833	1.683	275	0.665	0.847
Secondary	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.729	0.028	0.038	3.351	1.831	840	0.673	0.785
Higher	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.670	0.058	0.087	1.552	1.246	92	0.554	0.787
Belgrade	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.595	0.056	0.094	3.623	1.903	315	0.483	0.706
Vojvodina	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.797	0.045	0.057	3.980	1.995	262	0.706	0.887
Sumadija	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.710	0.050	0.071	1.819	1.349	151	0.610	0.810
South/East	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.760	0.034	0.045	4.779	2.186	760	0.692	0.829
DPA	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.676	0.039	0.058	3.571	1.890	559	0.597	0.754
IPA	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.694	0.052	0.075	5.012	2.239	394	0.589	0.798
TPA	Problems with dwelling: Damp walls, floors or foundation	0.804	0.031	0.038	3.564	1.888	535	0.743	0.866
Damp walls, floors or foundation — NO	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.007	3.428	1.852	409	0.008	0.008
Damp walls, floors or foundation — YES	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.005	5.605	2.368	1079	0.008	0.008
Damp walls, floors or foundation — NO	GNI	0.008	0.000	0.009	3.047	1.746	409	0.007	0.008
Damp walls, floors or foundation — YES	GNI	0.007	0.000	0.007	6.292	2.508	1079	0.007	0.007
Damp walls, floors or foundation — NO	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.001	2.961	1.721	409	0.009	0.009
Damp walls, floors or foundation — YES	Life expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.002	13.639	3.693	1079	0.008	0.009
Damp walls, floors or foundation — NO	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.012	4.427	2.104	409	0.008	0.008
Damp walls, floors or foundation — YES	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.007	5.994	2.448	1079	0.007	0.008
Male	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.421	0.032	0.076	3.027	1.740	733	0.357	0.485
Female	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.453	0.029	0.065	2.668	1.633	755	0.394	0.512
Poorest 60%	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.580	0.038	0.065	5.745	2.397	969	0.505	0.656
Richest 40%	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.164	0.031	0.190	3.617	1.902	519	0.101	0.226
Three or more	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.489	0.030	0.062	4.594	2.143	1254	0.429	0.550

One or two	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.227	0.077	0.338	4.949	2.225	147	0.074	0.380
None	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.056	0.032	0.563	1.689	1.300	87	0.000	0.120
Primary or none	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.451	0.053	0.118	2.849	1.688	275	0.345	0.558
Secondary	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.462	0.032	0.068	3.433	1.853	840	0.398	0.525
Higher	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.284	0.068	0.239	2.301	1.517	92	0.148	0.420
Belgrade	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.381	0.051	0.135	3.145	1.773	315	0.278	0.483
Vojvodina	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.505	0.090	0.178	10.245	3.201	262	0.325	0.685
Sumadija	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.434	0.051	0.117	1.554	1.246	151	0.333	0.536
South/East	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.431	0.037	0.087	4.253	2.062	760	0.356	0.506
DPA	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.407	0.032	0.079	2.152	1.467	559	0.343	0.471
IPA	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.412	0.063	0.152	6.323	2.515	394	0.287	0.538
TPA	Problems with dwelling: Rot in window frames or floor	0.480	0.049	0.101	5.601	2.367	535	0.383	0.577
Rot in window frames or floor — NO	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.006	5.421	2.328	800	0.008	0.008
Rot in window frames or floor — YES	HDI	0.008	0.000	0.005	3.127	1.768	688	0.008	0.008
Rot in window frames or floor — NO	GNI	0.007	0.000	0.008	5.625	2.372	800	0.007	0.008
Rot in window frames or floor — YES	GNI	0.007	0.000	0.007	3.199	1.789	688	0.007	0.007
Rot in window frames or floor — NO	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.002	13.190	3.632	800	0.008	0.009
Rot in window frames or floor — YES	Life expectancy index	0.009	0.000	0.002	6.228	2.496	688	0.008	0.009
Rot in window frames or floor — NO	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.010	6.906	2.628	800	0.007	0.008
Rot in window frames or floor — YES	Education expectancy index	0.008	0.000	0.007	3.554	1.885	688	0.007	0.008

Table SE.5: Sampling errors: Access to digital technologies — adolescents 10–19 years oldStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia, 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Male	Internet access at home	0.946	0.009	0.010	1.696	1.302	933	0.927	0.965
Female	Internet access at home	0.940	0.013	0.014	2.363	1.537	847	0.915	0.966
Poorest 60%	Internet access at home	0.898	0.017	0.019	3.056	1.748	1036	0.864	0.932
Richest 40%	Internet access at home	1.000	0.000	0.000	2.120	1.456	744	1.000	1.000
Three or more	Internet access at home	0.841	0.027	0.032	2.565	1.602	500	0.787	0.895
One or two	Internet access at home	0.971	0.012	0.012	3.243	1.801	656	0.947	0.994
None	Internet access at home	0.991	0.005	0.005	1.534	1.239	624	0.982	1.000

Primary or none	Internet access at home	0.804	0.049	0.061	3.244	1.801	231	0.706	0.902
Secondary	Internet access at home	0.961	0.009	0.009	1.709	1.307	831	0.943	0.978
Higher	Internet access at home	0.978	0.009	0.009	1.532	1.238	394	0.960	0.996
Belgrade	Internet access at home	0.973	0.014	0.014	2.773	1.665	364	0.945	1.000
Vojvodina	Internet access at home	0.978	0.009	0.009	2.133	1.460	455	0.960	0.997
Sumadija	Internet access at home	0.936	0.022	0.023	3.870	1.967	493	0.893	0.979
South/East	Internet access at home	0.877	0.027	0.030	2.491	1.578	468	0.823	0.930
DPA	Internet access at home	0.963	0.013	0.013	2.760	1.661	603	0.938	0.988
IPA	Internet access at home	0.970	0.018	0.018	3.911	1.978	361	0.934	1.000
TPA	Internet access at home	0.916	0.017	0.018	2.918	1.708	816	0.883	0.950
Internet access at home — No	HDI	0.774	0.007	0.009	2.799	1.673	110	0.760	0.788
Internet access at home — Yes	HDI	0.798	0.002	0.002	1.831	1.353	1670	0.795	0.801
Internet access at home — No	GNI	0.724	0.010	0.014	2.891	1.700	110	0.703	0.744
Internet access at home — Yes	GNI	0.761	0.002	0.003	1.990	1.411	1670	0.757	0.766
Internet access at home — No	Life expectancy index	0.852	0.002	0.003	2.963	1.721	110	0.848	0.857
Internet access at home — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.000	0.001	1.818	1.348	1670	0.854	0.856
Internet access at home — No	Education expectancy index	0.754	0.009	0.013	2.548	1.596	110	0.735	0.773
Internet access at home — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.783	0.002	0.003	1.769	1.330	1670	0.779	0.788
Male	Laptop	0.521	0.024	0.046	2.253	1.501	933	0.473	0.570
Female	Laptop	0.577	0.025	0.044	2.117	1.455	847	0.527	0.628
Poorest 60%	Laptop	0.367	0.024	0.064	2.363	1.537	1036	0.319	0.414
Richest 40%	Laptop	0.770	0.023	0.030	2.464	1.570	744	0.723	0.817
Three or more	Laptop	0.265	0.029	0.109	2.014	1.419	500	0.208	0.323
One or two	Laptop	0.548	0.029	0.053	2.233	1.494	656	0.490	0.606
None	Laptop	0.750	0.027	0.036	2.566	1.602	624	0.695	0.804
Primary or none	Laptop	0.207	0.033	0.161	1.441	1.200	231	0.141	0.274
Secondary	Laptop	0.530	0.023	0.043	1.742	1.320	831	0.485	0.576
Higher	Laptop	0.737	0.029	0.040	1.810	1.345	394	0.678	0.796
Belgrade	Laptop	0.621	0.042	0.068	2.882	1.698	364	0.536	0.705
Vojvodina	Laptop	0.600	0.038	0.063	3.147	1.774	455	0.524	0.676
Sumadija	Laptop	0.478	0.044	0.091	3.807	1.951	493	0.391	0.566
South/East	Laptop	0.491	0.034	0.070	1.775	1.332	468	0.423	0.559
DPA	Laptop	0.657	0.032	0.048	2.826	1.681	603	0.593	0.721
IPA	Laptop	0.511	0.042	0.081	2.503	1.582	361	0.428	0.594
TPA	Laptop	0.476	0.031	0.064	2.944	1.716	816	0.415	0.537
Laptop — No	HDI	0.791	0.003	0.004	2.919	1.709	815	0.786	0.797
Laptop — Yes	HDI	0.802	0.002	0.003	1.583	1.258	965	0.797	0.806
Laptop — No	GNI	0.751	0.004	0.005	2.964	1.722	815	0.743	0.758
Laptop — Yes	GNI	0.766	0.003	0.004	1.672	1.293	965	0.761	0.771
Laptop — No	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	2.785	1.669	815	0.853	0.856
Laptop — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	2.090	1.446	965	0.854	0.856
Laptop — No	Education expectancy index	0.774	0.004	0.005	2.787	1.669	815	0.766	0.782
Laptop — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.788	0.003	0.004	1.641	1.281	965	0.782	0.794
Poorest 60%	Desktop PC	0.572	0.026	0.046	2.794	1.672	1036	0.520	0.625
Richest 40%	Desktop PC	0.772	0.021	0.027	1.933	1.390	744	0.731	0.813
Three or more	Desktop PC	0.459	0.038	0.083	2.744	1.656	500	0.383	0.535
One or two	Desktop PC	0.694	0.026	0.038	2.129	1.459	656	0.642	0.746
None	Desktop PC	0.776	0.023	0.030	2.024	1.423	624	0.729	0.822
Primary or none	Desktop PC	0.494	0.059	0.120	2.986	1.728	231	0.375	0.612

Secondary	Desktop PC	0.672	0.024	0.035	2.124	1.457	831	0.625	0.720
Higher	Desktop PC	0.693	0.034	0.049	2.175	1.475	394	0.626	0.761
Belgrade	Desktop PC	0.628	0.038	0.060	2.308	1.519	364	0.553	0.704
Vojvodina	Desktop PC	0.706	0.028	0.039	1.925	1.388	455	0.651	0.761
Sumadija	Desktop PC	0.679	0.039	0.057	3.412	1.847	493	0.602	0.757
South/East	Desktop PC	0.610	0.040	0.066	2.577	1.605	468	0.530	0.691
DPA	Desktop PC	0.682	0.027	0.040	2.131	1.460	603	0.628	0.736
IPA	Desktop PC	0.647	0.046	0.071	3.311	1.820	361	0.555	0.738
TPA	Desktop PC	0.652	0.027	0.041	2.527	1.590	816	0.598	0.706
Desktop PC — No	HDI	0.795	0.003	0.004	2.351	1.533	666	0.789	0.802
Desktop PC — Yes	HDI	0.798	0.002	0.002	2.089	1.445	1114	0.794	0.802
Desktop PC — No	GNI	0.756	0.004	0.006	2.413	1.553	666	0.747	0.765
Desktop PC — Yes	GNI	0.761	0.003	0.003	2.103	1.450	1114	0.756	0.766
Desktop PC — No	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	2.311	1.520	666	0.853	0.857
Desktop PC — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	2.039	1.428	1114	0.854	0.856
Desktop PC — No	Education expectancy index	0.781	0.005	0.006	2.392	1.547	666	0.771	0.791
Desktop PC — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.782	0.003	0.004	2.196	1.482	1114	0.776	0.788
Male	Tablet	0.377	0.022	0.059	2.042	1.429	933	0.332	0.421
Female	Tablet	0.363	0.023	0.062	1.783	1.335	847	0.318	0.408
Poorest 60%	Tablet	0.235	0.020	0.087	2.262	1.504	1036	0.194	0.275
Richest 40%	Tablet	0.538	0.026	0.048	2.111	1.453	744	0.487	0.589
Three or more	Tablet	0.179	0.025	0.141	2.025	1.423	500	0.128	0.229
One or two	Tablet	0.346	0.027	0.077	2.054	1.433	656	0.293	0.399
None	Tablet	0.534	0.027	0.051	1.964	1.401	624	0.479	0.589
Primary or none	Tablet	0.243	0.048	0.196	2.639	1.624	231	0.148	0.338
Secondary	Tablet	0.367	0.023	0.062	1.838	1.356	831	0.322	0.413
Higher	Tablet	0.491	0.033	0.067	1.749	1.323	394	0.425	0.556
Belgrade	Tablet	0.444	0.038	0.086	2.248	1.499	364	0.368	0.521
Vojvodina	Tablet	0.409	0.034	0.084	2.557	1.599	455	0.340	0.478
Sumadija	Tablet	0.386	0.034	0.088	2.443	1.563	493	0.318	0.454
South/East	Tablet	0.222	0.028	0.125	1.684	1.298	468	0.166	0.277
DPA	Tablet	0.449	0.027	0.060	1.863	1.365	603	0.395	0.504
IPA	Tablet	0.328	0.038	0.117	2.420	1.556	361	0.251	0.405
TPA	Tablet	0.327	0.027	0.084	2.676	1.636	816	0.272	0.381
Tablet — No	HDI	0.792	0.002	0.003	2.433	1.560	1146	0.788	0.797
Tablet — Yes	HDI	0.805	0.002	0.003	1.454	1.206	634	0.801	0.810
Tablet — No	GNI	0.752	0.003	0.004	2.493	1.579	1146	0.746	0.758
Tablet — Yes	GNI	0.771	0.003	0.004	1.427	1.194	634	0.765	0.777
Tablet — No	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.001	0.001	2.045	1.430	1146	0.853	0.855
Tablet — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.856	0.001	0.001	2.153	1.467	634	0.855	0.858
Tablet — No	Education expectancy index	0.776	0.003	0.004	2.379	1.542	1146	0.769	0.782
Tablet — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.792	0.004	0.004	1.495	1.223	634	0.785	0.799

Table SE.6: Sampling errors: Access to digital technologies — adolescents 10–19 years oldStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Male	Internet access at home	0.729	0.024	0.033	2.182	1.477	733	0.681	0.778
Female	Internet access at home	0.764	0.021	0.027	1.832	1.354	755	0.722	0.805
Poorest 60%	Internet access at home	0.643	0.030	0.047	3.865	1.966	969	0.582	0.703
Richest 40%	Internet access at home	0.946	0.014	0.015	1.994	1.412	519	0.918	0.975
Three or more	Internet access at home	0.716	0.022	0.031	3.036	1.743	1254	0.671	0.760
One or two	Internet access at home	0.911	0.027	0.030	1.333	1.155	147	0.857	0.965
None	Internet access at home	0.916	0.045	0.049	2.356	1.535	87	0.825	1.000
None	Internet access at home	0.673	0.050	0.074	2.790	1.670	275	0.574	0.772
Primary	Internet access at home	0.747	0.024	0.032	2.520	1.588	840	0.700	0.794
Secondary or higher	Internet access at home	0.811	0.047	0.059	1.489	1.220	92	0.716	0.906
Belgrade	Internet access at home	0.715	0.045	0.063	2.776	1.666	315	0.625	0.804
Vojvodina	Internet access at home	0.831	0.053	0.063	6.218	2.494	262	0.726	0.936
Sumadija	Internet access at home	0.782	0.041	0.052	1.452	1.205	151	0.700	0.863
South/East	Internet access at home	0.717	0.023	0.032	1.913	1.383	760	0.671	0.762
DPA	Internet access at home	0.757	0.034	0.045	3.154	1.776	559	0.690	0.825
IPA	Internet access at home	0.766	0.039	0.051	3.269	1.808	394	0.688	0.844
TPA	Internet access at home	0.726	0.038	0.052	4.256	2.063	535	0.650	0.801
Internet access at home — No	HDI	0.780	0.005	0.007	3.425	1.851	392	0.769	0.790
Internet access at home — Yes	HDI	0.782	0.003	0.004	4.541	2.131	1096	0.775	0.788
Internet access at home — No	GNI	0.732	0.008	0.011	3.622	1.903	392	0.717	0.747
Internet access at home — Yes	GNI	0.740	0.005	0.007	5.106	2.260	1096	0.730	0.750
Internet access at home — No	Life expectancy index	0.851	0.001	0.002	4.112	2.028	392	0.848	0.854
Internet access at home — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.851	0.001	0.002	11.226	3.351	1096	0.848	0.853
Internet access at home — No	Education expectancy index	0.763	0.008	0.010	3.607	1.899	392	0.748	0.779
Internet access at home — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.762	0.005	0.007	4.941	2.223	1096	0.751	0.772
Male	Laptop	0.133	0.018	0.139	2.136	1.462	733	0.096	0.170
Female	Laptop	0.135	0.020	0.145	2.500	1.581	755	0.096	0.174
Poorest 60%	Laptop	0.071	0.017	0.240	4.286	2.070	969	0.037	0.104
Richest 40%	Laptop	0.255	0.032	0.126	2.778	1.667	519	0.191	0.319
Three or more	Laptop	0.107	0.015	0.139	2.916	1.708	1254	0.077	0.137
One or two	Laptop	0.191	0.058	0.305	3.260	1.806	147	0.074	0.308
None	Laptop	0.410	0.088	0.215	2.866	1.693	87	0.234	0.587
Primary	Laptop	0.069	0.022	0.313	1.824	1.351	275	0.026	0.112
Secondary or higher	Laptop	0.140	0.021	0.152	3.197	1.788	840	0.098	0.182
Higher	Laptop	0.197	0.049	0.250	1.549	1.245	92	0.099	0.295
Belgrade	Laptop	0.188	0.043	0.226	3.323	1.823	315	0.103	0.273
Vojvodina	Laptop	0.137	0.043	0.313	4.921	2.218	262	0.051	0.223
Sumadija	Laptop	0.162	0.037	0.227	1.482	1.217	151	0.089	0.236
South/East	Laptop	0.106	0.022	0.211	3.910	1.977	760	0.061	0.151
DPA	Laptop	0.190	0.028	0.146	2.507	1.583	559	0.134	0.245
IPA	Laptop	0.088	0.029	0.323	3.948	1.987	394	0.031	0.146
TPA	Laptop	0.116	0.029	0.249	4.824	2.196	535	0.058	0.174

Laptop — No	HDI	0.779	0.004	0.005	6.463	2.542	1292	0.772	0.787
Laptop — Yes	HDI	0.795	0.006	0.008	2.369	1.539	196	0.782	0.807
Laptop — No	GNI	0.735	0.005	0.007	7.175	2.679	1292	0.724	0.746
Laptop — Yes	GNI	0.755	0.008	0.011	2.176	1.475	196	0.739	0.771
Laptop — No	Life expectancy index	0.850	0.001	0.002	13.321	3.650	1292	0.847	0.853
Laptop — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.001	0.002	2.450	1.565	196	0.851	0.857
Laptop — No	Education expectancy index	0.759	0.006	0.008	7.178	2.679	1292	0.748	0.771
Laptop — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.780	0.010	0.013	2.724	1.650	196	0.761	0.800
Male	Desktop PC	0.181	0.022	0.124	2.475	1.573	733	0.065	0.138
Female	Desktop PC	0.174	0.021	0.120	2.319	1.523	755	0.246	0.400
Poorest 60%	Desktop PC	0.101	0.018	0.181	3.591	1.895	969	0.107	0.184
Richest 40%	Desktop PC	0.323	0.038	0.119	3.436	1.854	519	0.223	0.426
Three or more	Desktop PC	0.146	0.019	0.131	3.648	1.910	1254	0.107	0.184
One or two	Desktop PC	0.324	0.051	0.157	1.738	1.318	147	0.223	0.426
None	Desktop PC	0.380	0.085	0.224	2.751	1.659	87	0.210	0.550
None	Desktop PC	0.136	0.033	0.239	2.254	1.501	275	0.071	0.201
Primary	Desktop PC	0.173	0.022	0.124	2.764	1.662	840	0.130	0.217
Secondary or higher	Desktop PC	0.371	0.077	0.208	2.577	1.605	92	0.217	0.525
Belgrade	Desktop PC	0.130	0.033	0.251	2.643	1.626	315	0.065	0.195
Vojvodina	Desktop PC	0.171	0.058	0.336	7.355	2.712	262	0.056	0.286
Sumadija	Desktop PC	0.151	0.066	0.434	4.981	2.232	151	0.020	0.283
South/East	Desktop PC	0.203	0.022	0.111	2.320	1.523	760	0.158	0.248
DPA	Desktop PC	0.176	0.031	0.174	3.282	1.812	559	0.115	0.238
IPA	Desktop PC	0.184	0.021	0.114	1.145	1.070	394	0.142	0.226
TPA	Desktop PC	0.174	0.038	0.216	5.815	2.411	535	0.099	0.249
Desktop PC — No	HDI	0.782	0.004	0.005	6.073	2.464	1228	0.775	0.790
Desktop PC — Yes	HDI	0.777	0.004	0.006	2.118	1.455	260	0.768	0.786
Desktop PC — No	GNI	0.739	0.006	0.008	6.816	2.611	1228	0.728	0.750
Desktop PC — Yes	GNI	0.733	0.007	0.009	2.505	1.583	260	0.719	0.746
Desktop PC — No	Life expectancy index	0.851	0.001	0.002	13.147	3.626	1228	0.848	0.854
Desktop PC — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.851	0.001	0.001	2.379	1.542	260	0.848	0.853
Desktop PC — No	Education expectancy index	0.764	0.006	0.008	6.418	2.533	1228	0.752	0.775
Desktop PC — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.754	0.006	0.008	1.803	1.343	260	0.742	0.766
Male	Tablet	0.081	0.012	0.151	1.457	1.207	733	0.056	0.105
Female	Tablet	0.100	0.015	0.152	1.939	1.392	755	0.069	0.130
Poorest 60%	Tablet	0.055	0.013	0.229	2.956	1.719	969	0.030	0.080
Richest 40%	Tablet	0.159	0.020	0.127	1.562	1.250	519	0.119	0.200
Three or more	Tablet	0.063	0.010	0.165	2.301	1.517	1254	0.042	0.084
One or two	Tablet	0.244	0.053	0.216	2.224	1.491	147	0.139	0.350
None	Tablet	0.219	0.043	0.195	0.956	0.978	87	0.134	0.305
Primary or none	Tablet	0.073	0.023	0.317	1.970	1.404	275	0.027	0.119
Secondary	Tablet	0.079	0.014	0.184	2.473	1.573	840	0.050	0.108
Higher	Tablet	0.232	0.057	0.247	1.865	1.366	92	0.117	0.347
Belgrade	Tablet	0.098	0.024	0.247	1.868	1.367	315	0.050	0.147
Vojvodina	Tablet	0.040	0.013	0.318	1.348	1.161	262	0.015	0.066
Sumadija	Tablet	0.144	0.040	0.279	1.941	1.393	151	0.063	0.224
South/East	Tablet	0.098	0.018	0.182	2.667	1.633	760	0.062	0.134
DPA	Tablet	0.112	0.016	0.145	1.341	1.158	559	0.080	0.145

IPA	Tablet	0.086	0.019	0.226	1.874	1.369	394	0.047	0.125
TPA	Tablet	0.075	0.022	0.296	4.210	2.052	535	0.031	0.119
Tablet — No	HDI	0.781	0.004	0.005	6.006	2.451	1342	0.774	0.788
Tablet — Yes	HDI	0.781	0.005	0.007	1.294	1.137	146	0.770	0.791
Tablet — No	GNI	0.738	0.005	0.007	6.693	2.587	1342	0.727	0.748
Tablet — Yes	GNI	0.738	0.007	0.010	1.316	1.147	146	0.723	0.752
Tablet — No	Life expectancy index	0.850	0.001	0.002	12.913	3.594	1342	0.848	0.853
Tablet — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.001	0.002	1.622	1.274	146	0.851	0.856
Tablet — No	Education expectancy index	0.762	0.005	0.007	6.555	2.560	1342	0.752	0.773
Tablet — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.758	0.009	0.012	1.473	1.214	146	0.740	0.776

Table SE.7: Sampling errors: Children aged 10–13 years by involvement in economic activities or household chores during the last week and percentage engaged in child labour during the previous week

Standard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia, 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Male	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.154	0.029	0.185	1.545	1.243	240	0.097	0.211
Female	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.050	0.016	0.315	1.076	1.037	217	0.018	0.081
Poorest 60%	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.118	0.021	0.175	0.940	0.970	236	0.077	0.159
Richest 40%	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.095	0.022	0.234	1.304	1.142	221	0.051	0.140
Three or more	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.093	0.030	0.324	1.213	1.102	105	0.033	0.154
One or two	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.106	0.025	0.236	1.071	1.035	167	0.056	0.156
None	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.115	0.027	0.235	1.309	1.144	185	0.061	0.170
Primary or none	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.211	0.067	0.319	1.569	1.253	57	0.076	0.345
Secondary	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.104	0.020	0.192	1.061	1.030	254	0.064	0.145
Higher	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.070	0.019	0.269	0.838	0.915	146	0.032	0.108
Belgrade	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.037	0.020	0.526	1.017	1.008	94	0.000	0.077
Vojvodina	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.105	0.037	0.348	1.802	1.342	121	0.032	0.179
Sumadija	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.180	0.032	0.176	0.945	0.972	124	0.117	0.244
South/East	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.071	0.021	0.297	0.650	0.806	118	0.029	0.112
DPA	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.070	0.025	0.350	1.635	1.279	161	0.021	0.119
IPA	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.058	0.025	0.421	1.150	1.072	116	0.009	0.108
TPA	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.172	0.028	0.163	0.963	0.981	180	0.116	0.228
Any physical — no	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.090	0.013	0.143	0.818	0.904	412	0.065	0.116
Any physical — yes	Economic activities above age specific threshold	(0.232)	(0.071)	(0.304)	(1.454)	(1.206)	45	(0.091)	(0.373)
help with home-work — No	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.111	0.022	0.200	0.942	0.971	171	0.066	0.155
help with home-work — Yes	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.105	0.022	0.214	1.415	1.190	284	0.060	0.150

Male	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.141	0.028	0.199	1.604	1.266	240	0.085	0.197
Female	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.143	0.031	0.219	1.659	1.288	217	0.081	0.206
Poorest 60%	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.169	0.027	0.161	1.213	1.101	236	0.115	0.224
Richest 40%	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.114	0.029	0.250	1.835	1.354	221	0.057	0.171
Three or more	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.211	0.058	0.274	2.244	1.498	105	0.096	0.326
One or two	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.115	0.031	0.273	1.578	1.256	167	0.053	0.178
None	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.123	0.024	0.194	0.951	0.975	185	0.075	0.170
Primary or none	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.149	0.074	0.493	2.461	1.569	57	0.002	0.296
Secondary	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.163	0.030	0.182	1.583	1.258	254	0.104	0.222
Higher	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.105	0.027	0.253	1.148	1.071	146	0.052	0.158
Belgrade	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.052	0.022	0.434	0.968	0.984	94	0.007	0.096
Vojvodina	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.178	0.046	0.259	1.836	1.355	121	0.086	0.270
Sumadija	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.216	0.041	0.188	1.347	1.161	124	0.135	0.297
South/East	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.078	0.020	0.256	0.535	0.731	118	0.038	0.117
DPA	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.105	0.030	0.289	1.725	1.313	161	0.044	0.165
IPA	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.079	0.028	0.348	1.090	1.044	116	0.024	0.135
TPA	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.217	0.039	0.181	1.583	1.258	180	0.138	0.295
Any physical — no	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.145	0.023	0.157	1.682	1.297	412	0.099	0.190
Any physical — yes	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	(0.118)	(0.055)	(0.469)	(1.536)	(1.239)	45	(0.007)	(0.229)
Help with home-work — No	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.153	0.037	0.244	2.045	1.430	171	0.078	0.228
Help with home-work — Yes	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.125	0.020	0.160	0.967	0.983	284	0.085	0.166
Male	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.010	0.010	0.993	2.383	1.544	240	0.000	0.029
Female	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.026	0.009	0.362	0.721	0.849	217	0.007	0.044
Poorest 60%	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.020	0.008	0.385	0.708	0.842	236	0.005	0.036
Richest 40%	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.013	0.011	0.792	1.948	1.396	221	0.000	0.035
Three or more	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.025	0.003	0.109	0.035	0.187	105	0.020	0.031
One or two	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.015	0.012	0.755	1.447	1.203	167	0.000	0.039
None	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.013	0.013	0.983	2.343	1.531	185	0.000	0.039
Primary or none	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	57	0.000	0.000
Secondary	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.029	0.012	0.418	1.275	1.129	254	0.005	0.053
Higher	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.004	0.003	0.766	0.393	0.627	146	0.000	0.011

Belgrade	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.035	0.006	0.166	0.094	0.307	94	0.023	0.047
Vojvodina	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	121	0.000	0.000
Sumadija	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.031	0.021	0.696	2.116	1.455	124	0.000	0.073
South/East	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.002	0.002	1.004	0.200	0.447	118	0.000	0.006
DPA	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.020	0.003	0.161	0.093	0.305	161	0.013	0.026
IPA	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.040	0.027	0.674	2.004	1.416	116	0.000	0.095
TPA	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	180	0.000	0.000
Help with homework — No	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.037	0.016	0.419	1.294	1.137	171	0.006	0.069
Help with homework — Yes	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.003	0.002	0.766	0.393	0.627	284	0.000	0.006
Male	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.874	0.023	0.026	1.194	1.093	240	0.828	0.920
Female	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.900	0.021	0.024	1.060	1.030	217	0.857	0.942
Poorest 60%	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.894	0.020	0.023	0.995	0.997	236	0.853	0.934
Richest 40%	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.878	0.024	0.027	1.210	1.100	221	0.830	0.926
Three or more	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.898	0.026	0.028	0.802	0.895	105	0.847	0.949
One or two	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.892	0.021	0.024	0.761	0.872	167	0.850	0.934
None	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.873	0.029	0.033	1.372	1.171	185	0.815	0.931
Primary or none	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.902	0.046	0.050	1.356	1.164	57	0.811	0.993
Secondary	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.870	0.021	0.024	0.920	0.959	254	0.829	0.911
Higher	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.905	0.029	0.032	1.472	1.213	146	0.847	0.962
Belgrade	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.889	0.030	0.034	0.869	0.932	94	0.829	0.949
Vojvodina	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.929	0.022	0.024	0.931	0.965	121	0.884	0.973
Sumadija	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.859	0.031	0.036	1.067	1.033	124	0.798	0.920
South/East	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.865	0.040	0.046	1.310	1.144	118	0.785	0.944
DPA	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.895	0.025	0.028	1.196	1.093	161	0.845	0.946
IPA	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.851	0.035	0.041	1.016	1.008	116	0.781	0.921
TPA	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.897	0.022	0.025	0.946	0.973	180	0.853	0.942
Any physical — no	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.895	0.015	0.017	0.998	0.999	412	0.864	0.925
Any physical — yes	Household chores below the age specific threshold	(0.817)	(0.068)	(0.083)	(1.599)	(1.265)	45	(0.682)	(0.953)
Help with homework — No	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.839	0.031	0.037	1.319	1.148	171	0.778	0.901
Help with homework — Yes	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.920	0.017	0.019	1.099	1.048	284	0.885	0.955
Male	Total hazardous work	0.023	0.010	0.454	1.180	1.086	240	0.002	0.043
Female	Total hazardous work	0.006	0.000	0.071	0.007	0.082	217	0.005	0.007

Poorest 60%	Total hazardous work	0.024	0.009	0.385	0.829	0.911	236	0.006	0.042
Richest 40%	Total hazardous work	0.006	0.006	1.003	1.458	1.208	221	0.000	0.019
Three or more	Total hazardous work	0.012	0.001	0.109	0.016	0.126	105	0.009	0.014
One or two	Total hazardous work	0.025	0.013	0.520	1.115	1.056	167	0.000	0.050
None	Total hazardous work	0.009	0.008	0.916	1.329	1.153	185	0.000	0.025
Primary or none	Total hazardous work	0.019	0.015	0.787	0.705	0.840	57	0.000	0.050
Secondary	Total hazardous work	0.024	0.008	0.338	0.676	0.822	254	0.008	0.039
Higher	Total hazardous work	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	146	0.000	0.000
Belgrade	Total hazardous work	0.033	0.016	0.474	0.723	0.850	94	0.002	0.064
Vojvodina	Total hazardous work	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	121	0.000	0.000
Sumadija	Total hazardous work	0.027	0.015	0.573	1.238	1.112	124	0.000	0.057
South/East	Total hazardous work	0.001	0.001	0.934	0.112	0.335	118	0.000	0.004
DPA	Total hazardous work	0.010	0.008	0.861	1.277	1.130	161	0.000	0.026
IPA	Total hazardous work	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	116	0.000	0.000
TPA	Total hazardous work	0.030	0.012	0.404	0.874	0.935	180	0.006	0.054
Any physical — no	Total hazardous work	0.014	0.004	0.302	0.523	0.723	412	0.006	0.023
Any physical — yes	Total hazardous work	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.988)	(1.240)	(1.114)	45	(0.000)	(0.071)
Help with home- work — No	Total hazardous work	0.016	0.001	0.076	0.017	0.132	171	0.013	0.018
Help with home- work — Yes	Total hazardous work	0.015	0.010	0.645	1.662	1.289	284	0.000	0.034
Male	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.162	0.028	0.176	1.485	1.218	240	0.105	0.219
Female	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.082	0.018	0.225	0.937	0.968	217	0.045	0.118
Poorest 60%	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.152	0.022	0.143	0.835	0.914	236	0.109	0.196
Richest 40%	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.098	0.022	0.227	1.278	1.131	221	0.053	0.143
Three or more	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.130	0.030	0.233	0.918	0.958	105	0.070	0.191
One or two	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.132	0.027	0.208	1.069	1.034	167	0.077	0.186
None	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.116	0.027	0.234	1.300	1.140	185	0.062	0.170
Primary or none	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.211	0.067	0.319	1.569	1.253	57	0.076	0.345
Secondary	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.136	0.022	0.158	0.967	0.983	254	0.093	0.179
Higher	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.075	0.019	0.257	0.815	0.903	146	0.036	0.113
Belgrade	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.090	0.022	0.244	0.556	0.746	94	0.046	0.134
Vojvodina	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.105	0.037	0.348	1.802	1.342	121	0.032	0.179
Sumadija	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.203	0.035	0.171	1.028	1.014	124	0.134	0.273

South/East	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.074	0.021	0.282	0.619	0.786	118	0.032	0.116
DPA	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.090	0.025	0.275	1.326	1.151	161	0.040	0.140
IPA	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.076	0.029	0.378	1.230	1.109	116	0.019	0.134
TPA	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.190	0.028	0.148	0.902	0.949	180	0.134	0.246
Any physical — no	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.111	0.014	0.124	0.779	0.883	412	0.084	0.139
Any physical — yes	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	(0.232)	(0.071)	(0.304)	(1.454)	(1.206)	45	(0.091)	(0.373)
Help with home-work — No	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.151	0.024	0.160	0.866	0.931	171	0.103	0.200
Help with home-work — Yes	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.108	0.023	0.208	1.392	1.180	284	0.063	0.153
Male	Total child labour	0.154	0.029	0.185	1.545	1.243	240	0.097	0.211
Female	Total child labour	0.075	0.018	0.243	1.000	1.000	217	0.039	0.112
Poorest 60%	Total child labour	0.139	0.022	0.157	0.902	0.950	236	0.095	0.182
Richest 40%	Total child labour	0.098	0.022	0.227	1.278	1.131	221	0.053	0.143
Three or more	Total child labour	0.119	0.030	0.255	0.987	0.994	105	0.058	0.179
One or two	Total child labour	0.121	0.027	0.225	1.134	1.065	167	0.067	0.176
None	Total child labour	0.115	0.027	0.235	1.309	1.144	185	0.061	0.170
Primary or none	Total child labour	0.211	0.067	0.319	1.569	1.253	57	0.076	0.345
Secondary	Total child labour	0.124	0.021	0.174	1.044	1.022	254	0.081	0.166
Higher	Total child labour	0.075	0.019	0.257	0.815	0.903	146	0.036	0.113
Belgrade	Total child labour	0.072	0.021	0.294	0.639	0.799	94	0.030	0.115
Vojvodina	Total child labour	0.105	0.037	0.348	1.802	1.342	121	0.032	0.179
Sumadija	Total child labour	0.194	0.035	0.178	1.055	1.027	124	0.125	0.263
South/East	Total child labour	0.073	0.021	0.290	0.640	0.800	118	0.030	0.115
DPA	Total child labour	0.090	0.025	0.275	1.326	1.151	161	0.040	0.140
IPA	Total child labour	0.076	0.029	0.378	1.230	1.109	116	0.019	0.134
TPA	Total child labour	0.172	0.028	0.163	0.963	0.981	180	0.116	0.228
Any physical — no	Total child labour	0.104	0.014	0.133	0.828	0.910	412	0.076	0.131
Any physical — yes	Total child labour	(0.232)	(0.071)	(0.304)	(1.454)	(1.206)	45	(0.091)	(0.373)
Help with home-work — No	Total child labour	0.135	0.024	0.177	0.933	0.966	171	0.087	0.183
Help with home-work — Yes	Total child labour	0.108	0.023	0.209	1.396	1.182	284	0.063	0.153
Economic activities above age specific threshold — No	HDI	0.795	0.002	0.002	1.031	1.015	832	0.792	0.799
Economic activities above age specific threshold — Yes	HDI	0.780	0.006	0.008	1.336	1.156	52	0.768	0.792
Economic activities above age specific threshold — No	GNI	0.758	0.002	0.003	1.042	1.021	832	0.753	0.762

Economic activities above age specific threshold — Yes	GNI	0.734	0.009	0.012	1.475	1.215	52	0.716	0.752
Economic activities above age specific threshold — No	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.001	0.001	1.076	1.037	832	0.853	0.855
Economic activities above age specific threshold — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.002	0.002	1.337	1.156	52	0.851	0.858
Economic activities above age specific threshold — No	Education expectancy index	0.779	0.003	0.003	1.049	1.024	832	0.774	0.784
Economic activities above age specific threshold — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.757	0.008	0.011	1.204	1.097	52	0.741	0.773
Economic activities below the age specific threshold — No	HDI	0.798	0.002	0.002	1.083	1.041	711	0.794	0.802
Economic activities below the age specific threshold — Yes	HDI	0.783	0.003	0.004	1.596	1.263	173	0.776	0.789
Economic activities below the age specific threshold — No	GNI	0.760	0.003	0.003	1.088	1.043	711	0.755	0.766
Economic activities below the age specific threshold — Yes	GNI	0.742	0.004	0.006	1.505	1.227	173	0.733	0.751
Economic activities below the age specific threshold — No	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.001	0.001	1.102	1.050	711	0.853	0.855
Economic activities below the age specific threshold — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	1.124	1.060	173	0.853	0.857
Economic activities below the age specific threshold — No	Education expectancy index	0.784	0.003	0.004	1.079	1.039	711	0.778	0.790
Economic activities below the age specific threshold — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.757	0.005	0.007	1.716	1.310	173	0.747	0.767
Household chores below the age specific threshold — No	HDI	0.756	0.003	0.004	1.046	1.023	383	0.749	0.762
Household chores below the age specific threshold — Yes	HDI	0.757	0.003	0.004	1.128	1.062	501	0.751	0.763
Household chores below the age specific threshold — No	GNI	0.854	0.001	0.001	1.357	1.165	383	0.852	0.856

Household chores below the age specific threshold — Yes	GNI	0.854	0.001	0.001	0.959	0.979	501	0.853	0.856
Household chores below the age specific threshold — No	Life expectancy index	0.777	0.004	0.005	1.070	1.034	383	0.770	0.784
Household chores below the age specific threshold — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.779	0.003	0.004	1.008	1.004	501	0.772	0.785
Household chores below the age specific threshold — No	Education expectancy index	6.249	1.457	0.233	1.730	1.315	497	3.336	1.000
Household chores below the age specific threshold — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.333	0.333	0.999	1.353	1.163	387	0.000	1.000
Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions — Yes	HDI	0.795	0.002	0.002	1.059	1.029	806	0.792	0.799
Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions — No	HDI	0.785	0.006	0.007	1.304	1.142	78	0.774	0.796
Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions — Yes	GNI	0.758	0.002	0.003	1.069	1.034	806	0.753	0.762
Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions — No	GNI	0.742	0.008	0.011	1.484	1.218	78	0.726	0.759
Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.001	0.001	1.103	1.050	806	0.853	0.855
Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions — No	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.002	0.002	1.276	1.130	78	0.852	0.858

Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.779	0.003	0.003	1.065	1.032	806	0.774	0.785
Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions — No	Education expectancy index	0.764	0.008	0.010	1.166	1.080	78	0.748	0.780
Total child labour — No	HDI	0.795	0.002	0.002	1.043	1.021	827	0.792	0.798
Total child labour — Yes	HDI	0.785	0.005	0.007	0.982	0.991	57	0.774	0.796
Total child labour — No	GNI	0.757	0.002	0.003	1.052	1.025	827	0.753	0.762
Total child labour — Yes	GNI	0.741	0.008	0.011	1.148	1.071	57	0.724	0.757
Total child labour — No	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.001	0.001	1.082	1.040	827	0.853	0.855
Total child labour — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.856	0.002	0.002	1.261	1.123	57	0.852	0.859
Total child labour — No	Education expectancy index	0.779	0.003	0.003	1.061	1.030	827	0.774	0.784
Total child labour — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.766	0.008	0.010	0.868	0.931	57	0.751	0.781

Table SE.8: Sampling errors: Children aged 14–17 years by involvement in economic activities or household chores during the last week and percentage engaged in child labour during the previous week

Standard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia, 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Male	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.012	0.009	0.738	1.526	1.235	224	0.000	0.030
Female	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.015	0.009	0.594	1.088	1.043	203	0.000	0.034
Poorest 60%	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.024	0.011	0.467	1.298	1.139	261	0.002	0.046
Richest 40%	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	166	0.000	0.000
Three or more	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.042	0.024	0.572	1.570	1.253	118	0.000	0.090
One or two	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	167	0.000	0.000
None	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.008	0.001	0.072	0.006	0.080	142	0.007	0.010
Primary or none	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.041	0.029	0.704	1.430	1.196	64	0.000	0.100
Secondary	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.012	0.007	0.598	1.095	1.046	262	0.000	0.026
Higher	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	96	0.000	0.000
Belgrade	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	74	0.000	0.000
Vojvodina	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	123	0.000	0.000

Sumadija	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.008	0.009	1.035	1.027	1.013	112	0.000	0.025
South/East	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.053	0.026	0.499	1.277	1.130	118	0.000	0.105
DPA	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	127	0.000	0.000
IPA	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.022	0.021	0.967	1.743	1.320	80	0.000	0.064
TPA	Economic activities above age specific threshold	0.018	0.009	0.520	1.095	1.046	220	0.000	0.037
Male	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.343	0.030	0.087	0.906	0.952	224	0.284	0.403
Female	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.218	0.029	0.134	0.977	0.988	203	0.160	0.276
Poorest 60%	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.380	0.026	0.068	0.689	0.830	261	0.329	0.431
Richest 40%	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.156	0.033	0.211	1.476	1.215	166	0.090	0.222
Three or more	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.362	0.041	0.114	0.809	0.900	118	0.279	0.444
One or two	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.288	0.035	0.121	1.011	1.006	167	0.218	0.357
None	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.225	0.041	0.184	1.417	1.190	142	0.142	0.308
Primary or none	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.430	0.056	0.131	0.859	0.927	64	0.317	0.542
Secondary	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.267	0.024	0.091	0.777	0.881	262	0.219	0.316
Higher	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.232	0.051	0.218	1.413	1.189	96	0.131	0.333
Belgrade	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.074	0.017	0.235	0.327	0.572	74	0.039	0.108
Vojvodina	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.206	0.023	0.111	0.464	0.681	123	0.160	0.251
Sumadija	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.600	0.056	0.093	1.488	1.220	112	0.488	0.712
South/East	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.192	0.037	0.190	0.795	0.892	118	0.119	0.265
DPA	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.157	0.055	0.352	2.863	1.692	127	0.046	0.267
IPA	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.206	0.039	0.189	0.774	0.880	80	0.128	0.284
TPA	Economic activities below the age specific threshold	0.389	0.027	0.070	0.686	0.828	220	0.334	0.444
Male	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.001	0.001	1.001	0.167	0.408	224	0.000	0.002
Female	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	203	0.000	0.000
Poorest 60%	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.001	0.001	1.009	0.169	0.411	261	0.000	0.002
Richest 40%	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	166	0.000	0.000
Three or more	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.002	0.002	1.004	0.168	0.410	118	0.000	0.005
One or two	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	167	0.000	0.000
None	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	142	0.000	0.000
Primary or none	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.002	0.002	1.005	0.168	0.410	64	0.000	0.007
Secondary	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	262	0.000	0.000

Higher	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	96	0.000	0.000
Belgrade	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	74	0.000	0.000
Vojvodina	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.001	0.001	1.014	0.171	0.414	123	0.000	0.003
Sumadija	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	112	0.000	0.000
South/East	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	118	0.000	0.000
DPA	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	127	0.000	0.000
IPA	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.002	0.002	1.026	0.175	0.419	80	0.000	0.006
TPA	Household chores above age specific threshold	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	220	0.000	0.000
Male	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.238	0.023	0.096	0.662	0.814	224	0.193	0.284
Female	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.256	0.028	0.111	0.834	0.913	203	0.199	0.313
Poorest 60%	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.237	0.024	0.099	0.755	0.869	261	0.190	0.284
Richest 40%	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.259	0.034	0.131	1.075	1.037	166	0.192	0.327
Three or more	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.294	0.041	0.138	0.870	0.933	118	0.213	0.375
One or two	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.218	0.029	0.132	0.833	0.913	167	0.160	0.275
None	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.244	0.042	0.172	1.372	1.171	142	0.160	0.328
Primary or none	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.165	0.050	0.303	1.217	1.103	64	0.065	0.265
Secondary	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.276	0.025	0.092	0.824	0.908	262	0.225	0.327
Higher	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.235	0.044	0.188	1.075	1.037	96	0.147	0.324
Belgrade	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.243	0.043	0.177	0.750	0.866	74	0.157	0.330
Vojvodina	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.233	0.032	0.135	0.806	0.898	123	0.170	0.296
Sumadija	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.233	0.034	0.145	0.730	0.854	112	0.166	0.301
South/East	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.286	0.035	0.124	0.565	0.751	118	0.215	0.356
DPA	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.257	0.031	0.122	0.635	0.797	127	0.194	0.319
IPA	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.342	0.050	0.146	0.924	0.961	80	0.242	0.442
TPA	Household chores below the age specific threshold	0.204	0.024	0.118	0.782	0.884	220	0.156	0.252
Male	Total hazardous work	0.078	0.017	0.211	0.873	0.934	224	0.045	0.112
Female	Total hazardous work	0.026	0.010	0.383	0.767	0.876	203	0.006	0.046
Poorest 60%	Total hazardous work	0.094	0.017	0.179	0.819	0.905	261	0.060	0.128
Richest 40%	Total hazardous work	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	166	0.000	0.000
Three or more	Total hazardous work	0.094	0.027	0.285	0.924	0.961	118	0.040	0.148
One or two	Total hazardous work	0.069	0.013	0.191	0.465	0.682	167	0.043	0.095
None	Total hazardous work	0.007	0.006	0.996	0.938	0.969	142	0.000	0.020
Primary or none	Total hazardous work	0.118	0.029	0.244	0.532	0.729	64	0.060	0.175
Secondary	Total hazardous work	0.045	0.011	0.233	0.661	0.813	262	0.024	0.067
Higher	Total hazardous work	0.037	0.015	0.418	0.654	0.809	96	0.006	0.067
Belgrade	Total hazardous work	0.042	0.008	0.180	0.106	0.326	74	0.027	0.058

Vojvodina	Total hazardous work	0.023	0.010	0.442	0.659	0.812	123	0.003	0.043
Sumadija	Total hazardous work	0.078	0.019	0.245	0.577	0.760	112	0.040	0.116
South/East	Total hazardous work	0.084	0.034	0.403	1.383	1.176	118	0.016	0.152
DPA	Total hazardous work	0.011	0.004	0.413	0.226	0.476	127	0.002	0.019
IPA	Total hazardous work	0.071	0.021	0.301	0.579	0.761	80	0.028	0.114
TPA	Total hazardous work	0.073	0.017	0.233	0.929	0.964	220	0.039	0.107
Male	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.083	0.015	0.175	0.643	0.802	224	0.054	0.113
Female	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.032	0.010	0.310	0.624	0.790	203	0.012	0.052
Poorest 60%	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.103	0.015	0.148	0.618	0.786	261	0.073	0.134
Richest 40%	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	166	0.000	0.000
Three or more	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.104	0.028	0.269	0.926	0.962	118	0.048	0.160
One or two	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.069	0.013	0.191	0.465	0.682	167	0.043	0.095
None	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.015	0.007	0.436	0.416	0.645	142	0.002	0.028
Primary or none	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.135	0.032	0.235	0.572	0.756	64	0.071	0.198
Secondary	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.050	0.011	0.211	0.601	0.775	262	0.029	0.071
Higher	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.037	0.015	0.418	0.654	0.809	96	0.006	0.067
Belgrade	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.042	0.008	0.180	0.106	0.326	74	0.027	0.058
Vojvodina	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.024	0.010	0.424	0.638	0.799	123	0.004	0.044
Sumadija	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.086	0.012	0.134	0.194	0.440	112	0.063	0.109
South/East	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.097	0.034	0.346	1.196	1.094	118	0.030	0.165
DPA	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.011	0.004	0.413	0.226	0.476	127	0.002	0.019
IPA	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.073	0.022	0.296	0.576	0.759	80	0.030	0.117
TPA	Economic activities or household chores above threshold, or working under hazardous conditions	0.083	0.015	0.180	0.641	0.801	220	0.053	0.112
Male	Total child labour	0.013	0.009	0.698	1.449	1.204	224	0.000	0.031
Female	Total child labour	0.015	0.009	0.594	1.088	1.043	203	0.000	0.034
Poorest 60%	Total child labour	0.024	0.011	0.455	1.269	1.127	261	0.002	0.046
Richest 40%	Total child labour	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	166	0.000	0.000
Three or more	Total child labour	0.043	0.024	0.553	1.520	1.233	118	0.000	0.091

One or two	Total child labour	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	167	0.000	0.000
None	Total child labour	0.008	0.001	0.072	0.006	0.080	142	0.007	0.010
Primary or none	Total child labour	0.044	0.029	0.665	1.356	1.164	64	0.000	0.102
Secondary	Total child labour	0.012	0.007	0.598	1.095	1.046	262	0.000	0.026
Higher	Total child labour	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	96	0.000	0.000
Belgrade	Total child labour	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	74	0.000	0.000
Vojvodina	Total child labour	0.001	0.001	1.014	0.171	0.414	123	0.000	0.003
Sumadija	Total child labour	0.008	0.009	1.035	1.027	1.013	112	0.000	0.025
South/East	Total child labour	0.053	0.026	0.499	1.277	1.130	118	0.000	0.105
DPA	Total child labour	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	127	0.000	0.000
IPA	Total child labour	0.024	0.021	0.890	1.614	1.270	80	0.000	0.067
TPA	Total child labour	0.018	0.009	0.520	1.095	1.046	220	0.000	0.037

Table SE.9: Sampling errors: Children aged 10–13 years by child disciplining methods experienced during the last one monthStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia, 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Male	Only non-violent discipline	0.456	0.036	0.078	1.279	1.131	240	0.385	0.528
Female	Only non-violent discipline	0.469	0.038	0.082	1.222	1.105	217	0.393	0.546
Poorest 60%	Only non-violent discipline	0.495	0.039	0.079	1.382	1.176	236	0.417	0.572
Richest 40%	Only non-violent discipline	0.430	0.035	0.081	1.137	1.066	221	0.360	0.500
Three or more	Only non-violent discipline	0.431	0.056	0.129	1.411	1.188	105	0.320	0.542
One or two	Only non-violent discipline	0.535	0.044	0.082	1.270	1.127	167	0.447	0.624
None	Only non-violent discipline	0.416	0.034	0.083	0.883	0.940	185	0.347	0.485
Primary or none	Only non-violent discipline	0.312	0.071	0.226	1.345	1.160	57	0.171	0.454
Secondary	Only non-violent discipline	0.494	0.037	0.074	1.319	1.148	254	0.421	0.568
Higher	Only non-violent discipline	0.467	0.036	0.077	0.797	0.893	146	0.395	0.540
Belgrade	Only non-violent discipline	0.376	0.051	0.135	1.035	1.017	94	0.275	0.477
Vojvodina	Only non-violent discipline	0.380	0.052	0.137	1.463	1.209	121	0.276	0.485
Sumadija	Only non-violent discipline	0.507	0.050	0.098	1.378	1.174	124	0.407	0.607
South/East	Only non-violent discipline	0.589	0.062	0.106	1.562	1.250	118	0.464	0.713
DPA	Only non-violent discipline	0.436	0.035	0.079	0.859	0.927	161	0.366	0.505
IPA	Only non-violent discipline	0.503	0.062	0.124	1.630	1.277	116	0.378	0.628
TPA	Only non-violent discipline	0.465	0.049	0.106	1.711	1.308	180	0.366	0.563
Only non-violent discipline — No	HDI	0.801	0.003	0.004	1.204	1.097	234	0.794	0.808
Only non-violent discipline — Yes	HDI	0.789	0.003	0.004	0.796	0.892	223	0.783	0.795
Only non-violent discipline — No	GNI	0.764	0.005	0.006	1.303	1.142	234	0.755	0.774
Only non-violent discipline — Yes	GNI	0.747	0.004	0.005	0.747	0.864	223	0.739	0.755
Only non-violent discipline — No	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	1.426	1.194	234	0.852	0.857
Only non-violent discipline — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	1.074	1.036	223	0.853	0.857
Only non-violent discipline — No	Education expectancy index	0.788	0.005	0.006	1.078	1.038	234	0.778	0.797
Only non-violent discipline — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.771	0.005	0.006	0.870	0.933	223	0.762	0.780
Male	Psychological aggression	0.432	0.033	0.077	1.121	1.059	240	0.365	0.498
Female	Psychological aggression	0.430	0.038	0.088	1.210	1.100	217	0.355	0.506
Poorest 60%	Psychological aggression	0.366	0.036	0.098	1.276	1.130	236	0.294	0.438
Richest 40%	Psychological aggression	0.496	0.034	0.069	1.057	1.028	221	0.428	0.565
Three or more	Psychological aggression	0.452	0.057	0.127	1.486	1.219	105	0.338	0.567

One or two	Psychological aggression	0.370	0.039	0.105	1.061	1.030	167	0.292	0.448
None	Psychological aggression	0.472	0.038	0.081	1.067	1.033	185	0.395	0.549
Primary or none	Psychological aggression	0.546	0.089	0.164	1.861	1.364	57	0.367	0.724
Secondary	Psychological aggression	0.384	0.033	0.085	1.108	1.053	254	0.318	0.449
Higher	Psychological aggression	0.464	0.035	0.076	0.755	0.869	146	0.393	0.534
Belgrade	Psychological aggression	0.499	0.063	0.126	1.506	1.227	94	0.373	0.626
Vojvodina	Psychological aggression	0.541	0.048	0.089	1.172	1.082	121	0.445	0.637
Sumadija	Psychological aggression	0.324	0.038	0.116	0.897	0.947	124	0.249	0.400
South/East	Psychological aggression	0.373	0.058	0.156	1.408	1.187	118	0.257	0.490
DPA	Psychological aggression	0.444	0.040	0.091	1.172	1.083	161	0.363	0.525
IPA	Psychological aggression	0.425	0.053	0.125	1.202	1.096	116	0.319	0.531
TPA	Psychological aggression	0.421	0.044	0.105	1.403	1.185	180	0.333	0.510
Psychological aggression — No	HDI	0.791	0.003	0.003	0.734	0.857	263	0.786	0.796
Psychological aggression —Yes	HDI	0.801	0.004	0.005	1.442	1.201	194	0.793	0.810
Psychological aggression — No	GNI	0.749	0.004	0.005	0.751	0.866	263	0.742	0.756
Psychological aggression —Yes	GNI	0.765	0.006	0.007	1.506	1.227	194	0.754	0.777
Psychological aggression — No	Life expectancy index	0.856	0.001	0.001	0.978	0.989	263	0.854	0.857
Psychological aggression —Yes	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.001	0.002	1.537	1.240	194	0.851	0.856
Psychological aggression — No	Education expectancy index	0.773	0.004	0.005	0.700	0.837	263	0.766	0.780
Psychological aggression —Yes	Education expectancy index	0.789	0.006	0.007	1.285	1.134	194	0.777	0.801
Male	Physical punishment — Any	0.156	0.023	0.149	1.013	1.007	240	0.110	0.202
Female	Physical punishment — Any	0.064	0.019	0.293	1.230	1.109	217	0.027	0.102
Poorest 60%	Physical punishment — Any	0.098	0.023	0.231	1.329	1.153	236	0.053	0.144
Richest 40%	Physical punishment — Any	0.131	0.023	0.179	1.093	1.046	221	0.084	0.177
Three or more	Physical punishment — Any	0.095	0.034	0.359	1.516	1.231	105	0.027	0.163
One or two	Physical punishment — Any	0.083	0.018	0.217	0.694	0.833	167	0.047	0.119
None	Physical punishment — Any	0.154	0.030	0.193	1.235	1.111	185	0.095	0.214
Primary or none	Physical punishment — Any	0.246	0.069	0.280	1.485	1.218	57	0.108	0.384
Secondary	Physical punishment — Any	0.102	0.021	0.207	1.200	1.095	254	0.060	0.144
Higher	Physical punishment — Any	0.084	0.022	0.265	0.978	0.989	146	0.039	0.128
Belgrade	Physical punishment — Any	0.106	0.041	0.384	1.655	1.287	94	0.025	0.187
Vojvodina	Physical punishment — Any	0.137	0.030	0.221	0.979	0.990	121	0.076	0.197
Sumadija	Physical punishment — Any	0.132	0.031	0.234	1.154	1.074	124	0.070	0.194
South/East	Physical punishment — Any	0.068	0.022	0.325	0.742	0.862	118	0.024	0.111
DPA	Physical punishment — Any	0.110	0.031	0.279	1.704	1.305	161	0.049	0.172
IPA	Physical punishment — Any	0.110	0.018	0.167	0.360	0.600	116	0.074	0.147
TPA	Physical punishment — Any	0.121	0.026	0.211	1.071	1.035	180	0.070	0.172
Male	Physical punishment — Severe	0.027	0.015	0.547	2.022	1.422	240	0.000	0.056
Female	Physical punishment — Severe	0.009	0.009	0.984	1.868	1.367	217	0.000	0.027
Poorest 60%	Physical punishment — Severe	0.017	0.012	0.707	1.921	1.386	236	0.000	0.040
Richest 40%	Physical punishment — Severe	0.021	0.014	0.676	2.200	1.483	221	0.000	0.049
Three or more	Physical punishment — Severe	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	105	0.000	0.000
One or two	Physical punishment — Severe	0.023	0.016	0.697	1.880	1.371	167	0.000	0.056
None	Physical punishment — Severe	0.026	0.018	0.676	2.208	1.486	185	0.000	0.061
Primary or none	Physical punishment — Severe	0.045	0.044	0.970	2.563	1.601	57	0.000	0.132
Secondary	Physical punishment — Severe	0.016	0.012	0.706	2.041	1.429	254	0.000	0.040
Higher	Physical punishment — Severe	0.012	0.011	0.892	1.499	1.224	146	0.000	0.034
Belgrade	Physical punishment — Severe	0.045	0.028	0.626	1.733	1.316	94	0.000	0.101
Vojvodina	Physical punishment — Severe	0.021	0.020	0.975	2.525	1.589	121	0.000	0.061

Sumadija	Physical punishment — Severe	0.012	0.012	1.000	1.682	1.297	124	0.000	0.036
South/East	Physical punishment — Severe	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	118	0.000	0.000
DPA	Physical punishment — Severe	0.024	0.016	0.650	1.833	1.354	161	0.000	0.055
IPA	Physical punishment — Severe	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	116	0.000	0.000
TPA	Physical punishment — Severe	0.024	0.017	0.710	2.203	1.484	180	0.000	0.059
Male	Any violent discipline method	0.450	0.033	0.074	1.114	1.055	240	0.383	0.517
Female	Any violent discipline method	0.434	0.038	0.088	1.223	1.106	217	0.358	0.510
Poorest 60%	Any violent discipline method	0.379	0.036	0.096	1.274	1.129	236	0.306	0.451
Richest 40%	Any violent discipline method	0.507	0.034	0.066	1.029	1.014	221	0.440	0.574
Three or more	Any violent discipline method	0.455	0.057	0.126	1.481	1.217	105	0.341	0.569
One or two	Any violent discipline method	0.382	0.039	0.103	1.056	1.027	167	0.303	0.460
None	Any violent discipline method	0.490	0.039	0.079	1.079	1.039	185	0.413	0.567
Primary or none	Any violent discipline method	0.556	0.089	0.161	1.867	1.366	57	0.377	0.734
Secondary	Any violent discipline method	0.400	0.034	0.084	1.160	1.077	254	0.332	0.467
Higher	Any violent discipline method	0.469	0.035	0.075	0.766	0.875	146	0.399	0.540
Belgrade	Any violent discipline method	0.499	0.063	0.126	1.506	1.227	94	0.373	0.626
Vojvodina	Any violent discipline method	0.549	0.048	0.087	1.177	1.085	121	0.453	0.646
Sumadija	Any violent discipline method	0.353	0.039	0.110	0.921	0.960	124	0.275	0.432
South/East	Any violent discipline method	0.376	0.058	0.154	1.385	1.177	118	0.260	0.492
DPA	Any violent discipline method	0.458	0.040	0.088	1.150	1.072	161	0.377	0.538
IPA	Any violent discipline method	0.425	0.053	0.125	1.202	1.096	116	0.319	0.531
TPA	Any violent discipline method	0.438	0.044	0.101	1.394	1.180	180	0.350	0.527
Any violent discipline method — No	HDI	0.791	0.003	0.003	0.737	0.859	255	0.786	0.796
Any violent discipline method — Yes	HDI	0.800	0.004	0.005	1.423	1.193	202	0.792	0.809
Any violent discipline method — No	GNI	0.750	0.004	0.005	0.761	0.872	255	0.743	0.757
Any violent discipline method — Yes	GNI	0.764	0.006	0.007	1.475	1.214	202	0.753	0.775
Any violent discipline method — No	Life expectancy index	0.856	0.001	0.001	1.006	1.003	255	0.854	0.857
Any violent discipline method — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.001	0.002	1.514	1.230	202	0.851	0.856
Any violent discipline method — No	Education expectancy index	0.774	0.004	0.005	0.701	0.838	255	0.766	0.781
Any violent discipline method — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.788	0.006	0.007	1.271	1.128	202	0.776	0.799
Male	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.116	0.020	0.172	0.966	0.983	240	0.076	0.156
Female	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.070	0.017	0.248	0.960	0.980	217	0.035	0.104
Poorest 60%	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.067	0.016	0.234	0.891	0.944	236	0.035	0.098
Richest 40%	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.124	0.021	0.168	0.912	0.955	221	0.082	0.166
Three or more	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.059	0.019	0.323	0.733	0.856	105	0.021	0.097

One or two	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.080	0.012	0.154	0.336	0.580	167	0.056	0.105
None	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.131	0.027	0.206	1.159	1.076	185	0.077	0.185
Primary or none	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.118	0.048	0.409	1.295	1.138	57	0.022	0.215
Secondary	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.100	0.019	0.196	1.039	1.019	254	0.061	0.138
Higher	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.079	0.012	0.149	0.290	0.539	146	0.056	0.103
Belgrade	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.147	0.039	0.262	1.122	1.059	94	0.070	0.224
Vojvodina	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.142	0.031	0.219	1.003	1.001	121	0.080	0.204
Sumadija	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.023	0.005	0.227	0.170	0.412	124	0.013	0.034
South/East	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.085	0.022	0.252	0.577	0.759	118	0.042	0.129
DPA	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.097	0.023	0.236	1.057	1.028	161	0.051	0.143
IPA	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.083	0.014	0.168	0.267	0.517	116	0.055	0.110
TPA	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.101	0.024	0.238	1.110	1.054	180	0.053	0.148
Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished — No	HDI	0.793	0.002	0.003	0.782	0.884	414	0.789	0.797
Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished — Yes	HDI	(0.816)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.860)	(0.927)	43	(0.802)	(0.830)
Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished — No	GNI	0.753	0.003	0.004	0.824	0.908	414	0.748	0.759
Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished — Yes	GNI	(0.784)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.798)	(0.893)	43	(0.766)	(0.802)
Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished — No	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	0.913	0.956	414	0.853	0.856

Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished — Yes	Life expectancy index	(0.857)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(1.032)	(1.016)	43	(0.853)	(0.861)
Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished — No	Education expectancy index	0.777	0.003	0.004	0.727	0.852	414	0.771	0.783
Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished — Yes	Education expectancy index	(0.810)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.864)	(0.929)	43	(0.790)	(0.831)

Table SE.10: Sampling errors: Children aged 10–13 years by child disciplining methods experienced during the last one monthStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Male	Only non-violent discipline	0.232	0.037	0.158	1.033	1.017	137	0.159	0.306
Female	Only non-violent discipline	0.356	0.050	0.141	1.226	1.107	113	0.256	0.456
Poorest 60%	Only non-violent discipline	0.263	0.038	0.143	1.256	1.121	164	0.188	0.339
Richest 40%	Only non-violent discipline	0.342	0.061	0.177	1.265	1.125	86	0.221	0.463
Three or more	Only non-violent discipline	0.256	0.033	0.129	1.174	1.083	205	0.190	0.322
One or two	Only non-violent discipline	(0.389)	(0.100)	(0.256)	(1.315)	(1.147)	30	(0.190)	(0.588)
None	Only non-violent discipline	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	15	(*)	(*)
None	Only non-violent discipline	(0.243)	(0.072)	(0.298)	(1.275)	(1.129)	47	(0.098)	(0.387)
Primary	Only non-violent discipline	0.308	0.037	0.121	1.151	1.073	178	0.234	0.383
Secondary or higher	Only non-violent discipline	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	25	(*)	(*)
Belgrade	Only non-violent discipline	(0.206)	(0.074)	(0.360)	(1.511)	(1.229)	46	(0.058)	(0.355)
Vojvodina	Only non-violent discipline	(0.410)	(0.071)	(0.173)	(1.034)	(1.017)	46	(0.268)	(0.551)
Sumadija	Only non-violent discipline	(0.257)	(0.116)	(0.450)	(1.788)	(1.337)	30	(0.025)	(0.488)
South/East	Only non-violent discipline	0.275	0.040	0.145	1.020	1.010	128	0.196	0.355
DPA	Only non-violent discipline	0.244	0.057	0.233	1.551	1.245	93	0.130	0.358
IPA	Only non-violent discipline	0.302	0.048	0.158	0.733	0.856	67	0.206	0.398
TPA	Only non-violent discipline	0.319	0.064	0.199	1.740	1.319	90	0.192	0.446
Only non-violent discipline — No	HDI	0.781	0.005	0.006	1.239	1.113	174	0.772	0.791
Only non-violent discipline — Yes	HDI	0.779	0.007	0.009	1.628	1.276	76	0.765	0.794
Only non-violent discipline — No	GNI	0.736	0.007	0.009	1.394	1.181	174	0.722	0.749
Only non-violent discipline — Yes	GNI	0.738	0.010	0.014	1.671	1.293	76	0.718	0.758
Only non-violent discipline — No	Life expectancy index	0.852	0.001	0.001	1.208	1.099	174	0.850	0.854
Only non-violent discipline — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.849	0.002	0.003	1.823	1.350	76	0.845	0.854
Only non-violent discipline — No	Education expectancy index	0.763	0.007	0.009	1.348	1.161	174	0.749	0.777
Only non-violent discipline — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.757	0.011	0.014	1.540	1.241	76	0.735	0.778
Male	Psychological aggression	0.704	0.041	0.058	1.097	1.048	137	0.623	0.786
Female	Psychological aggression	0.594	0.057	0.096	1.520	1.233	113	0.480	0.709

Poorest 60%	Psychological aggression	0.677	0.040	0.059	1.250	1.118	164	0.598	0.757
Richest 40%	Psychological aggression	0.605	0.067	0.110	1.442	1.201	86	0.472	0.739
Three or more	Psychological aggression	0.679	0.040	0.059	1.498	1.224	205	0.599	0.759
One or two	Psychological aggression	(0.584)	(0.100)	(0.172)	(1.307)	(1.143)	30	(0.383)	(0.784)
None	Psychological aggression	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	15	(*)	(*)
None	Psychological aggression	(0.623)	(0.083)	(0.133)	(1.308)	(1.144)	47	(0.458)	(0.789)
Primary	Psychological aggression	0.645	0.042	0.065	1.361	1.167	178	0.561	0.729
Secondary or higher	Psychological aggression	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	25	(*)	(*)
Belgrade	Psychological aggression	(0.771)	(0.086)	(0.112)	(1.893)	(1.376)	46	(0.598)	(0.943)
Vojvodina	Psychological aggression	(0.552)	(0.065)	(0.118)	(0.859)	(0.927)	46	(0.422)	(0.683)
Sumadija	Psychological aggression	(0.701)	(0.118)	(0.168)	(1.688)	(1.299)	30	(0.465)	(0.936)
South/East	Psychological aggression	0.645	0.050	0.078	1.415	1.190	128	0.545	0.746
DPA	Psychological aggression	0.704	0.062	0.087	1.603	1.266	93	0.581	0.827
IPA	Psychological aggression	0.596	0.063	0.105	1.109	1.053	67	0.470	0.722
TPA	Psychological aggression	0.651	0.064	0.098	1.686	1.298	90	0.523	0.779
Psychological aggression — No	HDI	0.777	0.007	0.009	1.888	1.374	91	0.763	0.791
Psychological aggression — Yes	HDI	0.783	0.005	0.006	1.187	1.090	159	0.773	0.792
Psychological aggression — No	GNI	0.736	0.009	0.013	1.730	1.315	91	0.718	0.755
Psychological aggression — Yes	GNI	0.737	0.007	0.010	1.433	1.197	159	0.722	0.751
Psychological aggression — No	Life expectancy index	0.849	0.002	0.003	2.154	1.468	91	0.845	0.854
Psychological aggression — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.852	0.001	0.001	1.109	1.053	159	0.850	0.854
Psychological aggression — No	Education expectancy index	0.753	0.012	0.015	2.140	1.463	91	0.729	0.776
Psychological aggression — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.766	0.007	0.009	1.093	1.046	159	0.753	0.779
Male	Physical punishment — Any	0.281	0.046	0.162	1.410	1.188	137	0.190	0.372
Female	Physical punishment — Any	0.226	0.041	0.179	1.050	1.025	113	0.145	0.308
Poorest 60%	Physical punishment — Any	0.281	0.039	0.138	1.277	1.130	164	0.204	0.359
Richest 40%	Physical punishment — Any	0.202	0.043	0.210	0.870	0.933	86	0.117	0.287
Three or more	Physical punishment — Any	0.280	0.036	0.129	1.328	1.152	205	0.208	0.353
One or two	Physical punishment — Any	(0.179)	(0.072)	(0.403)	(1.111)	(1.054)	30	(0.035)	(0.322)
None	Physical punishment — Any	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	15	(*)	(*)
None	Physical punishment — Any	(0.156)	(0.057)	(0.363)	(1.098)	(1.048)	47	(0.043)	(0.270)
Primary	Physical punishment — Any	0.254	0.031	0.123	0.917	0.957	178	0.192	0.317
Secondary or higher	Physical punishment — Any	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	25	(*)	(*)
Belgrade	Physical punishment — Any	(0.307)	(0.092)	(0.301)	(1.798)	(1.341)	46	(0.122)	(0.492)
Vojvodina	Physical punishment — Any	(0.127)	(0.029)	(0.229)	(0.382)	(0.618)	46	(0.069)	(0.186)
Sumadija	Physical punishment — Any	(0.162)	(0.073)	(0.452)	(1.010)	(1.005)	30	(0.016)	(0.309)
South/East	Physical punishment — Any	0.308	0.040	0.130	0.969	0.984	128	0.228	0.388
DPA	Physical punishment — Any	0.346	0.050	0.144	0.971	0.985	93	0.246	0.446
IPA	Physical punishment — Any	0.250	0.048	0.193	0.841	0.917	67	0.154	0.347
TPA	Physical punishment — Any	0.176	0.042	0.239	1.142	1.069	90	0.092	0.261
Physical punishment — Any — No	HDI	0.781	0.005	0.007	1.932	1.390	187	0.770	0.791
Physical punishment — Any — Yes	HDI	0.781	0.007	0.009	0.944	0.971	63	0.767	0.795
Physical punishment — Any — No	GNI	0.739	0.007	0.010	2.009	1.417	187	0.724	0.754

Physical punishment — Any — Yes	GNI	0.729	0.010	0.014	0.994	0.997	63	0.709	0.750
Physical punishment — Any — No	Life expectancy index	0.850	0.001	0.002	2.119	1.456	187	0.848	0.853
Physical punishment — Any — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.853	0.002	0.002	1.137	1.066	63	0.850	0.857
Physical punishment — Any — No	Education expectancy index	0.759	0.008	0.010	1.949	1.396	187	0.743	0.775
Physical punishment — Any — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.769	0.010	0.013	0.985	0.992	63	0.749	0.789
Male	Physical punishment — Severe	0.032	0.021	0.657	1.979	1.407	137	0.000	0.075
Female	Physical punishment — Severe	0.005	0.005	1.010	0.591	0.769	113	0.000	0.016
Poorest 60%	Physical punishment — Severe	0.026	0.017	0.663	2.003	1.415	164	0.000	0.060
Richest 40%	Physical punishment — Severe	0.007	0.007	1.009	0.592	0.769	86	0.000	0.022
Three or more	Physical punishment — Severe	0.022	0.014	0.662	1.987	1.410	205	0.000	0.050
One or two	Physical punishment — Severe	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	30	(0.000)	(0.000)
None	Physical punishment — Severe	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	15	(*)	(*)
None	Physical punishment — Severe	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	47	0.000	0.000
Primary	Physical punishment — Severe	0.014	0.009	0.656	1.064	1.031	178	0.000	0.032
Secondary or higher	Physical punishment — Severe	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	25	(*)	(*)
Belgrade	Physical punishment — Severe	(0.082)	(0.044)	(0.536)	(1.150)	(1.072)	46	(0.000)	(0.170)
Vojvodina	Physical punishment — Severe	(0.027)	(0.028)	(1.056)	(1.538)	(1.240)	46	(0.000)	(0.084)
Sumadija	Physical punishment — Severe	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	30	(0.000)	(0.000)
South/East	Physical punishment — Severe	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	128	0.000	0.000
DPA	Physical punishment — Severe	0.057	0.028	0.501	1.334	1.155	93	0.000	0.114
IPA	Physical punishment — Severe	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	67	0.000	0.000
TPA	Physical punishment — Severe	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	90	0.000	0.000
Male	Any violent discipline method	0.726	0.036	0.050	0.916	0.957	137	0.653	0.799
Female	Any violent discipline method	0.599	0.057	0.096	1.536	1.239	113	0.484	0.714
Poorest 60%	Any violent discipline method	0.698	0.037	0.054	1.140	1.068	164	0.623	0.773
Richest 40%	Any violent discipline method	0.605	0.067	0.110	1.442	1.201	86	0.472	0.739
Three or more	Any violent discipline method	0.696	0.037	0.053	1.309	1.144	205	0.622	0.770
One or two	Any violent discipline method	(0.584)	(0.100)	(0.172)	(1.307)	(1.143)	30	(0.383)	(0.784)
None	Any violent discipline method	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	15	(*)	(*)
None	Any violent discipline method	(0.635)	(0.079)	(0.125)	(1.217)	(1.103)	47	(0.476)	(0.793)
Primary	Any violent discipline method	0.662	0.040	0.060	1.254	1.120	178	0.583	0.742
Secondary or higher	Any violent discipline method	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	25	(*)	(*)
Belgrade	Any violent discipline method	(0.771)	(0.086)	(0.112)	(1.893)	(1.376)	46	(0.598)	(0.943)
Vojvodina	Any violent discipline method	(0.552)	(0.065)	(0.118)	(0.859)	(0.927)	46	(0.422)	(0.683)
Sumadija	Any violent discipline method	(0.722)	(0.121)	(0.168)	(1.871)	(1.368)	30	(0.480)	(0.965)
South/East	Any violent discipline method	0.669	0.044	0.066	1.120	1.059	128	0.581	0.756
DPA	Any violent discipline method	0.732	0.051	0.069	1.161	1.078	93	0.630	0.834
IPA	Any violent discipline method	0.604	0.060	0.100	1.023	1.012	67	0.483	0.724
TPA	Any violent discipline method	0.657	0.065	0.099	1.758	1.326	90	0.527	0.787
Any violent discipline method — No	HDI	0.778	0.007	0.009	1.865	1.366	87	0.763	0.792
Any violent discipline method — Yes	HDI	0.782	0.005	0.006	1.166	1.080	163	0.773	0.792
Any violent discipline method — No	GNI	0.738	0.010	0.013	1.717	1.310	87	0.719	0.757

Any violent discipline method — Yes	GNI	0.736	0.007	0.010	1.395	1.181	163	0.722	0.750
Any violent discipline method — No	Life expectancy index	0.849	0.002	0.002	1.938	1.392	87	0.845	0.853
Any violent discipline method — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.852	0.001	0.001	1.156	1.075	163	0.850	0.854
Any violent discipline method — No	Education expectancy index	0.752	0.012	0.016	2.078	1.441	87	0.729	0.776
Any violent discipline method — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.766	0.006	0.008	1.093	1.045	163	0.753	0.779
Male	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.081	0.020	0.252	0.770	0.877	137	0.040	0.122
Female	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.062	0.027	0.442	1.450	1.204	113	0.007	0.117
Poorest 60%	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.053	0.013	0.255	0.618	0.786	164	0.026	0.080
Richest 40%	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.116	0.039	0.336	1.156	1.075	86	0.038	0.194
Three or more	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.061	0.018	0.296	1.154	1.074	205	0.025	0.096
One or two	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	(0.107)	(0.063)	(0.585)	(1.297)	(1.139)	30	(0.000)	(0.233)
None	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	15	(*)	(*)
None	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.977)	(0.498)	(0.705)	47	(0.000)	(0.034)
Primary	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.076	0.022	0.293	1.236	1.112	178	0.031	0.120
Secondary or higher	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	25	(*)	(*)
Belgrade	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	(0.214)	(0.084)	(0.393)	(1.895)	(1.377)	46	(0.046)	(0.383)
Vojvodina	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.916)	(1.515)	(1.231)	46	(0.000)	(0.099)
Sumadija	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	(0.064)	(0.040)	(0.628)	(0.691)	(0.831)	30	(0.000)	(0.145)
South/East	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.039	0.019	0.489	1.257	1.121	128	0.001	0.078
DPA	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.103	0.026	0.249	0.626	0.791	93	0.052	0.154
IPA	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.038	0.023	0.600	0.947	0.973	67	0.000	0.083
TPA	Percentage of mothers/caretakers who believe that a child needs to be physically punished	0.069	0.038	0.550	2.097	1.448	90	0.000	0.145

Table SE.11: Sampling errors: Child functioning (adolescents aged 10–17 years)Standard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia, 2019

10–17		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Male	At least in one domain	0.063	0.013	0.203	2.612	1.616	918	0.038	0.089
Female	At least in one domain	0.032	0.008	0.250	1.657	1.287	816	0.016	0.048
Poorest 60%	At least in one domain	0.047	0.009	0.192	1.689	1.300	923	0.029	0.065
Richest 40%	At least in one domain	0.052	0.013	0.244	2.601	1.613	811	0.027	0.078
Three or more	At least in one domain	0.079	0.020	0.255	2.459	1.568	416	0.039	0.119
One or two	At least in one domain	0.049	0.012	0.245	1.982	1.408	636	0.025	0.073
None	At least in one domain	0.029	0.008	0.288	1.635	1.279	682	0.012	0.046
Primary or none	At least in one domain	0.077	0.029	0.377	2.898	1.702	213	0.019	0.136
Secondary	At least in one domain	0.048	0.010	0.215	2.226	1.492	924	0.027	0.069
Higher	At least in one domain	0.039	0.011	0.290	1.795	1.340	592	0.016	0.061
Belgrade	At least in one domain	0.032	0.011	0.349	1.506	1.227	394	0.010	0.054
Vojvodina	At least in one domain	0.085	0.022	0.259	3.072	1.753	419	0.041	0.129
Sumadija	At least in one domain	0.029	0.013	0.461	3.102	1.761	469	0.002	0.056
South/East	At least in one domain	0.046	0.010	0.221	0.865	0.930	452	0.025	0.066
DPA	At least in one domain	0.037	0.011	0.304	2.145	1.464	619	0.014	0.059
IPA	At least in one domain	0.068	0.018	0.265	1.896	1.377	389	0.032	0.104
TPA	At least in one domain	0.050	0.013	0.263	2.744	1.657	726	0.024	0.076
Any violence — no	At least in one domain	0.052	0.010	0.201	2.511	1.585	1078	0.031	0.073
Any violence — yes	At least in one domain	0.044	0.009	0.213	1.257	1.121	656	0.025	0.063
Children who receive help with homework — No	At least in one domain	0.042	0.021	0.487	3.375	1.837	281	0.001	0.083
Children who receive help with homework — Yes	At least in one domain	0.052	0.011	0.207	1.555	1.247	701	0.031	0.074
At least in one domain — No	HDI	0.797	0.002	0.002	1.857	1.363	1653	0.793	0.800
At least in one domain — Yes	HDI	0.800	0.006	0.008	1.802	1.342	81	0.788	0.812
At least in one domain — No	GNI	0.759	0.002	0.003	1.947	1.395	1653	0.754	0.763
At least in one domain — Yes	GNI	0.763	0.009	0.011	1.972	1.404	81	0.745	0.780
At least in one domain — No	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.000	0.001	1.801	1.342	1653	0.854	0.856
At least in one domain — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.002	0.002	1.903	1.380	81	0.850	0.857
At least in one domain — No	Education expectancy index	0.782	0.002	0.003	1.806	1.344	1653	0.777	0.786
At least in one domain — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.788	0.009	0.011	1.713	1.309	81	0.770	0.805
10–14									
Male	At least in one domain	0.064	0.016	0.249	0.979	0.989	224	0.032	0.096
Female	At least in one domain	0.036	0.015	0.404	1.202	1.097	203	0.007	0.065
Poorest 60%	At least in one domain	0.042	0.011	0.273	0.800	0.894	261	0.019	0.064
Richest 40%	At least in one domain	0.065	0.021	0.325	1.310	1.144	166	0.023	0.107
Three or more	At least in one domain	0.053	0.014	0.271	0.448	0.669	118	0.024	0.081
One or two	At least in one domain	0.070	0.022	0.308	1.233	1.110	167	0.027	0.114
None	At least in one domain	0.028	0.015	0.524	1.140	1.068	142	0.000	0.057
Primary or none	At least in one domain	0.073	0.034	0.462	1.122	1.059	64	0.005	0.140
Secondary	At least in one domain	0.050	0.014	0.279	1.043	1.021	262	0.022	0.077

Higher	At least in one domain	0.044	0.019	0.445	0.887	0.942	96	0.005	0.082
Belgrade	At least in one domain	0.047	0.016	0.336	0.412	0.642	74	0.015	0.078
Vojvodina	At least in one domain	0.092	0.029	0.319	1.481	1.217	123	0.033	0.150
Sumadija	At least in one domain	0.004	0.003	0.715	0.208	0.456	112	0.000	0.009
South/East	At least in one domain	0.051	0.014	0.278	0.385	0.621	118	0.023	0.080
DPA	At least in one domain	0.038	0.010	0.261	0.332	0.576	127	0.018	0.057
IPA	At least in one domain	0.049	0.028	0.572	1.389	1.179	80	0.000	0.104
TPA	At least in one domain	0.060	0.018	0.299	1.249	1.118	220	0.024	0.096
10–17								0.000	0.000
Male	At least in one domain	0.068	0.016	0.237	1.962	1.401	464	0.036	0.100
Female	At least in one domain	0.033	0.009	0.284	1.125	1.060	420	0.014	0.052
Poorest 60%	At least in one domain	0.039	0.008	0.212	0.873	0.934	497	0.023	0.056
Richest 40%	At least in one domain	0.068	0.018	0.273	2.190	1.480	387	0.031	0.105
Three or more	At least in one domain	0.072	0.024	0.329	1.856	1.362	223	0.024	0.119
One or two	At least in one domain	0.060	0.016	0.266	1.525	1.235	334	0.028	0.092
None	At least in one domain	0.031	0.011	0.359	1.316	1.147	327	0.009	0.053
Primary or none	At least in one domain	0.060	0.023	0.385	1.195	1.093	121	0.014	0.107
Secondary	At least in one domain	0.049	0.013	0.274	1.954	1.398	516	0.022	0.076
Higher	At least in one domain	0.055	0.018	0.329	1.572	1.254	242	0.019	0.092
Belgrade	At least in one domain	0.034	0.015	0.423	1.074	1.036	168	0.005	0.064
Vojvodina	At least in one domain	0.100	0.028	0.278	2.348	1.532	244	0.044	0.156
Sumadija	At least in one domain	0.011	0.006	0.538	0.822	0.906	236	0.000	0.023
South/East	At least in one domain	0.053	0.015	0.278	0.830	0.911	236	0.024	0.083
DPA	At least in one domain	0.031	0.011	0.362	1.255	1.120	288	0.009	0.054
IPA	At least in one domain	0.075	0.022	0.293	1.311	1.145	196	0.031	0.120
TPA	At least in one domain	0.057	0.017	0.300	2.171	1.474	400	0.023	0.091
Any violence — no	At least in one domain	0.050	0.012	0.240	1.970	1.404	641	0.026	0.075
Any violence — yes	At least in one domain	0.057	0.016	0.276	1.090	1.044	243	0.025	0.088
Children who receive help with homework — No	At least in one domain	0.038	0.022	0.584	3.351	1.830	231	0.000	0.082
Children who receive help with homework — Yes	At least in one domain	0.061	0.013	0.222	0.983	0.991	329	0.034	0.087

Table SE.12: Sampling errors: Child functioning (adolescents aged 10–17 years)Standard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Male	At least in one domain	0.133	0.026	0.198	0.841	0.917	139	0.081	0.186
Female	At least in one domain	0.127	0.039	0.307	1.515	1.231	113	0.049	0.204
Poorest 60%	At least in one domain	0.156	0.025	0.163	0.852	0.923	166	0.105	0.207
Richest 40%	At least in one domain	0.073	0.030	0.419	1.063	1.031	86	0.012	0.134
Three or more	At least in one domain	0.149	0.022	0.145	0.760	0.872	206	0.106	0.193
One or two	At least in one domain	(0.064)	(0.052)	(0.818)	(1.464)	(1.210)	31	(0.000)	(0.168)
None	At least in one domain	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	15	(*)	(*)
None	At least in one domain	(0.186)	(0.060)	(0.325)	(1.073)	(1.036)	47	(0.065)	(0.306)
Primary	At least in one domain	0.131	0.021	0.158	0.677	0.823	180	0.090	0.173
Secondary or higher	At least in one domain	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	25	(*)	(*)
Belgrade	At least in one domain	(0.046)	(0.025)	(0.551)	(0.661)	(0.813)	47	(0.000)	(0.096)
Vojvodina	At least in one domain	(0.184)	(0.018)	(0.101)	(0.113)	(0.336)	46	(0.147)	(0.221)
Sumadija	At least in one domain	(0.150)	(0.044)	(0.295)	(0.389)	(0.624)	30	(0.062)	(0.239)

South/East	At least in one domain	0.136	0.032	0.235	1.130	1.063	129	0.072	0.200
DPA	At least in one domain	0.100	0.023	0.230	0.520	0.721	94	0.054	0.146
IPA	At least in one domain	0.187	0.052	0.277	1.188	1.090	67	0.083	0.291
TPA	At least in one domain	0.118	0.023	0.196	0.492	0.701	91	0.072	0.165
Any violence — no	At least in one domain	0.095	0.026	0.277	0.662	0.814	87	0.042	0.148
Any violence — yes	At least in one domain	0.147	0.025	0.171	0.859	0.927	165	0.097	0.198
Children who receive help with homework — No	At least in one domain	0.117	0.032	0.275	1.147	1.071	108	0.053	0.181
Children who receive help with homework — Yes	At least in one domain	0.097	0.027	0.282	0.956	0.978	119	0.042	0.151
Living with both parents — No	At least in one domain	0.160	0.060	0.375	1.544	1.243	58	0.040	0.280
Living with both parents — Yes	At least in one domain	0.122	0.022	0.185	0.915	0.956	194	0.077	0.166
10–14								0.000	0.000
Male	At least in one domain	0.146	0.029	0.200	1.107	1.052	158	0.088	0.205
Female	At least in one domain	0.158	0.025	0.155	0.630	0.794	144	0.109	0.207
Poorest 60%	At least in one domain	0.162	0.032	0.200	1.539	1.241	190	0.097	0.226
Richest 40%	At least in one domain	0.132	0.029	0.222	0.756	0.869	112	0.073	0.191
Three or more	At least in one domain	0.149	0.026	0.172	1.346	1.160	260	0.098	0.201
One or two	At least in one domain	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	19	(*)	(*)
None	At least in one domain	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	23	(*)	(*)
None	At least in one domain	0.278	0.048	0.172	0.762	0.873	62	0.182	0.374
Primary	At least in one domain	0.116	0.028	0.245	1.532	1.238	198	0.059	0.173
Secondary or higher	At least in one domain	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	24	(*)	(*)
Belgrade	At least in one domain	0.118	0.033	0.276	0.594	0.771	52	0.053	0.183
Vojvodina	At least in one domain	0.137	0.059	0.430	1.989	1.410	57	0.019	0.255
Sumadija	At least in one domain	(0.214)	(0.055)	(0.257)	(0.476)	(0.690)	33	(0.104)	(0.325)
South/East	At least in one domain	0.161	0.030	0.184	0.965	0.982	160	0.101	0.220
DPA	At least in one domain	0.222	0.045	0.203	1.240	1.114	106	0.132	0.313
IPA	At least in one domain	0.145	0.025	0.173	0.391	0.626	81	0.095	0.195
TPA	At least in one domain	0.094	0.018	0.187	0.431	0.656	115	0.059	0.129
Any violence — no	At least in one domain	0.143	0.019	0.135	0.805	0.897	267	0.104	0.181
Any violence — yes	At least in one domain	(0.215)	(0.078)	(0.362)	(1.329)	(1.153)	35	(0.059)	(0.370)
Children who receive help with homework — No	At least in one domain	(0.049)	(0.009)	(0.182)	(0.074)	(0.271)	42	(0.031)	(0.067)
Children who receive help with homework — Yes	At least in one domain	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	16	(*)	(*)
Living with both parents — No	At least in one domain	0.233	0.056	0.239	1.488	1.220	82	0.121	0.344
Living with both parents — Yes	At least in one domain	0.119	0.019	0.159	0.739	0.860	220	0.081	0.157
10–17									
Male	At least in one domain	0.140	0.020	0.141	0.972	0.986	297	0.100	0.179
Female	At least in one domain	0.143	0.021	0.145	0.880	0.938	257	0.101	0.184
Poorest 60%	At least in one domain	0.159	0.022	0.139	1.372	1.171	356	0.115	0.203
Richest 40%	At least in one domain	0.104	0.019	0.184	0.694	0.833	198	0.066	0.142
Three or more	At least in one domain	0.149	0.018	0.122	1.211	1.101	466	0.113	0.186
One or two	At least in one domain	0.081	0.034	0.426	0.863	0.929	50	0.012	0.149
None	At least in one domain	(0.126)	(0.061)	(0.485)	(1.111)	(1.054)	38	(0.004)	(0.248)

None	At least in one domain	0.238	0.039	0.165	0.937	0.968	109	0.159	0.316
Primary	At least in one domain	0.124	0.017	0.139	1.020	1.010	378	0.089	0.158
Secondary or higher	At least in one domain	(0.074)	(0.037)	(0.509)	(1.023)	(1.012)	49	(0.000)	(0.149)
Belgrade	At least in one domain	0.083	0.032	0.380	1.359	1.166	99	0.020	0.147
Vojvodina	At least in one domain	0.159	0.030	0.191	0.804	0.897	103	0.098	0.219
Sumadija	At least in one domain	0.180	0.058	0.323	1.198	1.094	63	0.064	0.297
South/East	At least in one domain	0.148	0.023	0.158	1.217	1.103	289	0.101	0.195
DPA	At least in one domain	0.161	0.025	0.158	0.929	0.964	200	0.110	0.212
IPA	At least in one domain	0.167	0.033	0.199	1.140	1.068	148	0.100	0.233
TPA	At least in one domain	0.106	0.024	0.229	1.336	1.156	206	0.057	0.154
Any violence — no	At least in one domain	0.130	0.020	0.150	1.125	1.060	354	0.091	0.169
Any violence — yes	At least in one domain	0.158	0.025	0.158	1.026	1.013	200	0.108	0.208
Children who receive help with homework — No	At least in one domain	0.098	0.025	0.252	1.096	1.047	150	0.049	0.147
Children who receive help with homework — Yes	At least in one domain	0.127	0.032	0.252	1.164	1.079	135	0.063	0.191
Living with both parents — No	At least in one domain	0.201	0.036	0.177	1.121	1.059	140	0.130	0.272
Living with both parents — Yes	At least in one domain	0.121	0.018	0.145	1.190	1.091	414	0.085	0.156
At least in one domain — No	HDI	0.783	0.004	0.005	2.305	1.518	480	0.775	0.790
At least in one domain — Yes	HDI	0.774	0.007	0.009	1.630	1.277	74	0.760	0.788
At least in one domain — No	GNI	0.738	0.005	0.007	2.457	1.567	480	0.727	0.749
At least in one domain — Yes	GNI	0.732	0.011	0.015	1.919	1.385	74	0.711	0.753
At least in one domain — No	Life expectancy index	0.851	0.001	0.002	4.363	2.089	480	0.848	0.854
At least in one domain — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.849	0.002	0.002	1.700	1.304	74	0.846	0.853
At least in one domain — No	Education expectancy index	0.765	0.006	0.008	2.605	1.614	480	0.753	0.777
At least in one domain — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.748	0.010	0.013	1.463	1.209	74	0.729	0.768

Table SE.13: Sampling errors: Contraception — girls aged 15–19 yearsStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Any modern method	0.968	0.010	0.010	0.580	0.762	189	0.949	0.988
Richest 40%	Any modern method	0.986	0.001	0.001	0.005	0.074	107	0.984	0.988
Three or more	Any modern method	0.962	0.019	0.020	0.725	0.852	81	0.924	1.000
One or two	Any modern method	0.985	0.001	0.001	0.008	0.091	116	0.983	0.987
None	Any modern method	0.974	0.010	0.010	0.389	0.624	99	0.954	0.994
Primary or none	Any modern method	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	19	(*)	(*)
Secondary	Any modern method	0.979	0.004	0.004	0.172	0.415	226	0.971	0.987
Higher	Any modern method	0.983	0.004	0.017	1.017	1.008	51	0.975	0.991
DPA	Any modern method	0.972	0.010	0.010	0.351	0.592	86	0.951	0.992
IPA	Any modern method	(1.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.394)	(0.628)	42	(1.000)	(1.000)
TPA	Any modern method	0.971	0.009	0.010	0.492	0.701	168	0.952	0.990

Poorest 60%	Any traditional method	0.903	0.020	0.022	0.834	0.913	189	0.862	0.943
Richest 40%	Any traditional method	0.912	0.021	0.023	0.651	0.807	107	0.870	0.955
Three or more	Any traditional method	0.892	0.031	0.035	0.754	0.869	81	0.830	0.955
One or two	Any traditional method	0.930	0.018	0.019	0.563	0.750	116	0.895	0.965
None	Any traditional method	0.890	0.030	0.033	0.923	0.961	99	0.830	0.949
Primary or none	Any traditional method	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	0.876	19	(*)	(*)
Secondary	Any traditional method	0.909	0.015	0.016	0.581	0.762	226	0.880	0.939
Higher	Any traditional method	0.970	0.017	0.017	0.581	0.762	51	0.936	1.000
DPA	Any traditional method	0.931	0.024	0.025	0.814	0.902	86	0.884	0.978
IPA	Any traditional method	(0.899)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.471)	(0.686)	42	(0.836)	(0.962)
TPA	Any traditional method	0.894	0.024	0.026	0.928	0.963	168	0.847	0.941
Poorest 60%	Mean number of methods known by women	0.090	0.002	0.025	0.815	0.903	189	0.086	0.095
Richest 40%	Mean number of methods known by women	0.097	0.002	0.016	0.271	0.520	107	0.094	0.100
Three or more	Mean number of methods known by women	0.093	0.004	0.039	0.764	0.874	81	0.086	0.100
One or two	Mean number of methods known by women	0.094	0.002	0.025	0.635	0.797	116	0.089	0.098
None	Mean number of methods known by women	0.092	0.002	0.025	0.540	0.735	99	0.088	0.097
Primary or none	Mean number of methods known by women	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	0.822	19	(*)	(*)
Secondary	Mean number of methods known by women	0.092	0.001	0.014	0.393	0.627	226	0.089	0.095
Higher	Mean number of methods known by women	0.107	0.002	0.021	0.406	0.637	51	0.103	0.112
DPA	Mean number of methods known by women	0.094	0.002	0.019	0.260	0.510	86	0.091	0.098
IPA	Mean number of methods known by women	(0.094)	(0.002)	(0.024)	(0.317)	(0.563)	42	(0.090)	(0.099)
TPA	Mean number of methods known by women	0.092	0.002	0.027	0.874	0.935	168	0.087	0.097

Table SE.14: Sampling errors: Contraception — girls aged 15–19 yearsStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Any modern method	0.932	0.019	0.020	1.208	1.099	213	0.894	0.970
Richest 40%	Any modern method	0.953	0.025	0.026	1.477	1.215	110	0.903	1.000
Three or more	Any modern method	0.936	0.016	0.017	1.243	1.115	284	0.904	0.969
One or two	Any modern method	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	1.068	21	(*)	(*)
None	Any modern method	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	1.036	18	(*)	(*)
None	Any modern method	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	1.073	10	(*)	(*)
Primary	Any modern method	0.924	0.020	0.022	1.236	1.112	218	0.884	0.964
Secondary or higher	Any modern method	0.992	0.008	0.008	0.826	0.909	95	0.976	1.000
DPA	Any modern method	0.961	0.018	0.019	0.962	0.981	121	0.925	0.997
IPA	Any modern method	0.922	0.039	0.043	1.730	1.315	82	0.844	1.000
TPA	Any modern method	0.930	0.025	0.027	1.299	1.140	120	0.879	0.981
Poorest 60%	Any traditional method	0.732	0.030	0.041	0.957	0.978	213	0.673	0.792
Richest 40%	Any traditional method	0.830	0.029	0.035	0.669	0.818	110	0.771	0.889
Three or more	Any traditional method	0.749	0.024	0.032	0.836	0.914	284	0.701	0.796
One or two	Any traditional method	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	0.831	21	(*)	(*)
None	Any traditional method	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	1.008	18	(*)	(*)
None	Any traditional method	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	1.038	10	(*)	(*)

Primary	Any traditional method	0.743	0.026	0.035	0.785	0.886	218	0.691	0.796
Secondary or higher	Any traditional method	0.816	0.042	0.052	1.151	1.073	95	0.731	0.901
DPA	Any traditional method	0.794	0.031	0.039	0.673	0.820	121	0.732	0.857
IPA	Any traditional method	0.652	0.055	0.084	1.053	1.026	82	0.543	0.761
TPA	Any traditional method	0.810	0.034	0.042	0.983	0.991	120	0.742	0.878
Poorest 60%	Mean number of methods known by women	0.045	0.002	0.047	1.127	1.062	213	0.040	0.049
Richest 40%	Mean number of methods known by women	0.054	0.003	0.058	1.105	1.051	110	0.048	0.061
Three or more	Mean number of methods known by women	0.047	0.002	0.038	1.003	1.001	284	0.043	0.050
One or two	Mean number of methods known by women	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	0.891	21	(*)	(*)
None	Mean number of methods known by women	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	0.640	18	(*)	(*)
None	Mean number of methods known by women	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	1.039	10	(*)	(*)
Primary	Mean number of methods known by women	0.044	0.002	0.047	1.114	1.055	218	0.040	0.048
Secondary or higher	Mean number of methods known by women	0.058	0.003	0.052	0.975	0.988	95	0.052	0.064
DPA	Mean number of methods known by women	0.049	0.003	0.052	0.945	0.972	121	0.044	0.054
IPA	Mean number of methods known by women	0.040	0.003	0.067	0.819	0.905	82	0.034	0.045
TPA	Mean number of methods known by women	0.052	0.003	0.054	0.959	0.980	120	0.046	0.058

Table SE.15: Sampling errors: Sexual behaviour — girls aged 15–19 yearsStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
DPA	Ever had sex	0.228	0.023	0.102	0.285	0.534	86	0.182	0.274
IPA	Ever had sex	(0.232)	(0.046)	(0.200)	(0.522)	(0.723)	42	(0.139)	(0.325)
TPA	Ever had sex	0.231	0.027	0.119	0.670	0.819	168	0.177	0.286
Primary or none	Ever had sex	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	19	(*)	(*)
Secondary	Ever had sex	0.163	0.016	0.100	0.424	0.651	226	0.130	0.195
Higher	Ever had sex	0.437	0.047	0.108	0.543	0.737	51	0.343	0.532
Poorest 60%	Ever had sex	0.235	0.024	0.104	0.587	0.766	189	0.186	0.283
Richest 40%	Ever had sex	0.224	0.030	0.134	0.600	0.775	107	0.164	0.283

Table SE.16: Sampling errors: Sexual Behaviour girls aged 15–19 yearsStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
DPA	Ever had sex	0.422	0.032	0.075	0.463	0.680	121	0.359	0.486
IPA	Ever had sex	0.381	0.079	0.207	2.113	1.454	82	0.224	0.539
TPA	Ever had sex	0.537	0.054	0.100	1.520	1.233	120	0.429	0.644
Primary or none	Ever had sex	0.554	0.036	0.065	1.196	1.093	228	0.482	0.627
Secondary or higher	Ever had sex	0.231	0.041	0.179	0.925	0.962	95	0.149	0.314
poorest 60%	Ever had sex	0.492	0.043	0.087	1.552	1.246	213	0.407	0.577
richest 40%	Ever had sex	0.393	0.038	0.098	0.672	0.820	110	0.316	0.469

Table SE.17: Sampling errors: Child marriage and early marriage — womenStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.025	0.005	0.181	1.676	1.295	1988	0.016	0.034
Richest 40%	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.388	0.623	1752	0.000	0.001
Belgrade	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.004	0.004	0.998	3.715	1.927	860	0.000	0.012
Vojvodina	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.020	0.005	0.278	1.744	1.321	965	0.009	0.031
Sumadija	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.010	0.003	0.356	1.145	1.070	1001	0.003	0.016
South/East	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.020	0.006	0.298	1.392	1.180	914	0.008	0.032
DPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.004	0.003	0.676	2.699	1.643	1399	0.000	0.010
IPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.008	0.004	0.466	1.443	1.201	780	0.001	0.016
TPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.025	0.005	0.203	1.601	1.265	1561	0.015	0.035
Poorest 60%	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.026	0.005	0.183	1.613	1.270	1799	0.017	0.036
Richest 40%	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.398	0.631	1645	0.000	0.001
Belgrade	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.004	0.004	0.998	3.812	1.952	821	0.000	0.013
Vojvodina	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.019	0.005	0.272	1.423	1.193	866	0.009	0.029
Sumadija	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.011	0.004	0.354	1.165	1.079	904	0.003	0.018
South/East	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.022	0.007	0.315	1.562	1.250	853	0.008	0.035
DPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.005	0.003	0.676	2.775	1.666	1313	0.000	0.011
IPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.009	0.004	0.469	1.497	1.223	738	0.001	0.017
TPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.026	0.005	0.202	1.442	1.201	1393	0.015	0.036
Poorest 60%	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.126	0.009	0.072	1.357	1.165	1799	0.108	0.144
Richest 40%	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.029	0.005	0.184	1.640	1.281	1645	0.018	0.039
Belgrade	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.036	0.008	0.233	1.748	1.322	821	0.019	0.052
Vojvodina	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.086	0.011	0.128	1.572	1.254	866	0.064	0.109
Sumadija	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.089	0.011	0.119	1.188	1.090	904	0.068	0.110
South/East	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.111	0.013	0.119	1.251	1.119	853	0.085	0.137
DPA	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.034	0.006	0.178	1.460	1.208	1313	0.022	0.046
IPA	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.065	0.012	0.188	1.862	1.364	738	0.040	0.089
TPA	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.132	0.010	0.075	1.147	1.071	1393	0.113	0.152
Poorest 60%	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.022	0.010	0.448	0.968	0.984	240	0.002	0.042

Richest 40%	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	150	0.000	0.000
Belgrade	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	79	0.000	0.000
Vojvodina	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.023	0.017	0.760	1.586	1.259	102	0.000	0.057
Sumadija	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.005	0.005	1.010	0.525	0.724	104	0.000	0.016
South/East	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.020	0.005	0.229	0.081	0.284	105	0.011	0.030
DPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	123	0.000	0.000
IPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	90	0.000	0.000
TPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.033	0.015	0.448	0.976	0.988	177	0.003	0.062
Poorest 60%	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.091	0.015	0.164	0.575	0.758	240	0.061	0.121
Richest 40%	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.011	0.002	0.204	0.083	0.288	150	0.007	0.016
Belgrade	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.014	0.005	0.338	0.167	0.409	79	0.005	0.024
Vojvodina	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.049	0.021	0.431	1.136	1.066	102	0.007	0.091
Sumadija	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.085	0.016	0.188	0.311	0.558	104	0.053	0.117
South/East	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.081	0.018	0.227	0.338	0.581	105	0.044	0.118
DPA	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.016	0.004	0.263	0.168	0.410	123	0.008	0.025
IPA	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.048	0.010	0.213	0.225	0.475	90	0.028	0.068
TPA	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.099	0.020	0.204	0.658	0.811	177	0.059	0.140
Poorest 60%	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.063	0.016	0.247	0.732	0.856	189	0.032	0.094
Richest 40%	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	107	0.000	0.000
Belgrade	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	39	0.000	0.000
Vojvodina	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.049	0.019	0.385	0.823	0.907	99	0.011	0.086
Sumadija	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.017	0.006	0.331	0.168	0.410	97	0.006	0.029
South/East	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.082	0.035	0.428	0.888	0.942	61	0.012	0.151
DPA	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.014	0.001	0.078	0.008	0.091	86	0.012	0.016
IPA	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	(0.000)	(0.000)	.	.	.	42	(0.000)	(0.000)
TPA	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.063	0.018	0.285	0.863	0.929	168	0.027	0.099

Table SE.18: Sampling errors: Child marriage and early marriage — womenStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.195	0.016	0.080	1.607	1.268	1043	0.164	0.226
Richest 40%	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.107	0.010	0.093	0.772	0.879	747	0.087	0.127
Belgrade	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.148	0.022	0.152	1.285	1.134	329	0.103	0.193
Vojvodina	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.156	0.025	0.160	1.610	1.269	290	0.106	0.205
Sumadija	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.152	0.024	0.157	0.936	0.967	200	0.104	0.200
South/East	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.164	0.015	0.091	1.486	1.219	971	0.134	0.193
DPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.178	0.018	0.101	1.371	1.171	641	0.142	0.215
IPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.150	0.022	0.147	1.841	1.357	516	0.106	0.195
TPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 15–49 years	0.145	0.014	0.098	1.118	1.058	633	0.116	0.173
Poorest 60%	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.207	0.017	0.082	1.437	1.199	830	0.173	0.241
Richest 40%	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.109	0.012	0.109	0.930	0.964	637	0.085	0.133
Belgrade	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.154	0.028	0.180	1.545	1.243	269	0.099	0.209
Vojvodina	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.165	0.025	0.150	1.220	1.105	233	0.115	0.214
Sumadija	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.167	0.027	0.162	0.957	0.978	173	0.113	0.222
South/East	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.167	0.015	0.091	1.242	1.115	792	0.137	0.198
DPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.195	0.021	0.109	1.460	1.208	520	0.152	0.237
IPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.147	0.021	0.142	1.396	1.181	434	0.106	0.189
TPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–49 years	0.149	0.016	0.105	1.087	1.043	513	0.118	0.181
Poorest 60%	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.634	0.022	0.034	1.648	1.284	830	0.591	0.677
Richest 40%	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.459	0.025	0.054	1.610	1.269	637	0.409	0.509
Belgrade	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.495	0.035	0.070	1.273	1.128	269	0.425	0.565
Vojvodina	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.623	0.060	0.096	4.186	2.046	233	0.504	0.743
Sumadija	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.522	0.055	0.106	2.203	1.484	173	0.411	0.632
South/East	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.564	0.022	0.038	1.421	1.192	792	0.521	0.607
DPA	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.562	0.032	0.056	2.055	1.434	520	0.498	0.625
IPA	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.510	0.030	0.059	1.461	1.209	434	0.450	0.570
TPA	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–49 years	0.588	0.036	0.062	3.065	1.751	513	0.515	0.661
Poorest 60%	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.197	0.026	0.135	0.867	0.931	200	0.144	0.250

Richest 40%	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.105	0.019	0.182	0.529	0.728	133	0.067	0.143
Belgrade	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.159	0.028	0.174	0.428	0.655	73	0.104	0.214
Vojvodina	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.139	0.053	0.380	1.226	1.107	50	0.033	0.244
Sumadija	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	(0.200)	(0.048)	(0.237)	(0.523)	(0.723)	35	(0.105)	(0.295)
South/East	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.156	0.019	0.120	0.445	0.667	175	0.119	0.194
DPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.174	0.022	0.125	0.457	0.676	139	0.131	0.218
IPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.152	0.028	0.185	0.496	0.704	84	0.095	0.208
TPA	Percentage married before age 15 — Women age 20–24 years	0.145	0.029	0.200	0.771	0.878	110	0.087	0.203
Poorest 60%	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.655	0.038	0.059	1.273	1.128	200	0.578	0.732
Richest 40%	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.418	0.049	0.117	1.348	1.161	133	0.320	0.516
Belgrade	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.462	0.045	0.098	0.621	0.788	73	0.372	0.553
Vojvodina	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.689	0.058	0.084	0.833	0.912	50	0.573	0.806
Sumadija	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	(0.586)	(0.086)	(0.147)	(1.142)	(1.069)	35	(0.413)	(0.759)
South/East	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.552	0.055	0.100	2.055	1.434	175	0.442	0.663
DPA	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.596	0.047	0.079	1.284	1.133	139	0.502	0.691
IPA	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.472	0.060	0.128	1.181	1.087	84	0.352	0.593
TPA	Percentage married before age 18 — Women age 20–24 years	0.571	0.059	0.103	1.609	1.268	110	0.453	0.689
Poorest 60%	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.362	0.033	0.090	0.978	0.989	213	0.296	0.427
Richest 40%	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.302	0.039	0.128	0.772	0.879	110	0.225	0.379
Belgrade	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.334	0.049	0.147	0.621	0.788	60	0.236	0.432
Vojvodina	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.373	0.055	0.147	0.865	0.930	57	0.263	0.483
Sumadija	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	(0.355)	(0.078)	(0.220)	(0.782)	(0.884)	27	(0.198)	(0.511)
South/East	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.329	0.034	0.105	0.904	0.951	179	0.260	0.398
DPA	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.351	0.031	0.089	0.477	0.690	121	0.289	0.413
IPA	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.288	0.064	0.223	1.607	1.268	82	0.160	0.416
TPA	Percentage currently married/in union — Women age 15–19 years	0.366	0.042	0.115	0.996	0.998	120	0.281	0.450

Table SE.19: Sampling errors: Early childbearing — womenStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.023	0.009	0.398	0.659	0.812	189	0.005	0.041
Richest 40%	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	107	0.000	0.000
Belgrade	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	39	(0.000)	(0.000)
Vojvodina	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.026	0.014	0.553	0.878	0.937	99	0.000	0.054
Sumadija	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.006	0.006	1.005	0.491	0.701	97	0.000	0.017
South/East	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.014	0.004	0.307	0.075	0.274	61	0.006	0.023
DPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	86	0.000	0.000
IPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	42	(0.000)	(0.000)
TPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.026	0.010	0.401	0.671	0.819	168	0.005	0.046
Poorest 60%	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.019	0.008	0.424	0.620	0.788	189	0.003	0.035
Richest 40%	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	107	0.000	0.000
Belgrade	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	39	(0.000)	(0.000)
Vojvodina	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.019	0.013	0.706	1.050	1.025	99	0.000	0.046
Sumadija	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	97	0.000	0.000
South/East	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.024	0.002	0.081	0.009	0.094	61	0.020	0.028
DPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.014	0.001	0.078	0.008	0.091	86	0.012	0.016
IPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	42	(0.000)	(0.000)
TPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.013	0.009	0.707	1.047	1.023	168	0.000	0.032
Poorest 60%	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.042	0.013	0.303	0.712	0.844	189	0.016	0.067
Richest 40%	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	107	0.000	0.000
Belgrade	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	39	(0.000)	(0.000)
Vojvodina	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.045	0.021	0.464	1.094	1.046	99	0.003	0.086

Sumadija	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.006	0.006	1.005	0.491	0.701	97	0.000	0.017
South/East	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.038	0.005	0.118	0.030	0.174	61	0.029	0.047
DPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.014	0.001	0.078	0.008	0.091	86	0.012	0.016
IPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	42	(0.000)	(0.000)
TPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.039	0.015	0.378	0.909	0.953	168	0.009	0.068
Poorest 60%	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.046	0.013	0.285	0.832	0.912	240	0.020	0.072
Richest 40%	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.006	0.002	0.332	0.125	0.354	150	0.002	0.011
Belgrade	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.007	0.003	0.458	0.140	0.374	79	0.001	0.013
Vojvodina	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.037	0.021	0.552	1.408	1.186	102	0.000	0.079
Sumadija	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.028	0.011	0.397	0.427	0.654	104	0.006	0.050
South/East	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.042	0.012	0.273	0.245	0.494	105	0.019	0.065
DPA	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.005	0.003	0.554	0.246	0.496	123	0.000	0.011
IPA	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.025	0.009	0.359	0.322	0.568	90	0.007	0.042
TPA	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.053	0.018	0.341	0.939	0.969	177	0.017	0.090

Table SE.19: Sampling errors: Early childbearing — womenStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.303	0.033	0.109	1.089	1.044	213	0.237	0.369
Richest 40%	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.209	0.046	0.221	1.412	1.188	110	0.116	0.301
Belgrade	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.282	0.064	0.227	1.156	1.075	60	0.154	0.409
Vojvodina	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.323	0.067	0.208	1.391	1.179	57	0.189	0.458
Sumadija	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	(0.299)	(0.055)	(0.186)	(0.430)	(0.656)	27	(0.188)	(0.409)
South/East	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.242	0.028	0.116	0.715	0.846	179	0.186	0.298
DPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.284	0.036	0.127	0.719	0.848	121	0.212	0.357

IPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.181	0.042	0.233	0.959	0.980	82	0.097	0.265
TPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth	0.315	0.045	0.142	1.199	1.095	120	0.226	0.404
Poorest 60%	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.022	0.012	0.527	1.360	1.166	213	0.000	0.046
Richest 40%	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.065	0.028	0.425	1.375	1.173	110	0.010	0.121
Belgrade	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.031	0.026	0.833	1.265	1.125	60	0.000	0.082
Vojvodina	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.076	0.040	0.528	1.528	1.236	57	0.000	0.155
Sumadija	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	(0.000)	(0.000)	.	.	.	27	(0.000)	(0.000)
South/East	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.030	0.015	0.500	1.304	1.142	179	0.000	0.060
DPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.035	0.018	0.512	1.048	1.024	121	0.000	0.070
IPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.037	0.026	0.703	1.521	1.233	82	0.000	0.089
TPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Are pregnant with first child	0.039	0.021	0.530	1.485	1.218	120	0.000	0.080
Poorest 60%	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth before age 15	0.325	0.034	0.104	1.106	1.052	213	0.258	0.393
Richest 40%	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth before age 15	0.274	0.039	0.142	0.835	0.914	110	0.196	0.352
Belgrade	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth before age 15	0.312	0.048	0.154	0.621	0.788	60	0.216	0.409
Vojvodina	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth before age 15	0.399	0.058	0.145	0.943	0.971	57	0.283	0.515
Sumadija	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth before age 15	(0.299)	(0.055)	(0.186)	(0.430)	(0.656)	27	(0.188)	(0.409)
South/East	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth before age 15	0.272	0.027	0.098	0.603	0.777	179	0.218	0.325
DPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth before age 15	0.319	0.030	0.093	0.453	0.673	121	0.260	0.378
IPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth before age 15	0.218	0.042	0.191	0.817	0.904	82	0.135	0.302
TPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth before age 15	0.354	0.044	0.125	1.116	1.056	120	0.265	0.442
Poorest 60%	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.025	0.008	0.315	0.533	0.730	213	0.009	0.040
Richest 40%	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.035	0.022	0.634	1.583	1.258	110	0.000	0.079

Belgrade	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.049	0.039	0.793	1.846	1.359	60	0.000	0.126
Vojvodina	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.024	0.006	0.242	0.095	0.309	57	0.012	0.035
Sumadija	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	(0.000)	(0.000)	.	.	.	27	(0.000)	(0.000)
South/East	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.028	0.013	0.457	0.998	0.999	179	0.002	0.053
DPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.039	0.023	0.581	1.538	1.240	121	0.000	0.085
IPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.041	0.021	0.516	0.908	0.953	82	0.000	0.083
TPA	Percentage of women age 15–19 years who Have had a live birth or are pregnant with first child	0.011	0.007	0.690	0.662	0.813	120	0.000	0.025
Poorest 60%	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.462	0.040	0.086	1.243	1.115	200	0.382	0.541
Richest 40%	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.263	0.039	0.150	1.094	1.046	133	0.184	0.341
Belgrade	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.357	0.042	0.118	0.579	0.761	73	0.273	0.441
Vojvodina	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.527	0.099	0.189	2.084	1.444	50	0.328	0.725
Sumadija	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	(0.307)	(0.089)	(0.291)	(1.394)	(1.181)	35	(0.128)	(0.486)
South/East	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.359	0.029	0.082	0.626	0.791	175	0.301	0.418
DPA	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.386	0.034	0.088	0.667	0.817	139	0.318	0.454
IPA	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.309	0.028	0.090	0.294	0.542	84	0.253	0.365
TPA	Percentage of women age 20–24 years who have had a live birth before age 18	0.422	0.062	0.146	1.776	1.333	110	0.298	0.545

Table SE.20: Sampling errors: Participation rate in organized learning — lower secondaryStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	NAR — lower secondary	0.980	0.008	0.008	1.323	1.150	456	0.964	0.995
Richest 40%	NAR — lower secondary	0.994	0.004	0.004	1.070	1.034	347	0.986	1.000
Belgrade	NAR — lower secondary	0.990	0.009	0.009	1.349	1.161	164	0.972	1.000
Vojvodina	NAR — lower secondary	0.984	0.010	0.010	1.510	1.229	203	0.963	1.000
Sumadija	NAR — lower secondary	0.984	0.008	0.008	1.014	1.007	220	0.968	1.000
South/East	NAR — lower secondary	0.989	0.009	0.009	1.347	1.161	216	0.970	1.000
DPA	NAR — lower secondary	0.990	0.006	0.006	0.889	0.943	270	0.979	1.000

IPA	NAR — lower secondary	0.991	0.009	0.009	1.569	1.253	183	0.974	1.000
TPA	NAR — lower secondary	0.980	0.009	0.009	1.409	1.187	350	0.962	0.998
Primary or none	NAR — lower secondary	0.946	0.025	0.027	1.408	1.187	120	0.895	0.997
Secondary	NAR — lower secondary	0.996	0.003	0.003	1.107	1.052	460	0.991	1.000
Higher	NAR — lower secondary	0.985	0.008	0.009	1.149	1.072	223	0.968	1.000
Male	NAR — lower secondary	0.990	0.005	0.005	1.088	1.043	425	0.980	1.000
Female	NAR — lower secondary	0.981	0.008	0.008	1.259	1.122	378	0.965	0.997
Three or more	NAR — lower secondary	0.980	0.010	0.010	1.051	1.025	223	0.961	1.000
One or two	NAR — lower secondary	0.988	0.008	0.008	1.701	1.304	290	0.972	1.000
None	NAR — lower secondary	0.989	0.007	0.007	1.139	1.067	290	0.975	1.000
Poorest 60%	Out of school — lower secondary	0.004	0.002	0.614	0.579	0.761	456	0.000	0.008
Richest 40%	Out of school — lower secondary	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	347	0.000	0.000
Belgrade	Out of school — lower secondary	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	164	0.000	0.000
Vojvodina	Out of school — lower secondary	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	203	0.000	0.000
Sumadija	Out of school — lower secondary	0.002	0.002	0.983	0.373	0.611	220	0.000	0.005
South/East	Out of school — lower secondary	0.007	0.005	0.745	0.639	0.799	216	0.000	0.017
DPA	Out of school — lower secondary	0.001	0.001	0.986	0.375	0.612	270	0.000	0.004
IPA	Out of school — lower secondary	0.004	0.004	0.982	0.781	0.884	183	0.000	0.013
TPA	Out of school — lower secondary	0.001	0.001	0.996	0.335	0.579	350	0.000	0.003
Primary or none	Out of school — lower secondary	0.014	0.008	0.597	0.552	0.743	120	0.000	0.030
Secondary	Out of school — lower secondary	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	460	0.000	0.000
Higher	Out of school — lower secondary	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	223	0.000	0.000
Male	Out of school — lower secondary	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	425	0.000	0.000
Female	Out of school — lower secondary	0.004	0.003	0.621	0.592	0.769	378	0.000	0.010
Three or more	Out of school — lower secondary	0.007	0.004	0.616	0.584	0.764	223	0.000	0.016
One or two	Out of school — lower secondary	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	290	0.000	0.000
None	Out of school — lower secondary	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	290	0.000	0.000

Table SE.21: Sampling errors: Participation rate in organized learning — lower secondaryStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	NAR — lower secondary	0.788	0.027	0.034	1.847	1.359	420	0.734	0.843
Richest 40%	NAR — lower secondary	0.813	0.024	0.030	0.816	0.903	209	0.764	0.861
Belgrade	NAR — lower secondary	0.748	0.051	0.068	1.736	1.318	143	0.646	0.850
Vojvodina	NAR — lower secondary	0.875	0.035	0.041	1.516	1.231	114	0.804	0.946
Sumadija	NAR — lower secondary	0.884	0.055	0.062	1.871	1.368	62	0.774	0.994
South/East	NAR — lower secondary	0.765	0.031	0.040	1.634	1.278	310	0.703	0.827
DPA	NAR — lower secondary	0.712	0.036	0.050	1.322	1.150	236	0.641	0.784
IPA	NAR — lower secondary	0.737	0.041	0.056	1.439	1.199	166	0.655	0.819
TPA	NAR — lower secondary	0.907	0.027	0.029	2.109	1.452	227	0.853	0.960
None	NAR — lower secondary	0.718	0.044	0.061	1.284	1.133	152	0.631	0.806
Primary	NAR — lower secondary	0.811	0.023	0.029	1.522	1.234	424	0.764	0.857
Secondary or higher	NAR — lower secondary	0.873	0.042	0.049	0.957	0.978	53	0.788	0.958
Male	NAR — lower secondary	0.816	0.025	0.031	1.260	1.123	306	0.766	0.866
Female	NAR — lower secondary	0.778	0.027	0.035	1.388	1.178	323	0.723	0.833
Three or more	NAR — lower secondary	0.794	0.024	0.030	1.858	1.363	525	0.746	0.842
One or two	NAR — lower secondary	0.786	0.063	0.080	1.764	1.328	71	0.660	0.912
None	NAR — lower secondary	(0.854)	(0.075)	(0.088)	(1.580)	(1.257)	33	(0.704)	(1.000)
Poorest 60%	Out of school — lower secondary	0.081	0.020	0.252	2.328	1.526	420	0.040	0.122
Richest 40%	Out of school — lower secondary	0.092	0.019	0.211	0.950	0.975	209	0.053	0.131
Belgrade	Out of school — lower secondary	0.084	0.035	0.421	2.052	1.432	143	0.013	0.155
Vojvodina	Out of school — lower secondary	0.033	0.024	0.744	2.469	1.571	114	0.000	0.082

Sumadija	Out of school — lower secondary	0.069	0.042	0.611	1.734	1.317	62	0.000	0.152
South/East	Out of school — lower secondary	0.110	0.023	0.207	1.643	1.282	310	0.065	0.156
DPA	Out of school — lower secondary	0.101	0.027	0.269	1.708	1.307	236	0.046	0.155
IPA	Out of school — lower secondary	0.137	0.037	0.269	1.900	1.379	166	0.063	0.210
TPA	Out of school — lower secondary	0.037	0.017	0.469	2.120	1.456	227	0.002	0.072
None	Out of school — lower secondary	0.137	0.041	0.296	1.898	1.378	152	0.056	0.218
Primary	Out of school — lower secondary	0.069	0.015	0.222	1.574	1.255	424	0.038	0.099
Secondary or higher	Out of school — lower secondary	0.080	0.040	0.500	1.286	1.134	53	0.000	0.160
Male	Out of school — lower secondary	0.077	0.018	0.234	1.389	1.179	306	0.041	0.112
Female	Out of school — lower secondary	0.092	0.018	0.197	1.269	1.126	323	0.056	0.129
Three or more	Out of school — lower secondary	0.087	0.018	0.206	2.100	1.449	525	0.051	0.123
One or two	Out of school — lower secondary	0.074	0.032	0.432	1.121	1.059	71	0.010	0.138
None	Out of school — lower secondary	(0.070)	(0.066)	(0.939)	(2.299)	(1.516)	33	(0.000)	(0.202)

Table SE.22: Sampling errors: Age for grade — lower secondaryStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.012	0.005	0.397	0.831	0.912	470	0.002	0.021
Richest 40%	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.018	0.008	0.452	1.412	1.188	355	0.002	0.034
Belgrade	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.014	0.010	0.757	1.380	1.175	171	0.000	0.034
Vojvodina	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.018	0.009	0.484	1.000	1.000	206	0.001	0.035
Sumadija	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.009	0.006	0.641	0.862	0.928	221	0.000	0.020
South/East	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.019	0.012	0.653	1.466	1.211	227	0.000	0.043
DPA	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.020	0.010	0.488	1.425	1.194	280	0.000	0.040
IPA	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.015	0.011	0.706	1.457	1.207	189	0.000	0.036
TPA	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.010	0.004	0.404	0.542	0.736	356	0.002	0.017
Primary or none	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.019	0.011	0.594	0.754	0.868	118	0.000	0.042
Secondary	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.014	0.005	0.350	0.772	0.879	461	0.004	0.023
Higher	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.016	0.010	0.607	1.419	1.191	221	0.000	0.036
Three or more	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.020	0.009	0.457	0.990	0.995	236	0.002	0.038
One or two	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.018	0.008	0.476	1.213	1.101	297	0.001	0.035
None	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.007	0.006	0.838	1.509	1.228	292	0.000	0.019
Male	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.012	0.005	0.402	0.870	0.933	430	0.002	0.021
Female	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.018	0.008	0.450	1.381	1.175	395	0.002	0.034
Poorest 60%	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.069	0.015	0.213	1.498	1.224	470	0.039	0.098
Richest 40%	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.016	0.006	0.368	0.824	0.908	355	0.004	0.028

Belgrade	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.042	0.019	0.463	1.644	1.282	171	0.003	0.080
Vojvodina	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.055	0.016	0.284	1.095	1.046	206	0.024	0.086
Sumadija	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.024	0.014	0.572	1.900	1.378	221	0.000	0.052
South/East	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.060	0.021	0.345	1.369	1.170	227	0.019	0.101
DPA	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.034	0.014	0.414	1.728	1.314	280	0.006	0.062
IPA	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.068	0.020	0.295	1.214	1.102	189	0.028	0.109
TPA	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.040	0.012	0.299	1.304	1.142	356	0.016	0.065
Primary or none	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.154	0.039	0.253	1.280	1.131	118	0.076	0.231
Secondary	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.035	0.011	0.308	1.583	1.258	461	0.013	0.057
Higher	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.017	0.010	0.584	1.372	1.171	221	0.000	0.037
Three or more	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.091	0.024	0.260	1.573	1.254	236	0.044	0.138
One or two	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.041	0.013	0.315	1.255	1.120	297	0.015	0.067
None	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.011	0.006	0.564	1.087	1.042	292	0.000	0.024
Male	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.044	0.012	0.264	1.445	1.202	430	0.021	0.067
Female	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.045	0.012	0.259	1.182	1.087	395	0.022	0.069

Table SE.23: Sampling errors: Age for grade — lower secondaryStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.015	0.005	0.363	0.746	0.864	376	0.004	0.025
Richest 40%	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.009	0.007	0.757	1.004	1.002	197	0.000	0.023
Belgrade	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.011	0.010	0.960	1.093	1.045	117	0.000	0.032
Vojvodina	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.008	0.007	0.991	0.996	0.998	119	0.000	0.022
Sumadija	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.020	0.020	1.014	1.280	1.131	63	0.000	0.060
South/East	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.015	0.005	0.374	0.554	0.744	274	0.004	0.025
DPA	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.009	0.007	0.729	0.904	0.951	201	0.000	0.023
IPA	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.007	0.001	0.181	0.032	0.180	136	0.005	0.010
TPA	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.018	0.008	0.445	0.935	0.967	236	0.002	0.034
None	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.007	0.007	0.992	0.779	0.883	124	0.000	0.021
Primary	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.009	0.005	0.518	0.966	0.983	388	0.000	0.018
Secondary or higher	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.053	0.024	0.455	0.644	0.803	52	0.005	0.101

Three or more	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.013	0.004	0.340	0.714	0.845	481	0.004	0.021
One or two	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	60	0.000	0.000
None	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.979)	(1.219)	(1.104)	32	(0.000)	(0.115)
Male	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.005	0.003	0.731	0.723	0.850	288	0.000	0.011
Female	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under age for grade	0.021	0.008	0.364	0.809	0.899	285	0.006	0.037
Poorest 60%	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.495	0.039	0.078	2.262	1.504	376	0.418	0.572
Richest 40%	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.347	0.038	0.109	1.229	1.108	197	0.271	0.423
Belgrade	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.511	0.041	0.080	0.716	0.846	117	0.429	0.593
Vojvodina	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.489	0.087	0.179	4.101	2.025	119	0.314	0.664
Sumadija	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.321	0.074	0.232	1.577	1.256	63	0.172	0.469
South/East	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.425	0.035	0.083	1.368	1.170	274	0.355	0.496
DPA	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.552	0.043	0.077	1.340	1.158	201	0.466	0.637
IPA	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.397	0.047	0.120	1.267	1.126	136	0.302	0.492
TPA	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.394	0.057	0.144	3.430	1.852	236	0.281	0.507
None	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.540	0.045	0.084	0.903	0.950	124	0.449	0.630
Primary	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.433	0.036	0.084	2.157	1.469	388	0.360	0.506
Secondary or higher	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.255	0.052	0.205	0.797	0.893	52	0.151	0.359
Three or more	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.469	0.035	0.074	2.324	1.524	481	0.400	0.539
One or two	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.313	0.056	0.180	0.917	0.958	60	0.201	0.426
None	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	(0.334)	(0.087)	(0.259)	(1.062)	(1.030)	32	(0.161)	(0.507)
Male	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.506	0.040	0.080	1.904	1.380	288	0.426	0.587
Female	Lower secondary school: Percent of children under over for grade	0.380	0.034	0.088	1.329	1.153	285	0.313	0.447

Table SE.24: Sampling errors: Participation rate in organized learning — upper secondaryStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deft*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deft</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	NAR — upper secondary	0.906	0.016	0.018	1.165	1.079	393	0.873	0.938
Richest 40%	NAR — upper secondary	0.991	0.007	0.007	1.306	1.143	241	0.977	1.000
Belgrade	NAR — upper secondary	0.951	0.022	0.024	1.348	1.161	121	0.906	0.995
Vojvodina	NAR — upper secondary	0.936	0.019	0.020	1.155	1.075	166	0.898	0.974
Sumadija	NAR — upper secondary	0.956	0.018	0.019	1.344	1.159	182	0.921	0.992
South/East	NAR — upper secondary	0.919	0.024	0.026	1.021	1.010	165	0.872	0.966
DPA	NAR — upper secondary	0.979	0.008	0.008	0.681	0.825	202	0.963	0.995
IPA	NAR — upper secondary	0.930	0.018	0.019	0.565	0.751	114	0.895	0.966
TPA	NAR — upper secondary	0.919	0.019	0.021	1.517	1.232	318	0.881	0.957

Primary or none	NAR — upper secondary	0.787	0.035	0.044	0.612	0.783	94	0.717	0.856
Secondary	NAR — upper secondary	0.968	0.011	0.012	1.247	1.117	311	0.946	0.991
Higher	NAR — upper secondary	0.971	0.014	0.014	0.855	0.925	121	0.944	0.998
Male	NAR — upper secondary	0.947	0.012	0.013	1.031	1.015	334	0.922	0.972
Female	NAR — upper secondary	0.933	0.016	0.017	1.244	1.115	300	0.901	0.966
Three or more	NAR — upper secondary	0.841	0.029	0.035	1.051	1.025	179	0.782	0.900
One or two	NAR — upper secondary	0.962	0.014	0.015	1.379	1.174	245	0.933	0.991
None	NAR — upper secondary	0.990	0.007	0.007	1.070	1.034	210	0.977	1.000
Poorest 60%	Out of school — upper secondary	0.065	0.014	0.221	1.256	1.120	393	0.036	0.094
Richest 40%	Out of school — upper secondary	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	241	0.000	0.000
Belgrade	Out of school — upper secondary	0.002	0.000	0.070	0.001	0.035	121	0.002	0.002
Vojvodina	Out of school — upper secondary	0.045	0.016	0.355	1.137	1.066	166	0.013	0.077
Sumadija	Out of school — upper secondary	0.037	0.017	0.450	1.377	1.173	182	0.004	0.070
South/East	Out of school — upper secondary	0.064	0.023	0.369	1.267	1.125	165	0.017	0.111
DPA	Out of school — upper secondary	0.008	0.000	0.062	0.006	0.079	202	0.007	0.009
IPA	Out of school — upper secondary	0.025	0.009	0.372	0.411	0.641	114	0.006	0.043
TPA	Out of school — upper secondary	0.063	0.017	0.269	1.507	1.228	318	0.029	0.097
Primary or none	Out of school — upper secondary	0.156	0.029	0.188	0.556	0.745	94	0.097	0.214
Secondary	Out of school — upper secondary	0.012	0.009	0.724	1.955	1.398	311	0.000	0.029
Higher	Out of school — upper secondary	0.009	0.001	0.089	0.010	0.098	121	0.007	0.011
Male	Out of school — upper secondary	0.036	0.010	0.263	0.891	0.944	334	0.017	0.055
Female	Out of school — upper secondary	0.040	0.013	0.324	1.280	1.131	300	0.014	0.066
Three or more	Out of school — upper secondary	0.123	0.026	0.214	1.040	1.020	179	0.070	0.175
One or two	Out of school — upper secondary	0.017	0.011	0.630	1.686	1.298	245	0.000	0.038
None	Out of school — upper secondary	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	210	0.000	0.000

Table SE.25: Sampling errors: Participation rate in organized learning — upper secondaryStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	NAR — upper secondary	0.230	0.036	0.158	2.869	1.694	376	0.157	0.302
Richest 40%	NAR — upper secondary	0.392	0.037	0.095	1.116	1.057	203	0.317	0.466
Belgrade	NAR — upper secondary	0.272	0.087	0.320	3.904	1.976	116	0.098	0.446
Vojvodina	NAR — upper secondary	0.261	0.086	0.329	4.738	2.177	102	0.089	0.432
Sumadija	NAR — upper secondary	0.377	0.077	0.205	1.389	1.178	57	0.223	0.531
South/East	NAR — upper secondary	0.280	0.036	0.128	1.895	1.377	304	0.208	0.352
DPA	NAR — upper secondary	0.256	0.054	0.210	2.852	1.689	210	0.149	0.364
IPA	NAR — upper secondary	0.278	0.045	0.162	1.634	1.278	164	0.188	0.369
TPA	NAR — upper secondary	0.310	0.056	0.181	3.381	1.839	205	0.197	0.422
None	NAR — upper secondary	0.209	0.056	0.266	1.956	1.398	111	0.098	0.321
Primary	NAR — upper secondary	0.318	0.037	0.115	2.041	1.429	327	0.245	0.391
Secondary or higher	NAR — upper secondary	(0.542)	(0.124)	(0.228)	(2.050)	(1.432)	31	(0.295)	(0.790)
Male	NAR — upper secondary	0.300	0.040	0.132	2.212	1.487	296	0.221	0.380
Female	NAR — upper secondary	0.266	0.036	0.135	1.875	1.369	283	0.194	0.338
Three or more	NAR — upper secondary	0.265	0.032	0.119	2.556	1.599	500	0.202	0.328
One or two	NAR — upper secondary	(0.401)	(0.080)	(0.199)	(1.142)	(1.069)	46	(0.242)	(0.560)
None	NAR — upper secondary	(0.411)	(0.110)	(0.267)	(1.622)	(1.273)	33	(0.191)	(0.630)
Poorest 60%	Out of school — upper secondary	0.616	0.034	0.055	1.896	1.377	376	0.547	0.684
Richest 40%	Out of school — upper secondary	0.480	0.033	0.070	0.858	0.926	203	0.413	0.547
Belgrade	Out of school — upper secondary	0.543	0.095	0.174	3.681	1.919	116	0.354	0.732
Vojvodina	Out of school — upper secondary	0.559	0.063	0.112	1.984	1.409	102	0.434	0.685
Sumadija	Out of school — upper secondary	0.476	0.067	0.141	0.992	0.996	57	0.342	0.611
South/East	Out of school — upper secondary	0.602	0.035	0.058	1.528	1.236	304	0.532	0.672

DPA	Out of school — upper secondary	0.530	0.051	0.097	1.992	1.411	210	0.427	0.633
IPA	Out of school — upper secondary	0.648	0.050	0.077	1.782	1.335	164	0.548	0.748
TPA	Out of school — upper secondary	0.549	0.047	0.086	2.071	1.439	205	0.455	0.644
None	Out of school — upper secondary	0.632	0.060	0.094	1.591	1.262	111	0.513	0.751
Primary	Out of school — upper secondary	0.495	0.033	0.066	1.398	1.183	327	0.430	0.560
Secondary or higher	Out of school — upper secondary	(0.345)	(0.096)	(0.279)	(1.365)	(1.168)	31	(0.153)	(0.538)
Male	Out of school — upper secondary	0.534	0.044	0.082	2.250	1.500	296	0.447	0.621
Female	Out of school — upper secondary	0.608	0.032	0.053	1.232	1.110	283	0.544	0.673
Three or more	Out of school — upper secondary	0.584	0.030	0.052	1.892	1.375	500	0.524	0.645
One or two	Out of school — upper secondary	(0.490)	(0.060)	(0.123)	(0.634)	(0.796)	46	(0.369)	(0.611)
None	Out of school — upper secondary	(0.469)	(0.107)	(0.229)	(1.514)	(1.231)	33	(0.254)	(0.684)

Table SE.26: Sampling errors: children under age 10–13 by the number of children's books present in the household and children who receive help with homework

Standard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.769	0.033	0.043	1.426	1.194	236	0.702	0.835
Richest 40%	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.947	0.018	0.019	1.506	1.227	221	0.911	0.984
Belgrade	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.901	0.025	0.028	0.660	0.813	94	0.851	0.951
Vojvodina	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.889	0.029	0.033	1.073	1.036	121	0.832	0.947
Sumadija	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.802	0.037	0.046	1.184	1.088	124	0.728	0.875
South/East	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.854	0.060	0.071	2.835	1.684	118	0.733	0.974
DPA	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.924	0.023	0.025	1.311	1.145	161	0.878	0.970
IPA	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.843	0.041	0.049	1.333	1.155	116	0.761	0.925
TPA	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.800	0.036	0.045	1.430	1.196	180	0.727	0.872
Primary or none	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.421	0.087	0.206	1.778	1.334	57	0.247	0.594
Secondary	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.885	0.022	0.024	1.123	1.060	254	0.841	0.928
Higher	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.980	0.010	0.011	0.841	0.917	146	0.959	1.000
Male	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.861	0.024	0.028	1.210	1.100	240	0.813	0.910
Female	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.853	0.036	0.042	2.160	1.470	217	0.781	0.925
Three or more	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.748	0.061	0.081	2.190	1.480	105	0.627	0.869
One or two	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.874	0.028	0.032	1.153	1.074	167	0.818	0.930
None	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.911	0.024	0.026	1.240	1.113	185	0.864	0.958
Poorest 60%	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.581	0.037	0.063	1.252	1.119	235	0.507	0.654
Richest 40%	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.585	0.039	0.067	1.452	1.205	220	0.506	0.664
Belgrade	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.570	0.044	0.077	0.747	0.864	93	0.482	0.658

Vojvodina	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.513	0.053	0.104	1.401	1.184	120	0.407	0.620
Sumadija	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.612	0.045	0.073	1.158	1.076	124	0.523	0.701
South/East	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.642	0.057	0.088	1.355	1.164	118	0.529	0.755
DPA	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.591	0.036	0.061	1.333	1.155	239	0.518	0.663
IPA	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.574	0.035	0.062	1.069	1.034	216	0.503	0.645
TPA	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.482	0.091	0.188	1.911	1.382	57	0.300	0.663
Primary or none	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.588	0.034	0.057	1.133	1.064	253	0.521	0.655
Secondary	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.613	0.040	0.065	1.018	1.009	145	0.533	0.693
Higher	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.622	0.033	0.052	0.794	0.891	160	0.557	0.687
Male	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.569	0.053	0.093	1.176	1.084	115	0.462	0.675
Female	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.552	0.042	0.076	1.261	1.123	180	0.467	0.636
Three or more	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.542	0.060	0.110	1.581	1.257	104	0.422	0.661
One or two	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.580	0.046	0.078	1.387	1.178	167	0.489	0.671
None	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.610	0.037	0.060	1.028	1.014	184	0.537	0.684

Table SE.27: Sampling errors: children under age 10–13 by the number of children’s books present in the household and children who receive help with homework

Standard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.101	0.028	0.276	1.468	1.212	164	0.046	0.157
Richest 40%	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.170	0.045	0.262	1.093	1.045	86	0.081	0.259
Belgrade	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	(0.205)	(0.083)	(0.405)	(1.889)	(1.374)	46	(0.039)	(0.370)
Vojvodina	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	(0.157)	(0.064)	(0.407)	(1.540)	(1.241)	46	(0.029)	(0.285)
Sumadija	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	(0.281)	(0.086)	(0.307)	(0.940)	(0.970)	30	(0.108)	(0.453)
South/East	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.050	0.023	0.456	1.400	1.183	128	0.004	0.095
DPA	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.156	0.047	0.300	1.459	1.208	93	0.062	0.249
IPA	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.082	0.046	0.555	1.861	1.364	67	0.000	0.174
TPA	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.121	0.038	0.313	1.264	1.124	90	0.045	0.197
None	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.755)	(0.559)	(0.748)	47	(0.000)	(0.054)
Primary	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.138	0.032	0.229	1.481	1.217	178	0.075	0.201
Secondary or higher	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	25	(*)	(*)
Male	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.096	0.026	0.273	1.087	1.043	137	0.043	0.148

Female	Percentage of children with 3 or more books to read at home	0.156	0.040	0.257	1.367	1.169	113	0.076	0.236
Poorest 60%	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.489	0.055	0.113	1.883	1.372	145	0.379	0.600
Richest 40%	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.514	0.067	0.129	1.242	1.114	81	0.381	0.647
Belgrade	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	(0.529)	(0.111)	(0.210)	(2.059)	(1.435)	42	(0.307)	(0.750)
Vojvodina	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	(0.498)	(0.129)	(0.259)	(3.144)	(1.773)	44	(0.240)	(0.755)
Sumadija	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	(0.494)	(0.044)	(0.090)	(0.188)	(0.434)	28	(0.405)	(0.583)
South/East	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.486	0.061	0.125	1.644	1.282	112	0.365	0.607
DPA	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.580	0.063	0.109	1.274	1.129	82	0.454	0.706
IPA	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.499	0.088	0.176	1.703	1.305	56	0.323	0.675
TPA	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.426	0.076	0.179	2.195	1.481	88	0.273	0.579
None	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	(0.367)	(0.089)	(0.243)	(1.285)	(1.133)	40	(0.189)	(0.546)
Primary	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.494	0.047	0.096	1.453	1.206	163	0.399	0.589
Secondary or higher	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	23	(*)	(*)
Male	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.494	0.061	0.124	1.897	1.377	124	0.371	0.616
Female	Percentage of children who receive help with homework	0.501	0.053	0.106	1.127	1.062	102	0.395	0.608

Table SE.28: Sampling errors: Participation in school-related activities — adolescents aged 10–13 yearsStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Private lessons for classes	0.130	0.025	0.191	1.252	1.119	236	0.080	0.180
Richest 40%	Private lessons for classes	0.257	0.028	0.110	0.943	0.971	221	0.201	0.313
Belgrade	Private lessons for classes	0.231	0.044	0.192	1.041	1.020	94	0.142	0.319
Vojvodina	Private lessons for classes	0.231	0.041	0.177	1.194	1.093	121	0.149	0.313
Sumadija	Private lessons for classes	0.186	0.028	0.153	0.735	0.857	124	0.129	0.243
South/East	Private lessons for classes	0.118	0.029	0.242	0.764	0.874	118	0.061	0.176
DPA	Private lessons for classes	0.226	0.033	0.144	1.074	1.036	161	0.161	0.291
IPA	Private lessons for classes	0.185	0.043	0.233	1.287	1.134	116	0.099	0.271
TPA	Private lessons for classes	0.166	0.025	0.150	0.786	0.886	180	0.116	0.216
Primary or none	Private lessons for classes	0.063	0.036	0.578	1.288	1.135	57	0.000	0.135
Secondary	Private lessons for classes	0.189	0.023	0.124	0.880	0.938	254	0.142	0.236
Higher	Private lessons for classes	0.250	0.032	0.127	0.814	0.902	146	0.187	0.313
Male	Private lessons for classes	0.197	0.026	0.130	1.027	1.014	240	0.146	0.248
Female	Private lessons for classes	0.189	0.026	0.135	0.892	0.944	217	0.138	0.241
Three or more	Private lessons for classes	0.081	0.029	0.352	1.233	1.110	105	0.024	0.139
One or two	Private lessons for classes	0.208	0.035	0.167	1.195	1.093	167	0.139	0.278
None	Private lessons for classes	0.250	0.027	0.107	0.691	0.832	185	0.196	0.303
Private lessons for classes — No	HDI	0.794	0.003	0.003	0.987	0.994	362	0.788	0.799
Private lessons for classes — Yes	HDI	0.803	0.004	0.005	0.714	0.845	95	0.794	0.811

Private lessons for classes — No	GNI	0.754	0.003	0.005	1.023	1.011	362	0.747	0.761
Private lessons for classes — Yes	GNI	0.767	0.006	0.007	0.675	0.821	95	0.756	0.778
Private lessons for classes — No	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	1.201	1.096	362	0.853	0.856
Private lessons for classes — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.856	0.002	0.002	1.244	1.115	95	0.852	0.859
Private lessons for classes — No	Education expectancy index	0.778	0.004	0.005	0.895	0.946	362	0.771	0.785
Private lessons for classes — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.789	0.007	0.008	0.694	0.833	95	0.776	0.802
Poorest 60%	Extended school stay	0.009	0.005	0.555	0.608	0.780	236	0.000	0.018
Richest 40%	Extended school stay	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	221	0.000	0.000
Belgrade	Extended school stay	0.009	0.009	1.005	0.875	0.935	94	0.000	0.027
Vojvodina	Extended school stay	0.005	0.005	1.027	0.675	0.822	121	0.000	0.015
Sumadija	Extended school stay	0.003	0.000	0.077	0.003	0.053	124	0.003	0.004
South/East	Extended school stay	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	118	0.000	0.000
DPA	Extended school stay	0.007	0.005	0.654	0.569	0.755	161	0.000	0.017
IPA	Extended school stay	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	116	0.000	0.000
TPA	Extended school stay	0.004	0.004	0.999	0.639	0.799	180	0.000	0.011
Primary or none	Extended school stay	0.011	0.011	1.004	0.650	0.806	57	0.000	0.033
Secondary	Extended school stay	0.005	0.003	0.650	0.561	0.749	254	0.000	0.012
Higher	Extended school stay	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	146	0.000	0.000
Male	Extended school stay	0.006	0.004	0.722	0.784	0.886	240	0.000	0.015
Female	Extended school stay	0.002	0.000	0.071	0.002	0.049	217	0.002	0.003
Three or more	Extended school stay	0.008	0.008	1.004	0.871	0.933	105	0.000	0.023
One or two	Extended school stay	0.007	0.004	0.587	0.382	0.618	167	0.000	0.015
None	Extended school stay	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	185	0.000	0.000
Poorest 60%	Sports	0.263	0.029	0.111	1.004	1.002	236	0.205	0.321
Richest 40%	Sports	0.659	0.035	0.052	1.209	1.099	221	0.590	0.728
Belgrade	Sports	0.634	0.058	0.091	1.371	1.171	94	0.518	0.750
Vojvodina	Sports	0.427	0.046	0.108	1.091	1.044	121	0.335	0.519
Sumadija	Sports	0.482	0.045	0.094	1.133	1.064	124	0.392	0.573
South/East	Sports	0.303	0.039	0.130	0.711	0.843	118	0.225	0.382
DPA	Sports	0.606	0.039	0.064	1.099	1.048	161	0.529	0.683
IPA	Sports	0.471	0.051	0.109	1.098	1.048	116	0.368	0.573
TPA	Sports	0.307	0.038	0.124	1.200	1.095	180	0.231	0.384
Primary or none	Sports	0.137	0.041	0.299	0.818	0.905	57	0.055	0.219
Secondary	Sports	0.403	0.033	0.081	1.099	1.048	254	0.337	0.468
Higher	Sports	0.677	0.038	0.056	1.007	1.004	146	0.601	0.753
Male	Sports	0.534	0.036	0.068	1.314	1.146	240	0.461	0.606
Female	Sports	0.373	0.036	0.097	1.162	1.078	217	0.301	0.446
Three or more	Sports	0.204	0.030	0.149	0.642	0.802	105	0.143	0.265
One or two	Sports	0.467	0.044	0.094	1.269	1.126	167	0.379	0.555
None	Sports	0.614	0.038	0.062	1.105	1.051	185	0.538	0.690
Sports — No	HDI	0.787	0.003	0.004	1.004	1.002	248	0.781	0.792
Sports — Yes	HDI	0.805	0.003	0.004	0.941	0.970	209	0.799	0.812
Sports — No	GNI	0.745	0.004	0.006	1.081	1.040	248	0.736	0.753
Sports — Yes	GNI	0.770	0.004	0.006	0.930	0.964	209	0.761	0.779
Sports — No	Life expectancy index	0.853	0.001	0.001	1.372	1.171	248	0.851	0.855
Sports — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.857	0.001	0.001	0.922	0.960	209	0.856	0.859
Sports — No	Education expectancy index	0.768	0.004	0.005	0.902	0.950	248	0.760	0.776
Sports — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.794	0.005	0.007	0.908	0.953	209	0.784	0.804

Poorest 60%	Foreign language lessons	0.114	0.022	0.195	1.128	1.062	236	0.070	0.159
Richest 40%	Foreign language lessons	0.277	0.030	0.107	1.007	1.003	221	0.218	0.337
Belgrade	Foreign language lessons	0.286	0.038	0.134	0.684	0.827	94	0.209	0.363
Vojvodina	Foreign language lessons	0.227	0.044	0.193	1.378	1.174	121	0.139	0.315
Sumadija	Foreign language lessons	0.156	0.027	0.177	0.794	0.891	124	0.101	0.210
South/East	Foreign language lessons	0.124	0.039	0.315	1.363	1.167	118	0.046	0.202
DPA	Foreign language lessons	0.243	0.028	0.114	0.738	0.859	161	0.187	0.298
IPA	Foreign language lessons	0.141	0.027	0.193	0.641	0.801	116	0.087	0.196
TPA	Foreign language lessons	0.181	0.036	0.201	1.565	1.251	180	0.108	0.253
Primary or none	Foreign language lessons	0.057	0.044	0.763	2.036	1.427	57	0.000	0.144
Secondary	Foreign language lessons	0.178	0.026	0.145	1.118	1.057	254	0.126	0.229
Higher	Foreign language lessons	0.277	0.030	0.110	0.702	0.838	146	0.216	0.338
Male	Foreign language lessons	0.188	0.026	0.138	1.090	1.044	240	0.136	0.240
Female	Foreign language lessons	0.204	0.028	0.137	1.001	1.001	217	0.148	0.260
Three or more	Foreign language lessons	0.014	0.005	0.324	0.168	0.409	105	0.005	0.023
One or two	Foreign language lessons	0.225	0.033	0.148	1.040	1.020	167	0.159	0.292
None	Foreign language lessons	0.282	0.029	0.103	0.755	0.869	185	0.224	0.340
Foreign language lessons — No	HDI	0.792	0.003	0.003	1.007	1.003	357	0.787	0.797
Foreign language lessons — Yes	HDI	0.809	0.005	0.006	0.733	0.856	100	0.799	0.818
Foreign language lessons — No	GNI	0.752	0.003	0.005	1.039	1.019	357	0.745	0.759
Foreign language lessons — Yes	GNI	0.773	0.006	0.008	0.748	0.865	100	0.761	0.786
Foreign language lessons — No	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.001	0.001	1.098	1.048	357	0.853	0.856
Foreign language lessons — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.857	0.002	0.002	1.303	1.142	100	0.854	0.860
Foreign language lessons — No	Education expectancy index	0.775	0.004	0.005	0.916	0.957	357	0.768	0.782
Foreign language lessons — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.800	0.007	0.008	0.703	0.839	100	0.786	0.813
Poorest 60%	Music class	0.044	0.015	0.350	1.289	1.135	236	0.013	0.075
Richest 40%	Music class	0.035	0.014	0.412	1.401	1.184	221	0.006	0.064
Belgrade	Music class	0.020	0.015	0.754	1.088	1.043	94	0.000	0.050
Vojvodina	Music class	0.022	0.013	0.567	0.931	0.965	121	0.000	0.048
Sumadija	Music class	0.077	0.029	0.371	1.595	1.263	124	0.020	0.135
South/East	Music class	0.027	0.011	0.398	0.420	0.648	118	0.005	0.048
DPA	Music class	0.044	0.017	0.394	1.259	1.122	161	0.009	0.079
IPA	Music class	0.048	0.023	0.479	1.221	1.105	116	0.002	0.095
TPA	Music class	0.029	0.016	0.537	1.533	1.238	180	0.000	0.061
Primary or none	Music class	0.000	0.000	.	.	.	57	0.000	0.000
Secondary	Music class	0.032	0.014	0.442	1.572	1.254	254	0.004	0.060
Higher	Music class	0.067	0.022	0.334	1.215	1.102	146	0.022	0.111
Male	Music class	0.020	0.006	0.306	0.471	0.687	240	0.008	0.032
Female	Music class	0.063	0.021	0.333	1.547	1.244	217	0.021	0.105
Three or more	Music class	0.002	0.000	0.109	0.002	0.046	105	0.001	0.002
One or two	Music class	0.074	0.026	0.348	1.573	1.254	167	0.022	0.125
None	Music class	0.032	0.012	0.365	0.797	0.893	185	0.009	0.055
Poorest 60%	Extra classes	0.370	0.032	0.086	0.987	0.994	236	0.307	0.434
Richest 40%	Extra classes	0.448	0.030	0.067	0.831	0.912	221	0.388	0.508
Belgrade	Extra classes	0.485	0.058	0.119	1.270	1.127	94	0.369	0.601
Vojvodina	Extra classes	0.301	0.039	0.129	0.911	0.954	121	0.223	0.379
Sumadija	Extra classes	0.491	0.031	0.063	0.527	0.726	124	0.429	0.552
South/East	Extra classes	0.359	0.044	0.122	0.810	0.900	118	0.271	0.446
DPA	Extra classes	0.518	0.041	0.079	1.192	1.092	161	0.436	0.600

IPA	Extra classes	0.397	0.041	0.102	0.723	0.850	116	0.316	0.479
TPA	Extra classes	0.306	0.028	0.092	0.648	0.805	180	0.250	0.363
Primary or none	Extra classes	0.318	0.088	0.275	2.044	1.430	57	0.143	0.494
Secondary	Extra classes	0.334	0.028	0.082	0.836	0.914	254	0.279	0.389
Higher	Extra classes	0.564	0.036	0.063	0.789	0.889	146	0.492	0.635
Male	Extra classes	0.372	0.033	0.090	1.182	1.087	240	0.305	0.438
Female	Extra classes	0.453	0.036	0.080	1.094	1.046	217	0.381	0.526
Three or more	Extra classes	0.323	0.050	0.156	1.300	1.140	105	0.223	0.424
One or two	Extra classes	0.389	0.035	0.090	0.830	0.911	167	0.319	0.458
None	Extra classes	0.480	0.033	0.069	0.803	0.896	185	0.414	0.547
Extra classes — No	HDI	0.793	0.003	0.004	1.194	1.093	272	0.787	0.799
Extra classes — Yes	HDI	0.798	0.003	0.004	0.748	0.865	185	0.792	0.805
Extra classes — No	GNI	0.754	0.004	0.006	1.271	1.128	272	0.746	0.763
Extra classes — Yes	GNI	0.759	0.005	0.006	0.812	0.901	185	0.750	0.768
Extra classes — No	Life expectancy index	0.854	0.001	0.001	0.996	0.998	272	0.852	0.855
Extra classes — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.857	0.001	0.001	0.708	0.842	185	0.855	0.858
Extra classes — No	Education expectancy index	0.777	0.004	0.006	1.051	1.025	272	0.768	0.786
Extra classes — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.784	0.005	0.006	0.709	0.842	185	0.775	0.794
Poorest 60%	School sections and clubs	0.494	0.035	0.071	1.132	1.064	236	0.424	0.565
Richest 40%	School sections and clubs	0.596	0.037	0.062	1.277	1.130	221	0.523	0.670
Belgrade	School sections and clubs	0.592	0.060	0.102	1.420	1.192	94	0.472	0.712
Vojvodina	School sections and clubs	0.565	0.048	0.085	1.192	1.092	121	0.469	0.662
Sumadija	School sections and clubs	0.529	0.048	0.090	1.265	1.125	124	0.433	0.624
South/East	School sections and clubs	0.497	0.059	0.119	1.363	1.167	118	0.378	0.615
DPA	School sections and clubs	0.561	0.042	0.075	1.273	1.128	161	0.477	0.645
IPA	School sections and clubs	0.593	0.044	0.075	0.852	0.923	116	0.504	0.681
TPA	School sections and clubs	0.501	0.046	0.092	1.477	1.215	180	0.409	0.593
Primary or none	School sections and clubs	0.514	0.094	0.182	2.032	1.426	57	0.326	0.701
Secondary	School sections and clubs	0.513	0.035	0.068	1.198	1.094	254	0.443	0.582
Higher	School sections and clubs	0.610	0.039	0.064	0.964	0.982	146	0.532	0.687
Male	School sections and clubs	0.434	0.033	0.075	1.082	1.040	240	0.368	0.499
Female	School sections and clubs	0.678	0.034	0.050	1.097	1.048	217	0.610	0.746
Three or more	School sections and clubs	0.494	0.056	0.113	1.397	1.182	105	0.382	0.605
One or two	School sections and clubs	0.524	0.039	0.074	0.991	0.996	167	0.446	0.602
None	School sections and clubs	0.597	0.039	0.065	1.130	1.063	185	0.519	0.674
School sections and clubs — No	HDI	0.793	0.003	0.004	0.913	0.956	218	0.786	0.799
School sections and clubs — Yes	HDI	0.797	0.003	0.004	1.246	1.116	239	0.790	0.804
School sections and clubs — No	GNI	0.752	0.004	0.006	0.902	0.950	218	0.743	0.761
School sections and clubs — Yes	GNI	0.760	0.005	0.006	1.318	1.148	239	0.750	0.769
School sections and clubs — No	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	0.706	0.840	218	0.853	0.857
School sections and clubs — Yes	Life expectancy index	0.855	0.001	0.001	1.420	1.192	239	0.852	0.857
School sections and clubs — No	Education expectancy index	0.777	0.005	0.006	0.885	0.941	218	0.768	0.786
School sections and clubs — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.783	0.005	0.006	1.162	1.078	239	0.772	0.793

Poorest 60%	Remedial classes	0.270	0.027	0.099	0.823	0.907	236	0.217	0.324
Richest 40%	Remedial classes	0.226	0.028	0.126	1.054	1.027	221	0.169	0.283
Belgrade	Remedial classes	0.256	0.043	0.169	0.932	0.965	94	0.170	0.343
Vojvodina	Remedial classes	0.303	0.041	0.135	1.000	1.000	121	0.221	0.385
Sumadija	Remedial classes	0.194	0.034	0.176	1.026	1.013	124	0.126	0.263
South/East	Remedial classes	0.247	0.037	0.150	0.714	0.845	118	0.173	0.321
DPA	Remedial classes	0.189	0.029	0.156	0.998	0.999	161	0.130	0.248
IPA	Remedial classes	0.294	0.045	0.155	1.039	1.019	116	0.203	0.384
TPA	Remedial classes	0.282	0.033	0.116	0.916	0.957	180	0.217	0.347
Primary or none	Remedial classes	0.304	0.071	0.233	1.370	1.170	57	0.162	0.445
Secondary	Remedial classes	0.289	0.030	0.105	1.104	1.051	254	0.228	0.350
Higher	Remedial classes	0.162	0.026	0.162	0.774	0.880	146	0.109	0.214
Male	Remedial classes	0.282	0.028	0.099	0.960	0.980	240	0.226	0.338
Female	Remedial classes	0.208	0.028	0.133	0.966	0.983	217	0.153	0.263
Three or more	Remedial classes	0.259	0.046	0.178	1.238	1.113	105	0.167	0.351
One or two	Remedial classes	0.255	0.031	0.120	0.807	0.898	167	0.194	0.317
None	Remedial classes	0.236	0.033	0.140	1.091	1.045	185	0.170	0.302
Remedial classes — No	HDI	0.797	0.002	0.003	0.642	0.801	340	0.793	0.801
Remedial classes — Yes	HDI	0.797	0.005	0.006	1.017	1.008	117	0.788	0.806
Remedial classes — No	GNI	0.755	0.003	0.004	0.727	0.853	340	0.749	0.761
Remedial classes — Yes	GNI	0.760	0.006	0.008	0.970	0.985	117	0.748	0.772
Remedial classes — No	Education expectancy index	0.779	0.003	0.004	0.555	0.745	340	0.773	0.785
Remedial classes — Yes	Education expectancy index	0.782	0.007	0.009	1.013	1.007	117	0.768	0.796

Table SE.29: Sampling errors: Participation in school-related activities — adolescents aged 10–13 yearsStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deft*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deft</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Sports	0.027	0.013	0.467	0.943	0.971	147	0.002	0.052
Richest 40%	Sports	0.154	0.048	0.312	1.246	1.116	81	0.058	0.250
DPA	Sports	0.042	0.025	0.580	1.173	1.083	83	0.000	0.092
IPA	Sports	0.058	0.029	0.497	0.852	0.923	57	0.000	0.116
TPA	Sports	0.091	0.033	0.364	1.236	1.112	88	0.025	0.158
None	Sports	(0.051)	(0.035)	(0.677)	(0.945)	(0.972)	41	(0.000)	(0.121)
Primary	Sports	0.054	0.015	0.269	0.679	0.824	164	0.025	0.083
Secondary or higher	Sports	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	23	(*)	(*)
Male	Sports	0.104	0.031	0.297	1.302	1.141	126	0.042	0.165
Female	Sports	0.018	0.014	0.754	1.066	1.032	102	0.000	0.046
Three or more	Sports	0.042	0.015	0.347	0.990	0.995	185	0.013	0.072
One or two	Sports	0.155	0.067	0.432	1.025	1.012	29	0.021	0.288
None	Sports	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	14	(*)	(*)

Table SE.30: Sampling errors: Support for child learning at school — adolescents aged 10–13 yearsStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.776	0.034	0.044	1.527	1.236	236	0.708	0.844
Richest 40%	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.919	0.019	0.021	1.147	1.071	221	0.881	0.958
Belgrade	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.836	0.042	0.050	1.214	1.102	94	0.752	0.920
Vojvodina	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.846	0.032	0.038	1.024	1.012	121	0.781	0.911
Sumadija	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.890	0.032	0.036	1.461	1.209	124	0.826	0.954
South/East	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.801	0.054	0.068	1.806	1.344	118	0.692	0.910
DPA	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.895	0.028	0.031	1.434	1.198	161	0.840	0.950
IPA	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.813	0.037	0.045	0.919	0.959	116	0.740	0.886
TPA	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.820	0.040	0.049	1.884	1.373	180	0.741	0.900
Primary or none	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.722	0.095	0.131	2.578	1.606	57	0.533	0.911
Secondary	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.844	0.024	0.028	1.042	1.021	254	0.797	0.892
Higher	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.900	0.028	0.031	1.344	1.159	146	0.844	0.957
Male	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.850	0.024	0.028	1.127	1.062	240	0.802	0.898
Female	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.844	0.033	0.039	1.707	1.307	217	0.779	0.910
Three or more	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.772	0.056	0.073	2.024	1.423	105	0.659	0.884
One or two	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.845	0.032	0.038	1.298	1.139	167	0.781	0.910
None	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.897	0.026	0.029	1.298	1.139	185	0.845	0.948
Poorest 60%	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.705	0.035	0.050	1.354	1.164	236	0.634	0.775
Richest 40%	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.876	0.022	0.025	1.020	1.010	221	0.832	0.920
Belgrade	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.725	0.046	0.064	1.012	1.006	94	0.633	0.817
Vojvodina	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.783	0.037	0.047	1.027	1.013	121	0.709	0.858
Sumadija	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.871	0.032	0.037	1.295	1.138	124	0.806	0.936
South/East	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.747	0.053	0.071	1.431	1.196	118	0.642	0.853
DPA	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.822	0.029	0.035	0.984	0.992	161	0.765	0.879
IPA	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.775	0.043	0.055	1.100	1.049	116	0.690	0.861

TPA	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.767	0.040	0.052	1.572	1.254	180	0.686	0.847
Primary or none	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.614	0.090	0.147	1.973	1.405	57	0.434	0.794
Secondary	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.795	0.026	0.033	1.039	1.019	254	0.743	0.848
Higher	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.849	0.031	0.036	1.133	1.064	146	0.787	0.911
Male	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.789	0.026	0.033	0.983	0.991	240	0.738	0.841
Female	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.791	0.034	0.043	1.422	1.192	217	0.724	0.858
Three or more	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.677	0.056	0.083	1.621	1.273	105	0.565	0.789
One or two	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.793	0.034	0.043	1.170	1.082	167	0.724	0.862
None	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.858	0.029	0.033	1.206	1.098	185	0.801	0.915
Poorest 60%	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.819	0.034	0.041	1.752	1.324	236	0.751	0.886
Richest 40%	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.900	0.018	0.020	0.808	0.899	221	0.864	0.935
Belgrade	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.785	0.040	0.051	0.882	0.939	94	0.706	0.864
Vojvodina	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.814	0.032	0.039	0.840	0.916	121	0.750	0.877
Sumadija	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.930	0.028	0.030	1.614	1.270	124	0.875	0.985
South/East	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.889	0.059	0.066	3.394	1.842	118	0.771	1.000
DPA	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.887	0.022	0.025	0.835	0.914	161	0.843	0.931
IPA	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.852	0.031	0.036	0.786	0.887	116	0.791	0.914
TPA	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.835	0.042	0.050	2.212	1.487	180	0.752	0.918
Primary or none	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.753	0.099	0.131	3.037	1.743	57	0.555	0.951
Secondary	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.865	0.021	0.024	0.931	0.965	254	0.823	0.907
Higher	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.890	0.028	0.031	1.200	1.095	146	0.834	0.945
Male	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.870	0.022	0.025	1.060	1.030	240	0.827	0.914
Female	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.846	0.033	0.039	1.735	1.317	217	0.780	0.912
Three or more	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.799	0.054	0.068	2.047	1.431	105	0.690	0.907
One or two	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.853	0.029	0.034	1.106	1.052	167	0.795	0.912
None	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.902	0.022	0.025	1.012	1.006	185	0.857	0.946

Table SE.31: Sampling errors: Support for child learning at school — adolescents aged 10–13 yearsStandard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.621	0.049	0.079	1.599	1.264	147	0.523	0.719
Richest 40%	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.721	0.054	0.074	1.004	1.002	81	0.613	0.828
DPA	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.694	0.061	0.088	1.378	1.174	83	0.572	0.816
IPA	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.625	0.091	0.146	1.994	1.412	57	0.442	0.808
TPA	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.633	0.059	0.093	1.368	1.170	88	0.515	0.750
None	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	(0.551)	(0.081)	(0.147)	(1.016)	(1.008)	41	(0.389)	(0.713)
Primary	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.641	0.047	0.074	1.585	1.259	164	0.547	0.736
Secondary or higher	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.876	0.056	0.065	0.741	0.861	23	0.763	0.989
Male	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.618	0.052	0.084	1.445	1.202	126	0.514	0.721
Female	Familiar with decisions made by the Parents' Council	0.696	0.048	0.069	1.096	1.047	102	0.600	0.793
Poorest 60%	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.585	0.051	0.088	1.707	1.307	147	0.482	0.688
Richest 40%	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.707	0.052	0.074	0.925	0.962	81	0.603	0.812
DPA	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.682	0.058	0.085	1.226	1.107	83	0.566	0.799
IPA	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.580	0.088	0.152	1.793	1.339	57	0.403	0.757
TPA	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.598	0.066	0.110	1.664	1.290	88	0.467	0.730
None	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	(0.546)	(0.082)	(0.149)	(1.023)	(1.012)	41	(0.383)	(0.709)
Primary	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.609	0.050	0.081	1.693	1.301	164	0.510	0.709
Secondary or higher	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	23	(*)	(*)
Male	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.597	0.052	0.087	1.410	1.188	126	0.494	0.700
Female	Parents' Council discussed key education issues/school performance reports	0.656	0.053	0.081	1.254	1.120	102	0.550	0.763
Poorest 60%	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.491	0.056	0.114	1.968	1.403	147	0.379	0.603
Richest 40%	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.592	0.054	0.091	0.844	0.918	81	0.485	0.700
DPA	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.488	0.061	0.125	1.177	1.085	83	0.366	0.611

IPA	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.403	0.075	0.186	1.305	1.143	57	0.253	0.553
TPA	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.623	0.062	0.100	1.534	1.239	88	0.498	0.748
None	Attended school celebration or a sport event	(0.432)	(0.074)	(0.172)	(0.854)	(0.924)	41	(0.283)	(0.580)
Primary	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.547	0.044	0.081	1.294	1.138	164	0.459	0.636
Secondary or higher	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.498	0.126	0.252	1.602	1.266	23	0.247	0.750
Male	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.563	0.057	0.101	1.687	1.299	126	0.449	0.677
Female	Attended school celebration or a sport event	0.471	0.049	0.105	0.972	0.986	102	0.372	0.569

Table SE.32: Sampling errors: Perception of a better life — women aged 15–19Standard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Improved during the last one year	0.518	0.031	0.059	0.668	0.817	189	0.457	0.579
Richest 40%	Improved during the last one year	0.466	0.039	0.083	0.701	0.837	107	0.388	0.543
Belgrade	Improved during the last one year	(0.505)	(0.067)	(0.133)	(0.823)	(0.907)	39	(0.371)	(0.639)
Vojvodina	Improved during the last one year	0.461	0.041	0.090	0.745	0.863	99	0.378	0.543
Sumadija	Improved during the last one year	0.485	0.041	0.084	0.578	0.760	97	0.403	0.567
South/East	Improved during the last one year	0.583	0.057	0.098	0.735	0.857	61	0.468	0.697
DPA	Improved during the last one year	0.491	0.044	0.090	0.722	0.850	86	0.403	0.579
IPA	Improved during the last one year	(0.571)	(0.053)	(0.092)	(0.492)	(0.701)	42	(0.466)	(0.677)
TPA	Improved during the last one year	0.481	0.034	0.070	0.713	0.844	168	0.414	0.548
Primary or none	Improved during the last one year	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	19	(*)	(*)
Secondary	Improved during the last one year	0.460	0.026	0.056	0.587	0.766	226	0.408	0.511
Higher	Improved during the last one year	0.650	0.047	0.072	0.577	0.760	51	0.557	0.744
Three or more	Improved during the last one year	0.388	0.048	0.123	0.710	0.843	81	0.293	0.484
One or two	Improved during the last one year	0.537	0.042	0.079	0.860	0.928	116	0.452	0.622
None	Improved during the last one year	0.530	0.036	0.068	0.539	0.734	99	0.457	0.602
Poorest 60%	Will get better after one year	0.859	0.023	0.026	0.755	0.869	189	0.814	0.904
Richest 40%	Will get better after one year	0.852	0.010	0.012	0.090	0.300	107	0.833	0.872
Belgrade	Will get better after one year	(0.764)	(0.054)	(0.071)	(0.747)	(0.864)	39	(0.656)	(0.873)
Vojvodina	Will get better after one year	0.832	0.029	0.035	0.660	0.813	99	0.773	0.890
Sumadija	Will get better after one year	0.929	0.010	0.010	0.119	0.345	97	0.910	0.948
South/East	Will get better after one year	0.869	0.011	0.012	0.055	0.234	61	0.847	0.890
DPA	Will get better after one year	0.926	0.006	0.006	0.046	0.214	86	0.915	0.938
IPA	Will get better after one year	(0.851)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.190)	(0.436)	42	(0.804)	(0.898)
TPA	Will get better after one year	0.817	0.025	0.030	0.643	0.802	168	0.767	0.866
Primary or none	Will get better after one year	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	19	(*)	(*)
Secondary	Will get better after one year	0.837	0.015	0.018	0.372	0.610	226	0.806	0.867
Higher	Will get better after one year	0.912	0.031	0.034	0.708	0.841	51	0.851	0.974
Three or more	Will get better after one year	0.873	0.033	0.038	0.740	0.860	81	0.807	0.940
One or two	Will get better after one year	0.900	0.017	0.018	0.366	0.605	116	0.867	0.934
None	Will get better after one year	0.794	0.022	0.028	0.307	0.554	99	0.749	0.838

Table SE.33: Sampling errors: Perception of a better life — women aged 15–19Standard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
Poorest 60%	Improved during the last one year	0.423	0.040	0.094	1.392	1.180	213	0.343	0.503
Richest 40%	Improved during the last one year	0.478	0.048	0.100	1.002	1.001	110	0.383	0.574
Belgrade	Improved during the last one year	0.637	0.080	0.125	1.583	1.258	60	0.478	0.797
Vojvodina	Improved during the last one year	0.407	0.084	0.206	1.951	1.397	57	0.239	0.574
Sumadija	Improved during the last one year	(0.685)	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.080)	(0.284)	27	(0.636)	(0.733)
South/East	Improved during the last one year	0.347	0.038	0.110	1.077	1.038	179	0.270	0.423
DPA	Improved during the last one year	0.502	0.050	0.099	1.107	1.052	121	0.403	0.602
IPA	Improved during the last one year	0.333	0.059	0.177	1.255	1.120	82	0.215	0.450
TPA	Improved during the last one year	0.457	0.055	0.120	1.582	1.258	120	0.347	0.567
None	Improved during the last one year	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	10	(*)	(*)
Primary	Improved during the last one year	0.411	0.035	0.084	1.068	1.034	218	0.342	0.480
Secondary or higher	Improved during the last one year	0.501	0.063	0.126	1.516	1.231	95	0.375	0.627
Three or more	Improved during the last one year	0.443	0.035	0.079	1.413	1.188	284	0.373	0.514
One or two	Improved during the last one year	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	21	(*)	(*)
None	Improved during the last one year	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	18	(*)	(*)
Poorest 60%	Will get better after one year	0.860	0.022	0.026	0.878	0.937	213	0.815	0.905
Richest 40%	Will get better after one year	0.878	0.034	0.038	1.150	1.072	110	0.811	0.946
Belgrade	Will get better after one year	0.902	0.024	0.027	0.382	0.618	60	0.853	0.950
Vojvodina	Will get better after one year	0.820	0.033	0.040	0.492	0.702	57	0.754	0.886
Sumadija	Will get better after one year	(0.911)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.246)	(0.496)	27	(0.859)	(0.963)
South/East	Will get better after one year	0.865	0.029	0.034	1.242	1.114	179	0.806	0.924
DPA	Will get better after one year	0.865	0.025	0.029	0.592	0.770	121	0.815	0.915
IPA	Will get better after one year	0.921	0.027	0.029	0.801	0.895	82	0.867	0.975
TPA	Will get better after one year	0.834	0.033	0.040	1.018	1.009	120	0.768	0.900
None	Will get better after one year	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	10	(*)	(*)
Primary	Will get better after one year	0.875	0.023	0.026	1.066	1.033	218	0.829	0.921
Secondary or higher	Will get better after one year	0.839	0.034	0.040	0.797	0.893	95	0.771	0.906
Three or more	Will get better after one year	0.873	0.018	0.021	0.818	0.904	284	0.837	0.909
One or two	Will get better after one year	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	21	(*)	(*)
None	Will get better after one year	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	(*)	18	(*)	(*)

Table SE.34: Sampling errors: Education of parents — higher education — adolescents aged 10–19Standard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia 2014 and 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
2019									
DPA	Mother — higher education	0.480	0.036	0.075	2.587	1.609	486	0.408	0.552
IPA	Mother — higher education	0.238	0.034	0.142	1.965	1.402	312	0.170	0.305
TPA	Mother — higher education	0.146	0.021	0.141	2.227	1.492	665	0.105	0.188
Belgrade	Mother — higher education	0.527	0.045	0.086	2.437	1.561	292	0.436	0.618
Vojvodina	Mother — higher education	0.229	0.032	0.138	2.450	1.565	375	0.165	0.292
Sumadija	Mother — higher education	0.191	0.038	0.196	3.783	1.945	406	0.116	0.267
South/East	Mother — higher education	0.232	0.026	0.110	1.174	1.084	390	0.181	0.283
DPA	Father — higher education	0.352	0.030	0.086	1.982	1.408	486	0.291	0.412
IPA	Father — higher education	0.168	0.034	0.202	2.563	1.601	312	0.100	0.235
TPA	Father — higher education	0.104	0.016	0.152	1.754	1.324	665	0.072	0.136
Belgrade	Father — higher education	0.363	0.036	0.100	1.673	1.293	292	0.291	0.436

Vojvodina	Father — higher education	0.179	0.030	0.166	2.591	1.610	375	0.119	0.238
Sumadija	Father — higher education	0.140	0.027	0.189	2.428	1.558	406	0.087	0.193
South/East	Father — higher education	0.163	0.025	0.154	1.478	1.216	390	0.113	0.214
2014									
DPA	Mother — higher education	0.289	0.037	0.127	2.950	1.718	424	0.216	0.362
IPA	Mother — higher education	0.228	0.036	0.160	2.933	1.713	406	0.155	0.300
TPA	Mother — higher education	0.110	0.019	0.173	2.365	1.538	649	0.072	0.148
Belgrade	Mother — higher education	0.284	0.050	0.178	3.445	1.856	257	0.183	0.385
Vojvodina	Mother — higher education	0.187	0.031	0.165	2.428	1.558	412	0.125	0.248
Sumadija	Mother — higher education	0.155	0.028	0.177	2.507	1.583	436	0.100	0.210
South/East	Mother — higher education	0.186	0.031	0.164	2.328	1.526	374	0.125	0.247
DPA	Father — higher education	0.280	0.037	0.131	3.023	1.739	424	0.206	0.354
IPA	Father — higher education	0.130	0.023	0.180	1.882	1.372	406	0.083	0.177
TPA	Father — higher education	0.104	0.020	0.194	2.785	1.669	649	0.064	0.145
Belgrade	Father — higher education	0.170	0.040	0.234	3.071	1.753	257	0.091	0.249
Vojvodina	Father — higher education	0.142	0.031	0.221	3.154	1.776	412	0.079	0.205
Sumadija	Father — higher education	0.153	0.029	0.191	2.867	1.693	436	0.094	0.211
South/East	Father — higher education	0.197	0.030	0.150	2.081	1.442	374	0.138	0.256

Table SE.34: Sampling errors: Education of parents — higher education — adolescents aged 10–19Standard errors, coefficients of variation, design effects (*deff*), square root of design effects (*deff*), and confidence intervals for selected indicators, Serbia Roma settlements 2019

		Value (<i>r</i>)	Standard error (<i>se</i>)	Coefficient of variation (<i>se/r</i>)	Design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Square root of design effect (<i>deff</i>)	Unweighted count	Confidence limits	
								Lower bound $r - 2se$	Upper bound $r + 2se$
DPA	Mother — secondary or higher education	0.108	0.028	0.263	3.458	1.860	462	0.051	0.165
IPA	Mother — secondary or higher education	0.070	0.018	0.258	1.666	1.291	331	0.034	0.107
TPA	Mother — secondary or higher education	0.067	0.013	0.190	1.290	1.136	448	0.042	0.093
Belgrade	Mother — secondary or higher education	0.106	0.046	0.438	5.153	2.270	259	0.013	0.198
Vojvodina	Mother — secondary or higher education	0.071	0.016	0.218	0.975	0.988	223	0.040	0.102
Sumadija	Mother — secondary or higher education	0.157	0.041	0.260	1.495	1.223	123	0.075	0.238
South/East	Mother — secondary or higher education	0.063	0.011	0.181	1.378	1.174	636	0.040	0.086
DPA	Father — higher education or higher education	0.120	0.024	0.203	2.307	1.519	462	0.071	0.168
IPA	Father — higher education or higher education	0.134	0.028	0.211	2.274	1.508	331	0.077	0.190
TPA	Father — higher education or higher education	0.119	0.027	0.222	3.331	1.825	448	0.066	0.173
Belgrade	Father — higher education or higher education	0.087	0.026	0.302	1.992	1.411	259	0.035	0.140
Vojvodina	Father — higher education or higher education	0.115	0.040	0.345	4.145	2.036	223	0.036	0.195
Sumadija	Father — higher education or higher education	0.127	0.026	0.206	0.735	0.857	123	0.074	0.179
South/East	Father — higher education or higher education	0.139	0.020	0.143	2.059	1.435	636	0.100	0.179



**INEQUALITY IN THE
LIVES OF ADOLESCENTS
IN SERBIA**